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ABSTRACT 
 To what extent does language policy affect or have an impact on the quality of 
democracy? In third wave democracies of sub-Saharan Africa, a diglossic language 
policy—the type of policy that organizes the languages of the community in an 
asymmetrical manner, in which the language of the former colonial power assumes 
political and social predominance—constitutes a powerful hindrance to engaging 
citizenship. Such a policy perpetuates the linguistic divide between the state and society. 
Subsequently, ordinary citizens’ political departicipation ensues, with serious 
consequences on the quality of democracy. 
Deriving from the data gathered in Praia, Cape Verde, through a combination of 
archival research, informed direct and focus groups interviews, during summers of 2010 
and 2011, I argue that diglossic language policy limits the quality of democracy by way 
of lower classes’ diminished surveillatory and initiatory political participation. Diglossic 
language policy creates and reinforces a state that is linguistically detached from society. 
The state, as such, is illegible to the non-high language speakers, who may find it very 
difficult to follow its operations, procedures, and processes. Ultimately, state illegibility 
  viii 
breeds low levels of surveillatory participation on the part of non-high language speakers. 
Inability to “read” the state translates into failure to properly supervise it.  
At the same time, initiatory political participation, the entering and engaging in 
political discussion and deliberation with peers or state agents, is also constrained. This 
state of affairs derives from: a) inaudibility, the notion that political communication in the 
vernacular is of less value; and b) ridicule, the idea that to speak the high language 
incorrectly is to succumb to public derision, a condition that invalidates the message.    
 In the final analysis, diglossic language policy preserves the divide between elite 
and masses, whereby the latter participation in politics is limited to voting. While it 
creates the conditions for political effervescence at the top, through elite pluralism and 
competition, the Schumpeterian elite democracy freezes the bottom. Given the limited 
forms of political participation of ordinary citizens, states with diglossic language policy, 
such as Cape Verde, should not be considered quality democracies.    
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CHAPTER ONE: THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY AND LANGUAGE 
POLICY 
 
 
On October 13
th
, 2011, in “Conserva em Dia,” a television talk show from Cape Verde’s 
national television channel that focuses on current social and political issues, the topic of 
the day was fisheries and their social, economic and environmental impact. On that 
episode, three individuals whose livelihood and professional life revolved around the 
question of fisheries were invited as guest speakers and commentators: Esperança 
Riviera, representing a network of artisanal fisheries community-based organizations (the 
Rede Organizações Profissionais de Pesca Artesanal), Rafael Menezes, the president of a 
local fishermen association, (Associação Armadores Pescadores e Peixeira Praia Santa 
Maria), and Óscar Melício, president  of the National Institute for the Development of 
Fisheries (INDP), an autonomous state agency.  
In linguistic terms, that day’s show was characterized by code-switching, that is, 
the alternating between two languages, the Cape Verdean language
1
, the national 
language of the country, spoken by all, and the Portuguese language, the official language 
of the state and the language of prestige and social status. Between the anchorwoman and 
Esperança Riveira and Oscar Melício, Portuguese was the language of communication. 
                                                        
1
 I prefer the term Cape Verdean language to Cape Verdean Creole—though the speakers of the language 
often refer to the language simply as “Creole.” The latter is ideologically charged and may negatively in the 
analysis that is to be conducted. For instance, as noted by Louis-Jean Calvet, “the term creole tends to 
designate quite simply something that one does not wish to call a language.” See Louis-Jean Calvet, 
Towards an Ecology of World Languages (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 174 (added italics). 
  
  
2 
However, the Cape Verdean language was the choice for communication between the 
reporter and Rafael Menezes. The linguistic choice is, in itself, an indication, or a marker, 
of social status and level of formal education.  
 Right at the beginning of the show, when Mr. Menezes was first given the 
opportunity to speak, and after thanking them inviting him, he went on to state, “I would 
like if each one of us, who could speak in [Cape Verdean] Creole, to speak in that 
language, for there are fishermen, there are our colleagues who…do not have much 
formal education…and who want to understand the easiest words [in order for us to have] 
not a beautiful show but something that [the fishermen] understands.”2 Responding in 
Portuguese, the anchorwoman stated that “[a]bout the language question, our show is 
made for not only to the fishermen but to all Cape Verdeans who are watching us and 
those who live abroad who speak Portuguese. Thus, the rule of the show has always been 
Portuguese, Creole. There is no problem here.” The anchorwoman simply did not get the 
point: Mr. Menezes wanted to amplify the realm of the participants in this public debate. 
Mr. Menezes, as representing a social stratum with high stakes in the issue of fisheries, 
wanted to include the fishermen, by eliminating any need for intermediary elements in 
this debate. If the debate was all in the national language, the local fishermen would more 
easily get the gist of what the commentators were saying about something on which their 
livelihood depends. Mr. Menezes, as the president of the local fishermen association, 
seemed to have been primarily interested in opening the content of the debate to his 
                                                        
2
   Converça em Dia, “O Impacto Social e Económica da Pesca,” Televisão de Cabo Verde, October 13, 
2011, http://www.rtc.cv/index.php?paginas=47&id_cod=12881&nome_programa= 
Conversa%20em%20Dia&data=2011-10-13&codigo=ced (accessed July 13, 2012). This and other 
translations by the autor.  
  
3 
fellow colleagues. In so doing the public debate would have included ordinary citizens 
from different aspects of life, particularly those with rudimentary knowledge and skills in 
the Portuguese language. 
 The situation is a good illustration of the extent that language policy, in its de 
facto and de jure character, serves as an instrument to restrict the number of participants 
in the public debate, curtailing ordinary citizens’ chances for further political education. 
That day’s show is also an interesting example of what I call the politics of inaudibility. 
In spite of being a national language, spoken throughout the country—and by the Cape 
Verdean diaspora throughout the Atlantic World—the vernacular language is yet to be 
recognized as respectable idiom to be used in the official public sphere, including in the 
media. The concept of politics of inaudibility, as I see it, is linked to political exclusion. 
This is to say that the voice of the ordinary citizens, who are not proficient or skillful in 
the official language of the country, the Portuguese language, are often unheard. 
 Political activists, thinkers and community leaders across the planet are now 
arguing for the opening of the ordinary citizens’ channels of political participation in the 
conduct and management of the public affairs of their respective states. In the past few 
decades, it has become quite common to watch in the news ordinary citizens’ social 
movements, whether protesting, rioting or confronting the forces of security. The so-
called “Arab Spring” when ordinary citizens flocked to the streets leading to regime 
changes in Tunisia and Egypt, and the recent mass urban protests in Brazil, motivated by 
the country’s chronic high levels of state corruption and poor services, or individual 
actions of state employees to reveal state secrets, as in the case of Edward Snowden, are 
  
4 
indications that the average citizens seek not only to reclaim a venue of actual 
participation in the political affairs but also to do whatever towards the objective.
3
  
 Protests and other forms of contentious politics are the last resort mechanisms at 
disposal of ordinary citizens to force an entrance into politics.
4
 These mechanisms are 
often used when all other available forms are exhausted. People choose these 
mechanisms of participation, in great part, because the socio-political institutional 
arrangement does not provide channels for the real and effective partaking in the 
management of public business. Language policy, this dissertation argues, is one of the 
many established socio-political institutions that can effectively limit or prevent ordinary 
citizens’ engaging political participation.  
This doctoral dissertation is a study of the quality of democracy.
5
 The primary 
assumption of this dissertation is that the quality of democracy is directly and intimately 
linked to the question of public participation in the political affairs of their respective 
polities. As such, this dissertation stresses that more and better political participation 
breeds more and better democracy—beyond electoral democracy. As a scholarly 
discussion of politics in an African context, it critically departs from the superficial and 
                                                        
3
 See, among others, F. Gregory Gause,  “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of 
Authoritarian Stability,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 81-90; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the 
Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 
44, no. 2 (2012): 127-149; A. Saad-Filho, “Mass Protests Under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 
2013,” Critical Sociology  39, 5 (2013): 657-669; Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, 
the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State (New York, NY : Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2014).    
4
 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge 
[England]: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
5
 The topic of the quality of democracy, in spite of being recently developed, is quite vibrant. Recent 
studies of the quality of democracy includes Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullel, and Osvaldo 
Miguel Iazzetta, The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications (Notre Dame, Ind: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2004); Larry Jay Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, Assessing the Quality of Democracy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Gerardo L. Munck, 2014. “What Is Democracy? A 
Reconceptualization of the Quality of Democracy,” Democratization (2014): 1-26.   
  
5 
shallow understanding of what constitutes a democracy. The quality of democracy is 
something that increases with the quantity and quality of citizens’ participation. If 
democracy is, as the etymology implies, “the rule of the people,” then citizens must act in 
all different forms and stages of government, from the debate on policies, to its making 
and implementation. What ultimately increases the quality of democracy is the intensity 
and extensity of citizen participation.  
One of the basilar arguments of this doctoral dissertation is that language policy 
that reinforces the social dominance of a language that is alien to a great majority of the 
people in effect limits the intensity and extent of political participation. When the state 
and the social and political elite maintain a language, derived from the colonial 
experience, as the main—if not the only—language of public administration, education, 
judicial matters, and media, the political outcome often alienates the great majority of the 
people. A linguistic wall is created around the state that makes it impenetrable to the 
ordinary, vernacular language speakers. Effective political participation in the realms of 
public debate, policy making and implementation, as such, is drastically reduced.  
This doctoral dissertation makes a theoretical contribution about the study of 
democracy and the state. It brings forth the concept of the “illegible state,” that is, the fact 
that the public institutions and personnel are often not properly supervised by the general 
population as they live in two distinct linguistic communities. In other words, the state’s 
main vehicle of formal (and often informal) communication is a language that a sizeable 
percentage of its population either does not understand or has only a rudimentary 
  
6 
understanding of it. This linguistic situation (or diglossia), I argue, curtails political 
participation—in its different forms.  
Limiting political participation to electoral activity ultimately results in 
concomitant freezing of the quality of democracy. Therefore, this dissertation does not 
accept the argument proposed by many scholars, such as Staffan Lindberg, who argue 
that quality of democracy increases with the number of free and fair elections held.
6
 
Successive elections, if not accompanied by opening of other non-electoral fields of 
political participation, may simply lead to elite democracy.  
 Effective democracy is about minimizing, or even totally removing, the obstacles 
to political engagement. In other words, an effectively democratic regime is the one that 
frees all the structural, institutional and cultural impediments that often block citizens 
from partaking in the whole processes of choosing the composition of the government as 
well as the outcomes—in kind and degree—that should derive from these authorities.7 
Non-participation in an effectively democratic society should be the realm of purely 
individual choice. That is to say that personal preference is to be only element that should 
make individuals to refrain from active participation in the whole political business.   
There are a myriad of real and potential obstacles to effective political 
participation. Social class, level of education, availability of resources such as time 
and/or money, having or not having  public skills such as capacity to public speech, 
geographic location, age, mental capacity, language policy, and so on, are some 
                                                        
6
 Staffan I. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006).  
7
 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). 
  
7 
important factors that may hinder effective and engaging citizenship.
8
  This dissertation 
focuses on one of these real obstacles to full participation in politics, namely language 
policy. Institutional and social practices, dictated from the state, may curtail or limit the 
ordinary’s citizen political participation. This means that we must look at two interrelated 
things. On the one hand, the state policies that describe, dictate and enforce which 
language(s) are to be used in official domains and/or as the medium to certain functions 
(e.g., public education, the realm of state bureaucracy, and so). On the other hand, the 
social practices and policies that overemphasize one language (or a group of languages) 
as prestigious and a symbol of status and social distinction, constitute powerful obstacles 
to ordinary citizens’ political participation.  The set of government-sanctioned policies 
that mandate and define the domains in which some languages are to be used—often at 
the expense of others—coupled with the social practices that emphasize one or more 
languages as prestigious, and, ipso facto, the language of modernity, science and public 
debate, have a significant impact in overall willingness and capacity of ordinary citizen to 
actively participate in the political affairs of the polity.    
 This dissertation focuses on the impact of language policy on the level of political 
participation. Two main reasons have dictated the focus on language policy. First, the 
                                                        
8
 Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case 
Study of Uganda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, 
and Sidney Verba, “The Public Consequences of Private Inequality: Family Life and Citizen 
Participation,” The American Political Science Review 91, 2 (1997): 373-389; Michael Parkin and Frances 
Zlotnick, “English Proficiency and Latino Participation in U.S. Elections,” Politics & Policy 39, 4 (2011): 
515-537; Kay Lehman Schlozman, Nancy Burns, Sidney Verba, and Jesse Donahue, “Gender and Citizen 
Participation: Is There a Different Voice?,” American Journal of Political Science 39, 2 (1995): 267-293; 
Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastián Valenzuela, “Social Media Use for News and 
Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political Participation,” Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 17, 3 (2012): 319-336.  
  
8 
theme has received little attention within the field of political science in general and 
comparative politics in particular. There are only a few political scientists who have 
analyzed the language question as a variable that helps us understand democratic 
experiences.
9
 While it does not aspire to establish a “linguistic turn” in political science, 
this doctoral thesis goes along the lines of taking language policy very seriously if one is 
to understand and grasp the whole processes and operations of politics.  
Second, around the globe political communities have been split along the lines of 
official language speaking elite and the local and indigenous languages speaking masses. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in sub-Saharan Africa. While the actual percentage of 
fluent speakers of English, French and Portuguese is relatively small, these languages are 
the official language of the state, education, public administration and the symbol of high 
social status. The study of political implications of language policy choices constitutes, 
thus, an attempt to address a real-life problem, for it behooves social sciences to limit its 
comfortable presence in the ivory tower and be in contact with the reality.  
 One of the main focuses of this dissertation, as mentioned above, is language 
policy. With an eye on language policy, this doctoral dissertation seeks to explain why 
the great majority of people do not engage in or involve themselves in certain types and 
forms of political participation. To understand the processes and hindrances to full 
political participation is, in itself, a strategy to redress the situation.  To find the cure for 
                                                        
9
 Brian Weinstein, The Civic Tongue: Political Consequences of Language Choices (New York: Longman, 
1983); David D. Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge [England]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); David D. Laitin, Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali 
Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977);  Ali AlʼAmin Mazrui and Alamin M. Mazrui, 
Political Culture of Language: Swahili, Society and the State (Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute of Global 
Culture Studies (IGCS), Binghamton University, the State University of New York, 1999). 
  
9 
the disease one must first understand the disease. If democracy is to be a system in which 
citizens are “omnipresent” and can have their interests and dislikes heard throughout the 
whole processes of policy making and implementation, one must start by looking at the 
language situation.  
 
Literature Review 
A quality democracy cannot be disassociated from ordinary citizens’ engaging political 
participation. Ultimately, a democracy is to be measured as “good” or as “bad” if citizens 
are—or are not—participating in different stages of the election of government, policy 
making, and policy implementation. The literature review that follows weaves the notions 
of political participation with that of the quality of democracy.   
A branch of democratic studies that stretches back to the 1940s maintains that 
quality democracy to be inversely correlated with general masses’ political participation. 
In other words, the less the intensity and extension of political participation translates in a 
quality democracy. Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 book, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, a statement about an elitist theory of democracy, argues that democracy is a 
political method whereby competitive elites fight for people’s vote.10  Democracy is a 
“method” of seeking power—through popular cast votes. Schumpeter writes that:   
“[d]emocracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional 
arrangements for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions 
and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will 
produce under given historical conditions.”11 
 
                                                        
10
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950). 
11
 Ibid., 242 (emphasis in the original). 
  
10 
Democracy is fundamentally about a process of “arriving at decisions.”12 That is to say, 
democracy is an “institutional arrangement that would place decision-making power in 
the hands of a few individuals who had attained the confidence of the people.”13 People's 
participation is restricted to “accepting or refusing the men [sic] who are to rule them.”14 
Once politicians are voted into power, the citizens are to return to the comfort of private 
lives, for they have fulfilled their democratic duty. This means that the process of public 
policy, the output of the government, is to be left to the experts and professional 
politicians. Accordingly, common citizens, lacking education, social and technical skills, 
simply cannot interfere in this rather tricky and complicated business. Moreover, 
evidence was lacking that the common people “hold a definite and rational opinion about 
every individual question.”15 Schumpeter, therefore, is calling for a technocratic order, a 
political system whereby a government of experts exercises full and unrestrained control 
over policies and system outputs.
16
   
For Schumpeter democracy exists when two conditions are met: first, there is a 
pluralism among the elite, who compete for access to power, and, second, the common 
citizens are called, from time to time, to pronounce about what section of the elite should 
be put in authority over them. Uncontrolled, unguided, and unrestrained political 
participation by the common citizens may ultimately lead to democratic breakdown. For 
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Schumpeter less citizenship, measured in terms of minimal engagement in politics, 
translates, therefore, into better democracy.  
 What I call the “Schumpeter’s legacy” made—and still makes—an impact on 
scholarship on democracy. This Schumpeter legacy is divided into two major pillars, 
namely the centrality of elections as the defining element of democracy and limited 
participation of the general citizens in politics. The Schumpeterian legacy can be 
understood as the fear that increased political participation by the general masses may 
undermine political stability and ultimately leading to political crises and breakdown.
17
 
Thus, the fear of the illiberal masses whose entrance in politics would cause either 
democratic decay or political decay, is the condition for democratic elitism.  
 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in their now-classical study The Civic 
Culture, echo Schumpeter, when they argued that the called pre-modern political cultures 
were not conducive to active civic and political engagement.
18
 The book is a statement 
about a culturalist approach of political science. To these two political scientists, 
parochial political culture tends to dominate politics in the developing world. For this 
reason, political regimes in these new states were to be controlled. Echoing Schumpeter, 
Almond and Verba state that “[i]n all societies, of course, the making of specific 
decisions is concentrated in the hands of very few people. Neither the ordinary citizen 
nor ‘public opinion’ can make policy.”19  Almond and Verba, like many other 
modernization theorists, are agreeing to the fact that political life is a two-tiered scheme: 
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the elite and the ordinary citizens, those with decision-making powers and the 
constructors of policy that affect the whole polity and the group of people over which the 
former exercises command authority.
20
  
Robert Dahl is another central name in the empirical study of democracy. Dahl 
renovated the Schumpeterian notion of democracy. Though Dahl’s ideas have evolved 
over time, an “essential continuity” in his theory of democracy can be discerned.21 
Democracy, according to Dahl, is but a principle that political communities should strive 
to reach. Empirically, human communities are far removed to that principle. Thus, he 
opts for the concept of polyarchy when dealing with the empirical study of democracy.
22
 
Polyarchy is defined as a political system sustained by two pillars: opposition (among 
plural elites) and participation (through electoral involvement of the citizens).  
Dahl’s earliest writings on democracy, as other writers of the same period, do not 
emphasize or highlight political participation by common citizens. His views were that no 
contradiction could be found between a democratic regime and limited or even 
nonparticipation. His conceptualization of democracy was fundamentally Schumpeterian, 
based on the notion that it was a method, a process of reaching political decisions. In his 
own words, Dahl considers that:  
What we call ‘democracy’—that is, a system of decision-making in which leaders 
are more or less responsive to the preferences of nonleaders—does seem to 
operate with a relatively low level of citizen participation. Hence it is inaccurate 
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to say that one of the necessary conditions for ‘democracy’ is extensive citizen 
participation.
23
 
 
Democracy is primarily about competition among the elites. Dahl's political 
elitism was centered on the notion that outputs from the system can be reached without or 
minimal participation from the general populace. He is rather skeptical about positive 
political contribution of the common citizens, chiefly those occupying the lower 
socioeconomic ladder. In A Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl is quite clear in 
condescending view vis-à-vis the poor citizens: “current evidence suggests that in the 
United States the lower one's socioeconomic class, the more authoritarian one's 
predisposition [...].”24 This idea that the lower classes of the society are essentially anti-
democratic and tends to be predisposed to authoritarianism stems from Schumpeter's own 
analysis, as noted above.
25
 It follows that ordinary citizens’ political participation must be 
limited—lest that “an increase in political activity [of lower socioeconomic classes] 
brings the authoritarian-minded into the political arena.”26  
According to Dahl, efficient and high-quality political decisions and public 
policies result mainly from elite bargaining and negotiation. The elite know what is best 
for the polity. In a way, Dahl places much emphasis on stability of the system as a 
whole.
27
 Strong political institutionalization precedes massification of politics.  Stated 
differently, there is the assumption that ordinary citizens’ autonomous and qualitative 
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participation in politics may ultimately create a tremendous pressure onto the system as 
whole, which eventually would lead to a political crisis. Dahl, thus, writes that “[i]n the 
future as in the past then, stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result 
from rather slow evolutionary process than from the revolutionary overthrow of existing 
hegemonies.”28  
By the 1970s, political participation became a major theme in political science. 
Two main strands have developed in studies of political participation. First, there are 
those who take a normative approach to the phenomenon. Carole Pateman and Benjamin 
Barber are perhaps the most known and widely cited representatives of this approach.
29
 
While this dissertation is not about political theory, a brief comment on their work is 
warranted here. Pateman’s book is essentially a response to Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist 
conceptualization of democracy. As shown below, Schumpeter claims that that 
democracy is about the political elites competing for votes—not more than that.30 
Pateman’s case is a defense of a participatory theory of democracy. Against democratic 
elitism, Pateman contends that participation reinforces—rather than provoking decay 
of—democratic institutions.31 Barber’s Strong Democracy is a critique of liberal 
democracy, whose main pillar is individualism. His conclusion is that participatory 
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democracy is superior to what he terms “thin democracy” (that is, liberal democracy), 
given the fact that excess liberalism tramples democratic institutions.
32
 
 On the other hand, there are those who seek to understand political participation 
from the empirical point of view. The study of democracy became a study of the logic of 
participation and the goal was to learn the extent that participation caused more 
democracy.  Sherry Arnestein may well be one of the first to write on the subject. In her 
article “A ladder of citizen participation,” Arnstein analyzes different degrees of political 
participation.
33
 She proposes a ladder of seven different degrees, which are then grouped 
into three major types of political participation:  nonparticipation (manipulation and 
therapy), tokenism (informing, consultation, and placation) and citizen control 
(partnership, delegation, and citizen control). The basic point of the model is that 
citizen’s degree of decision-making clout increases as we move upward in the ladder. 
Thus, in the first two instances (manipulation and therapy), citizens do not effectively and 
engagingly participate in politics. Rather, the objective is “to enable powerholders to 
‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants.”34  As we move upward in the ladder, “increasing 
degree of decision making clout” is attached to citizens.35 
While modernization theorists were rather wary of the masses’ participation in 
politics, they sought to elaborate theories that explain and prescribe active political 
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activities. Myron Weiner’s 1971 book chapter may be one of the first theoretically 
comprehensive reports on the subfield of political participation. Political Participation 
was defined as a citizen-based channel to either demonstrate their support for and/or to 
demand upon the government.
36
 Political participation is limited to the actions that are 
conducted within the limits provided by the laws. Violent forms of political participation 
(such as rebellion, revolution) are excluded as it would be contrary to the core of 
democratic practices and value—mainly that of stability and rule of law. Political 
changes, even if good, made as the outcome of violent participation may be 
counterproductive in the long run, as it may inaugurate the precedence that violence can 
be used as a tool to change—while the strengths should be used for change within the 
legal framework. Political participation also understood as the medium to influence the 
actions of the state bureaucracy (unelected officials).
37
   
 In the early 1970s, as the USA was going through a lot of grassroots political 
engagement and mass protest movements, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie sought to 
explain what accounts for political participation.
38
 The authors define political 
participation as “acts that aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the 
choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government 
personnel.”39 The authors’ key objectives are to learn about the participants in social 
movements and the motives that make them actively enter into politics. They basically 
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conclude that the social economic forces influence who partakes in politics. This is the 
called socio-economic status model (SES), according to which the higher the socio-
economic status of one individual the more participation in political life of the 
community.  Later comparative research conducted on the topic by these authors 
concluded that the SES model varies across different states.
40
 
 Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson’s study of political participation in the 
developing world is another valuable analysis. They start their book by noting that 
“[b]roadening political participation is a hallmark of political modernization,” and they 
define political participation as any “activity by private citizens designed to influence 
government decision-making.”41 Political participation is the dependent variable of their 
study and the objective of the investigation is “to shed some light on how various 
changes associated with modernization affect patterns of participation.”42 
 More recently, Verba and others revisited the topic and brought newer and fresher 
perspectives.
43
 The understanding of political participation is approached by turning it 
upside down. The authors’ main goal is to create a theory that explains why some people 
fail to take part in politics. They contend that three main reasons keep people outside of 
politics: inability (“because they can’t”), unwillingness (“because they don’t want”) and 
being ignored by active participants (“because nobody asked”). Political participation, as 
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proposed by Verba et al., results from the available resources (time, money and civic 
skills) at the possession of the individual.   
 In spite of new directions of the study of democracy, the same idea of democracy 
as a political system based on electoral participation nonetheless maintained. Scholars 
who study democratic transition did not depart as much from Schumpeterian democracy. 
Take for instance the seminal work of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter.44 
For these two authors, a fundamental feature of regime transition in Southern Europe and 
Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s was the employment of the political pacts. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter recognize the undemocratic characteristics of pacts when they 
write that “they are typically negotiated among a small number of participants 
representing established (and often highly oligarchical) groups or institutions [and] they 
seek to limit accountability to wider publics.”45  Similarly, Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and 
Seymour Lipset’s characterization of democracy are basically minimalist: competition, 
electoral participation and civil and political liberties.
46
 
A point that one must make reference to is whether more participation leads to 
better governance and/or provision of public goods. In other words, the extent that the 
“invasion” of the political sphere by the average citizen leads to better political solutions 
and a quality democracy.  
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The reduction of democracy to electoral participation is particularly visible among 
large N comparativists. This minimalist definition of democracy is based on the notion 
that a state is democratic provided that the political leadership is chosen via competitive 
elections. According to Adam Przeworski, democracy is not more than “a system in 
which parties lose elections.”47 After all, elections are easily observable and measurable 
political phenomenon at disposal of the political scientists. Samuel Huntingon’s study of 
what he termed the third wave of democratization fully embraces Schumpeterian notion 
of democracy, which, as noted above, elections are the central characterizing element.
48
 
The application of this model is also found in Przeworski and others’ comparative study 
of democracy. 
49
 Przeworski’s inclination towards the minimalist conceptualization of 
democracy is explain by his opposition to consensus-based model of democracy, which 
he believes not to be practicable.    
Guillermo O’Donnell notes that scholars who follow the Schumpeterian legacy 
provide a definition of democracy “centered on fair elections, to which they add, often 
explicitly, some surrounding conditions, stated as freedoms or guarantees that are deemed 
necessary and/or sufficient for the existence of this kind of election.”50 
                                                        
47
 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10. 
48
 Samuel Huntington, Third Wave of Democracy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)   
49
 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in 
the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2000). See for similar minimalist 
conceptualization in Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose A. Cheibub, and Femando Limongi. 1996. 
“What Makes Democracies Endure?”Journal of Democracy 7, 1 (1996), 50. Elsewhere, Przeworski goes to 
provide a “defense” of the minimalist conceptualization of democracy. For more on this see, Adam 
Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-
Cordsn, ed., Democracy’s Values (Cambridge: Cambrige Univeristy Press, 1999), 12-18.  
50
 Guillermo A. O'Donnell. “Democracy, law, and comparative politics,” Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 36, No. l (2001): 7-36. 
  
20 
The move towards electoral democracy, at the global level, during the last quarter 
of the twentieth century—a phenomenon aptly called the third wave of 
democratization—gave new impetus to the study of democracy.  Scholars began to note 
the wide diversity of the proclaimed democratic regimes around the globe.
51
 Liberal 
Democracy had become a key element in political discourse (though often not in 
practice).
52
 Careful scholars began to note severe problems with the new democracies. In 
a global comparative perspective, scholars noted that the dichotomy democratic-non-
democratic does not hold true.  Rather, what exists is a regime continuum, in which the 
two extremes are the authoritarian/totalitarian and fully democratic regimes.
53
 Therefore, 
assuming that there is a minimal definition of democracy, scholars began to talk about 
different degrees of democratic condition.  
To many, the analysis of democracy is about a dichotomy. For instance, Adam 
Przeworski and others maintain the either/or approach—instead of the democratic 
continuum.
54
 Such an approach is flawed as it includes states with different levels of 
democratic history, experience and culture, in the same camp. By so doing—that is, 
grouping different experiences under same label—there is the danger of conceptual 
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stretching, as noted by Giovanni Sartori.
55
 This means that the analytical concepts are to 
be stretched to the point that it can include diverse cases. All-encompassing concepts 
essentialize political realities and, as such, distort and negatively impact political 
analysis.  Moreover, as noted by Zachary Elkins, such an approach is “insensitive to the 
incremental, and sometimes partial, process that characterizes many democratic 
transitions.”56  
To many scholars it makes sense to speak of a “gradation of democracy.”57 For 
instance, Larry Diamond, basically informed by Richard Sklar’s notion of developmental 
democracy, considers democracy to “emerge in fragments or in parts.”58 This means that, 
across the different democratic experiences that one finds around the globe, it is possible 
to find a number of points in the democratic regime continuum. This explains why 
different adjectives and qualifiers have been used by scholars to describe different levels 
of democratic experiences, leading David Collier and Steven Levitsky to write about 
“democracy with adjectives.”59 Some examples include Fareed Zakaria’s notion of 
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“illiberal democracy,” Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s concept of “electoral 
democracy” or Guillermo O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy.”60   
Recent scholarship on democracy favors a theoretical perspective that seeks to 
compare actual and existing electoral democracies with an ideal democracy. Scholars of 
comparative politics began to pay closer attention to the “varieties of democracy” at the 
global level. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino have noted that “as democracy has 
spread over the past three decades to a majority of the world’s states, analytic attention 
has turned increasingly from explaining regime transitions to evaluating and explaining 
the character of democratic regimes.”61  
 That the topic has attracted attention to scholars and policy makers can be seen in 
the fact that several databases, indexes and webpages are devoted to the topic—often 
each proposing its own processes and dimensions to measure the quality of democracy. 
The case of Freedom House is quite illustrative in this regard.
62
 Its index of democracy is 
widely used not only by scholars but also within policy circles. According to their seven-
point index, regimes vary from “free” (1-2.5), “partially free” (3.0-5.0) and “not free” 
(5.5-7.0), depending of their total scores, calculated from civil and political liberties.
63
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This index, as well as others that were not mentioned here, is characterized by the 
following features: first, the notion of an ideal democracy (whether real or utopian) 
against which the case studies are to be compared with; second, the formula of 
assessment to include different dimensions (i.e., not one-dimensional); and, the last but 
not the last, the assumption that the unit of study be, at least, minimally democratic. 
 While the list of the dimensions that are used for assessing the quality of 
democracy is long, some of these elements are found in different studies that seek to 
measure how democratic a unit of study is (or units of study). Dimensions such as 
accountability—vertical and horizontal—civil and political rights, political participation 
are often found in all different models of assessing the quality of democracy.
64
 
 Earliest studies of the quality of democracy can be traced to Robert Dahl. For him 
democracy is “a political system [which] one of the characteristics of which is the quality 
of being completely or almost completely responsive to all citizens.”65 For the regimes 
that approximate to that ideal democracy Dahl calls them polyarchy, or “relatively (but 
incompletely) democratized regimes, [that is, …] regimes that have been substantially 
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popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public 
contestation.”66 In his later work, Dahl talks about the “ideal democracy,” sustained by 
five fundamental pillars: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened 
understanding, and control of the agenda and inclusion of adults.
67
 
 Carolyn Logan and Robert Mattes, focusing on twenty African cases, devise a 
new index of democratic quality.
68
 While accepting the dimensions proposed by 
Diamond and Morlino (with some minor modifications), Logan and Mattes follow a 
different path—that of bottom-up approach that relies on public opinion of the common 
African citizens. Informed by Mill’s words that “citizens know where the democratic 
shoe pinches,” they propose an index constructed through careful analysis of the 
responses provided by the ordinary citizens to a series of questions. Studies and analysis 
of the quality of democracy have been mainly in two directions: global comparative study 
(e.g., Polity IV and Freedom House), in which the measures are to be applied to all the 
states and the area-regional.
69
 Many scholars shy from constructing a universal formula 
that can be applied for the analysis of the quality of democracy.  
Leonardo Morlino and others indicated their frustration about the multitude of 
techniques and models of assessments developed by scholars. They write that, “despite 
substantial and widely shared concerns about democratic quality, scholars rarely agree 
about measurements and classifications; nor can most current models fully adjudicate 
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issues of directionality, endogeneity, and potential trade-offs between measures of ‘good’ 
democracy.”70 
 Some scholars, such as Logan and Mates, complained that the mainstream study 
of the quality of democracy was essentially dominated by the approach that stresses 
either behavioral measures or the collection of experts’ judgments on the cases of study. 
They proposed that the study of the quality of democracy be informed by the actual 
“lived experiences and subjective evaluations of ordinary citizens.”71 
 Levine and Moline bring an interesting point to the quality of democracy 
approach when they note that the concept should not to be taken for good government. 
They note that “the quality of democracy depends on the operation of processes whereby 
the population selects and controls its government and influences public policies, and not 
on the efficacy of government in the solution of the problems of the country.”72 Their 
approach, as such, emphasizes more the action and agency of the citizens—that is, the 
extent that they influence the outcomes and policies from the government—and less 
about how these outcomes are produced.  
 Scholarship on democracy and political participation often neglects the 
importance and significance of language and language policy.
73
 It can be said that 
common to these different sub-fields of democratic studies is the conspicuous absence of 
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the analysis of the impact of language and language policy on the overall process of 
democracy. The obvious analytical negligence is due to two main factors. First, the 
empirical theory of democracy often tends to be biased in favor of the elite class (as noted 
above). As a consequence, not much attention has been paid to the linguistic divide that 
exists between this class and the masses and to the extent that this divides may actually 
be counterproductive to the overall democratic construction. Linguists have for some 
time called attention to the phenomenon of “elite closure” in post-colonial societies, 
based primarily on proficiency of the European language inherited from colonialism.
74
 
Yet, the impact of the mechanism of “elite closure” in the democratic process is yet to be 
profoundly studied. 
Language policy and planning has been simply defined as “[m]aking deliberate 
decisions about the form of a language.”75 In order to better understand the concept of the 
language policy and planning, one must try first to break down its constitutive elements: 
first, it is made of two different stages, namely that of planning and that of the policy 
itself—as the term clearly indicates. Second, there is the source of the process, often to be 
the state itself or an organism within the state (for instance, many of the modern states 
have either a ministry or a department whose key task is to devise the language policy 
and planning). Third, there is the subject or the planned element (that is, the language 
itself). Fourth, there is the target of the project policy, which in most of the cases 
coincides with the geographical boundary of the nation-state.  
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 Language policy and planning has two basic elements: description and 
prescription. That is to say that, on the one hand, language policy and planning describes 
the linguistic status quo by pointing out the fault lines or the areas of intervention. On the 
other hand, the language policy and planning often includes prescriptive elements as it 
prescribes a set of interventions that are to be done in the future.    
For a political scientist or for a “policy scientist,” the term “policy” often refers to 
a set of principles and procedures emanating from a center of authority with the objective 
to redress a particular aspect of social life or in its totality. Put differently, the term 
language policy is a misnomer—at least from the point of view of the policy or political 
sciences. To some political scientists such Harold Lasswell, the analysis of public policy 
is fundamentally about the actions (and omissions) of the governments.
76
 This is to say, 
public policy analysis is to understand what the government does (or fails to 
do).Therefore, when one is talking about public policy one is making a reference to a 
combination of different things that include (but are not limited to) legislation—to 
include budgets—governmental regulations, administrative and executive orders, judicial 
decisions and government actions that are not taken.
77
 
 Language policy, as accepted by sociolinguists, constitutes the combination of 
two essential elements: a) the acceptance of the members of a speech community on 
certain language items (such as sounds, words or grammar) and language varieties (codes 
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or dialects) and, b) the ideologies that sustain those choices.
78
 As such, unlike the case of 
the political scientists who will place the center of gravity of any policy in the domains of 
the state power, for the sociolinguistics the epicenter of language policy is the society at 
large. Language policy, thus, can be thought to be horizontally defined insofar, as argued 
by Bernard Spolsky and Richard Lambert, it is based on the “common agreement” of the 
members of a speech community.
79
 
 Language planning, on the other hand, can be described to be vertically 
formulated. That is to say, it emanates from the formal center of authority, i.e., the state. 
As noted above, modern states often include among their institutions a particular agency 
that focuses on the language questions.
80
 Thus, for B. Jernudd and J. Das Gupta, it is the 
“political and administrative activity for solving language problems in society.”81 The 
approach, as such, is top-down, as through administrative and legal decisions the state 
sought to modify linguistic patterns and/or behaviors of the members of a given society.  
The verticality of the language planning in form and content leads Haugen to distinguish 
it from what he terms as language “happening,” that is, “social movement without 
unifying control.”82To another established name in sociolinguistics, Joshua Fishman, 
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language planning is a top-down directive and, at the same time, directional and 
justificational: not only does it prescribe about the routes to be taken but it also provides 
a set of elements to justify such a direction.
83
 
  Between language policy and language planning the borderline is a thin one; they 
are interwoven and mutually influence each other. As such, it makes much more sense to 
talk about language policy and planning. That is to say that the two elements overlap 
each other and the lines of influence is two-way road. As for examples, it is important to 
remember that societal language ideologies—mainly the dominant one—often find its 
way through state legislations and directives, and these in turn may influence how people 
think about the languages of their community.   
 R. de Cillia and B. Busch, divide the practice of language policy and planning 
into three major trends: a) a “consciously planned policy” that directly tackles the 
language question pertaining to a given speech community; b) a language policy as a 
subsidiary of existing laws that tackle other societal issues, such as education policy, 
consumers laws, and so on; and c) a “laissez-faire” politics in which minimal or no 
intervention by the central authority is observed. Portuguese colonial language policy fits 
the second category: the policies on language were often integral parts of laws and 
policies designed to either frame the colonial policy in its totality or to tackle particular 
fields of the colonial social life (e.g., native policy).
84
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 For Bernard Spolsky, language policy is an umbrella concept that is made up of 
three fundamental elements: “the habitual pattern of selecting among the varieties that 
make up its linguistic repertoire; its language beliefs or ideology—the beliefs about 
language and language use; and any specific efforts to modify or influence that practice 
by any kind of language intervention, planning or management.” It is only the last 
component that really corresponds to the intervention of the political authorities (the 
state, central or local) in the matters of language (policy).
85
 
 A contribution in the study of language policy that cannot be neglected is that of 
analysis of diglossia.  Charles Ferguson’s seminal paper brought in the analysis of 
diglossia to the forefront of language policy and practices.
86
 By analyzing closely related 
languages, he concludes that predominant language becomes the marker of prestige and 
status. Joshua Fishman furthered the analysis of diglossia by applying it to situations 
where unrelated languages are present.
87
   
At this point, two conclusions, therefore, can be reached: first, scholars from 
different fields have recognized that language does impact the overall political game, 
either in the domestic or international aspect of it; and, second, the literature is still timid 
and quite limited indeed when it comes to understanding and analyzing the influence and 
impact of language policy on democracy—particularly in societies characterized by a 
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linguistic divide and with a one-sided language policy. In other words, the literature has 
failed to answer (let alone to respond to) questions such as: How does the linguistic 
divide influence democratic practice? Will a fair language policy create more democratic 
conditions for the full and active political participation of the citizens? Can a fair 
language policy increase popular participation in the national politics as well as increase 
people’s control over the elected leaders?  
Some scholars have probed the influence of language/language policy on the 
political life.
88
 Thus, language policy has been considered as an essential element in 
nationalist politics. Language policy also has been considered as part of a strategy of 
domination by the elite in post-colonial states through the mechanism of “elite closure.”89 
Furthermore, it also has been considered as a critical component of some states’ foreign 
policy, insofar as an increasing number of states are developing and implementing 
language spread policies as part of their strategies for international relations.  Still other 
studies make a linkage between language policy and imperialism.
90
 
 In the sub-field of democratic studies, the linkage between democracy and the 
language question has been tackled more by the political theorists and by the 
sociolinguists, who have been advocating a new development in human rights, namely 
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the linguistic human rights. If so many writers, activists, scholars from other subfields are 
considering the impact of the language question in the overall quality of democracy, this, 
in itself, is a reason as to why the research should be conducted.  
 Against this background, the dissertation asks the following question: to what 
extent does language policy affect or have an impact on the quality of democracy? 
Phrasing in a different way, this thesis looks at the mechanisms through which language, 
language ideologies, policies and practices influence how people behave politically. The 
guiding question of the dissertation can be broken down into several questions of a more 
limited scope that can better help the analysis of democratic quality. Thus, the thesis asks 
 Does language policy affect social behavior? The question is related to the extent 
that people react differently in light of the language that is spoken around them.  
 Does the dominant language, the language of authority and state, breed 
departicipation, understood as the non-political withdrawal from partaking in the 
public affairs?  
 Can the quality of democracy be divorced from electoralism and be assessed 
beyond the conditions of civil liberties?  To put it differently, can it be a true 
democracy where there are several structural constraints to common citizens’ 
active participation in the public affairs of the community? 
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Theoretical Framework: The Quality of Democracy and the Language 
Question 
 
In this dissertation, language policy includes not only the policy part itself but also the 
planning stage. In this way, I am indebted to Thomas Ricento. He notes that he 
“deliberately use[s] ‘Language policy’ as a superordinate term which subsumes, 
‘language planning.’ Language policy research is concerned not only with official and 
unofficial acts of governmental and other institutional entities, but also with the historical 
and cultural events and processes that have influenced, and continue to influence, societal 
attitude and practices with regard to language use, acquisition and status.’’91 I understand 
language policy as including not only the actions and omissions of the state institutions 
but also the whole context within which the debate on language takes place. In this 
regard, the concept of language ideology is of capital importance. 
Language policy can be said to define not only the actors but also the arena of 
politics. Yet, lack of interest by political scientists in probing the interaction between 
language and politics has meant a scarcity of heuristic devices that can help advance our 
understanding of the phenomenon. Recently, sociolinguists and other scholars have 
developed many analytical concepts, such as linguistic human rights or linguicism that 
can be employed to fully understand the intersection between language and politics.
92
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These concepts are employed to describe the raw nature of political regimes, democratic 
and nondemocratic alike. These concepts have been pushed by theorists of 
multiculturalism who tend to argue that true democracy implies recognition of minority 
groups’ particularities, including the use and practice of their own language in the public 
and private spheres.
93
 
Democracy, however understood implies the political presence of the people. The 
latter is assumed to be the foundation and the source of legitimacy to the instituted 
government. A democratic government, as such, is a type of political rule in which the 
people have a say in the political process. A question that has made scholars hours of 
work is the extent of what the people have to say in the overall political process. The 
proposed definition of democracy is citizen-centered. This means that emphasis is placed 
upon full and engaging participation of the citizens in all and varied aspects of political 
life, ranging from partaking in the elections, in the public and political debates, 
contacting and demanding accountability on the part of the state agents, and participating 
in the process of policy making and implementation. This definition of democracy is 
contrasted with that of electoral democracy.
94
 Risking oversimplifying, electoral 
democracy is here defined as a political system in which the extent of citizen 
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participation is limited to the process of routinely choosing the rulers. This means that in 
between elections, the citizens are not actively part of the political system, chiefly in what 
concerns the debate, making and implementing public policies.  
 The argument that this dissertation develops can be schematically thought as 
following: diglossic language policy and linguistic practices > social system in which the 
mother tongue is devaluated and illegible state > curtailed political participation > not a 
quality of democracy (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. From Diglossic Language Policy to Less Democratic Quality 
 
A diglossic language policy and practice can be understood as the 
institutionalization of a linguistic hierarchy in which different languages are confined to 
different domains.
95
 In such a situation, there is one language that becomes a high 
language and other (or several) who are relegated to a subordinate position (low 
language). The high language is the language for socially-valued functions such as formal 
education, public bureaucracy, commerce and business, administration of justice and 
mass media. On the other hand, the low language is consigned, socially and 
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institutionally, to the private realm. It is to be used within the intimate circle of friends, 
family members and neighbors. Through social and political, formal and informal rules 
and norms, the low language is kept out of the formal public domains.  
Coupled with the diglossic language policy, the path dependence of language 
policy leads the post-colonial state, its personnel and apparatuses rely heavily on a 
language that is not the mother tongue of its citizens. The operations, procedures and 
processes of power are conducted through the medium of a language that many—if not 
most—do not fully understand. This situation creates what I call the illegible state. The 
state is said to be illegible when its operations, processes and procedures cannot be fully 
grasped and comprehended by a significant portion of its citizens. An illegible state, as 
such, is a concealed state.  
The proper understanding of the concept of illegible state warrants a brief 
discussion of the state. Joel Migdal writes that the state is the mountain that every 
political scientist has to climb at one point.
96
 A number of scholars have delved on the 
question of the state.
97
 However, this is not the place for an exhaustive review on the 
subject.  It suffices to note the contribution of Max Weber, according to whom the state is 
“a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
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physical force within a given territory.”98 Basing on this Weberian understanding of the 
state, I define the state as the constellation of institutions and personnel that commands, 
or purport to command, legitimately or not, the social, economic, and political destiny of 
a population in a given territory. The illegibility of the state refers thus to the fact that 
many citizens simply cannot properly understand or grasp the actions and omissions 
carried out by these state personnel and institutions. These citizens, who don’t fully grasp 
the high language, cannot perform such a task for they don’t understand the boundaries 
within which the state actors are supposed to act.   
 The social context in which the mother tongue is taken to be politically 
worthless—that is to say without any worth in terms of being used for the performance of 
modern functions—limit and restrain political participation on the part of those citizens 
who are not proficient in the official language. Similarly, given the fact that the state is 
“illegible,” this situation curbs the citizens’ capacity to openly supervise and oversee the 
actions (and omissions) of the state and/or its agents. Lastly, curtailed political 
participation is tremendous burden on the overall quality of democracy. A good 
democracy is that in which the general citizens do not face as much of informal and 
formal obstacles to their participation.  
One of the most salient aspects of political participation is at the level of political 
debate.  Politics, chiefly in the electoral democratic regimes, is ostensibly about 
communication among different actors, individual and collective, seeking a resolution of 
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key issues that pertain to most or to all. The importance of communication in the political 
resolution of issues and conflicts has been highlighted by Jürgen Habermas, who has 
developed the called theory of communicative action.  According to this theory, 
cooperation among members of a polity is ultimately the consequence of a deep 
engagement in the dual processes of deliberation and argumentation.
99
 In other words, 
through effective communication, actions spring up.   
The typical dictionary definition of participation is “to take part in.”100 The 
definition hints a fact that to speak of participation means to be part of a group activity or 
dynamic. To take part in, therefore, is to be part of.  As such, it encompasses an idea of 
association, either informally or formally, with other people. Scholars define political 
participation as conscious social activity carried out by the citizens with the goal of 
changing the composition of government and/or the government’s policies.101 In other 
words, to participate in politics is fundamentally about pursuing two inter-related 
objectives. On the one hand, political participation is about shaping how the government 
looks like. In other words, participation in politics often is about defining and classifying 
who gets to be at the helm of the state. On the other hand, political participation may not 
be as preoccupied with those in control of the state but with what is being decided. 
Basically, in this mode of participation, it is about helping, designing, and implementing 
the “allocation of scarce resources.”102  
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To speak about political participation is to contrast to other political behaviors 
such as apathy and alienation. These two latter forms of political behaviors are on the 
opposite side to political participation. Yet, there is a distinction between the two. 
Alienation is not the same as apathy. As defined by Weiner, alienation implies “intense 
political feeling concerning the futility of political action.”103 As such, alienation can be 
put in the category of what Albert Hirschman called “exit.”104 I prefer the Hirschman 
concept of exit to Weiner’s alienation—as this term suggest false consciousness, and, as 
such, mobilized and controlled, though by subtle and unrecognized forms, by exogenous 
agents (lack of agency). Apathy, on the other hand, suggests total or partial lack of 
interest in the political matters.  
Victor Webb notes that political participation is fundamentally about “citizens 
[being] involved in one of three ways, viz. in (i) decision making (at the local levels), in 
(ii) being consulted about issues that concern them, and/or in (iii) simply being kept 
informed by politicians.”105 Effective democracy is strengthened when citizens engage in 
more and better forms of participation.
106
  That is to say that when the quantity and 
quality of political participation is increased, the whole democratic system significantly 
improves.
107
 The quantity of political participation refers to its extension, that is, the raw 
number of people actually and effectively partaking in politics, through different forms 
and formats. The quality of political participation, on the other hand, indexes its intensity, 
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the depth of partaking in politics, getting involved and following the processes and 
operations of power.  
To participate politically in a given event or situation is to make oneself 
voluntarily present.
108
 The “presence” in political participation can be physical, such as 
partaking in a street protest against a given government policy, or virtual, such as writing 
a letter to the state official. But then the question that one needs not fail to ask is what 
constitute political participation. This term refers to the arena of power relations. Politics 
is the social game for the distribution of power and influence.
109
 Given that the ultimate 
source of political power is the state, political participation is about state-society 
relations: the extent to which the latter may influence, change or shape the former.
110
   
There are basically two “autonomous” arenas of politics: high politics, or politics 
at the level of the state institutions and the political elite, and low politics, or politics at 
the grassroots, at the level of the ordinary citizens and how these, whether individual or 
in conjunction with others, seek to influence the composition and/or the output of the 
state. Political participation makes a linkage between the two arenas of politics, between 
the arenas of high and low politics. While there are other mechanisms that link the two 
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realms of politics, such as political mobilization, the concept of political participation 
posits initiative and ownership of the actions on the part of the ordinary citizenry.   
For analytical purposes, I categorize political participation into two major 
formats:  surveillatory and initiatory participation. I will show below that the dividing 
line between the two formats and modalities of participation is blurry and unclear. Let me 
first discuss what I call surveillatory political participation. It is the type of political 
participation through which citizens supervise and control the actions, and quite often the 
omissions, of those acting on their behalf.  Through surveillatory participation, citizens 
act to supervise and control the state in order to ensure that it won’t go beyond the 
imposed institutional limits.  Surveillatory political participation is mainly about two 
correlated elements: first, it involves observation and inspection of the state, and, second, 
it implies that actions are taken in light of the results from the first element. The process 
of observation and inspection of the state (and its agents) naturally involves an 
understanding of the institutional boundaries of the state, that is, the institutional limits 
within which the activities of the state are to be conducted. To control is above all to have 
an idea of the institutional borders. In other words, surveillatory political participation is 
intimately linked to the notion of “enlightened understanding” of politics. According to 
Robert A. Dahl:  
[t]o acquire civic competence, citizens need opportunities to express their own 
 views;  learn from one another; engage in discussion and deliberation; read, hear, 
 and question experts, political candidates, and persons whose judgments they 
 trust; and learn in other ways that depend on freedom of expression.
111
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With enlightened understanding of the political landscape, citizens’ political 
actions may be towards demanding accountability from the actions (or omissions) 
committed on their behalf. Surveillatory political participation, therefore, implies what 
can be called state literacy, insofar as it is important to have a minimum of understanding 
of the processes, procedures, and operations of power.    
The other form of participation I call initiatory political participation. I define 
initiatory participation as the concerted acts of the citizens towards providing signals and 
indications to those in the positions of authority about expected political output, be these 
laws or policies. Initiatory participation, as such, has to do with the political initiative 
taken by the citizens themselves, free from enlistment of the state and social elites. In 
other words, initiatory political participation is related to the activities, whether 
individually or collectively carried, that seek to essentially impact the state’s output (such 
as a policy, a law, a service, and so on). This form of participation is called as initiatory 
insofar as the citizens themselves come up with innovative and inventive alternatives 
and/or complements to state’s outputs. Basically, initiatory participation is about seeking 
to shape outcomes deriving from the decision-making bodies and/or personnel of the 
state. A mass protest or citizen-campaign of gathering signatures to propose a change in a 
law or policy sent to the legislative body constitute examples of initiatory political 
participation.  
Political participation is a multi-modal process. It ranges from voting—perhaps 
the most common and conspicuous form of political participation—to other less visible 
forms such as contacting a state representative/official, partaking in the public forums 
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and debates, including the official ones such as public hearings, taking part in a peaceful 
demonstration against certain policies and/or certain socio-political practices that can be 
prejudicial to the common good.  
 Intensive and extensive political participation ultimately results in a quality 
democracy. In other words, the more people participate and the more types of 
participation are used the better the overall democratic condition of the regime. A quality 
democracy is essentially about effective and engaging participation of the common men 
and women. Effective participation is something that can be thought in terms of depth 
(active and engaging participation) and breadth (different modes of political 
participation). There is a value in political participation. For one, it is pedagogical. To 
participate in politics is to learn about political process. At the same time, active 
citizenship is self-reinforcing insofar as the more one acts politically the more the 
likelihood that one will continue to engage in the political matters of the polity. In this 
sense, political participation can be taken to be a different type of “capital,” one whose 
use leads to its increase. In this vein, S. J.  Rosenstone and J. M. Hansen state that “the 
more involved people are in social life, the more likely they are to be mobilized, the more 
likely they are to be offered the social incentives toward activism, and the more prone 
they are to take part in politics.”112  Ultimately the more people participate in politics the 
more their elected and non-elected officials will be responsive to them. This is to say, 
intensive and extensive political participation brings more and better political 
accountability.   
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A Note on the Methods  
This doctoral dissertation is, above all, a case study in comparative politics. This means 
that focus was placed upon one subject, which a thorough analysis is to be conducted. 
Todd Landman noted that its key objective “is the process of describing the political 
phenomenon and events” in one political entity (Cape Verde islands in this case).113 
Knowledge in this case is built by an in-depth study.   
 The process of data collection for the dissertation project involved a variety of 
researches, in a period that extended, intermittently, from May of 2010 to September 
2012. Given that the approach of the thesis is that of historical institutionalism, I spent 
three months doing archival research at the Arquivo Nacional Histórico (National 
Historical Archives), the Biblioteca Nacional (National Library) and the Archives of the 
Assembleia Nacional (National Assembly), all in the capital city of Praia. My ultimate 
objective with the archival research was to learn about the development of language 
policy in a historical perspective as well as the contours of the public discourse, by the 
colonial and autochthone intellectuals and officials, in what refers to language practices 
and policies. In other words, discourse analysis is a major component of this thesis. I first 
started by looking at the different colonial and post-colonial newspapers. These 
newspapers are valuable source of information about different language ideologies that 
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have developed since the colonial times.  Since the early twentieth century, newspapers 
have become a site of debate on various issues, including on the role of the vernacular 
and/or about the socio-political relationships that should develop between the Cape 
Verdean and Portuguese languages.   
 I also paid particular attention to the Boletim Oficial, the government official 
gazette, where all policies and legislations that were passed were to be published in order 
to become effective. A careful reading of the Boletim Oficial, from the colonial to the 
post-colonial times, provides a pictorial description of the development of language 
policy in a historical perspective. Given that what is found in the Boletim Oficial is the 
“end product”, I also went on to look at other sources, mainly newspapers and the 
archives of parliamentary debate. The many articles and opinion editorial pieces 
published in the newspapers, along with the parliamentary debates, are important to help 
the research to fully understand the stream of the colonial language ideology, its weight 
as well as its continuity way in the post-colonial times. At the National Assembly, I read 
over the archives of parliamentary debates, chiefly in the two constitutional reform 
debates—in which the language question was a major and central element. 
 In summer 2011, I organized key informant interviews and focus groups. I 
followed the semi-structured interview approach with the key informants. I limited my 
interviews to ten key informant interviews—some of which were conducted outside Cape 
Verde, in Portugal and in the United States. The reason for this is that the dissertation 
seeks to stress more the voice of the ordinary citizens, the main subject of study, and less 
on the opinions, however valuable, of the learned and highly-trained elite. Informants 
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were chosen in terms of their knowledge, as result of their own professional or academic 
experiences, of the linguistic situation in Cape Verde. As such, I interviewed two former 
ministers of education (Corsino Tolentino and Victor Borges), and a former minister of 
culture (Manuel Veiga), who, for many, is still the banner of the movement for 
officialization of the Cape Verdean language, writers and literary critics.   
 Focus group interviews were conducted in different parts of the capital city of 
Praia. Praia, like most of the post-colonial capital cities, is the political, social and 
economic hub of the country. As such, people from all different sectors of society and 
from different regions and islands of the country flock into the city where better 
economic opportunities could be found. This means that it was possible to draw quite 
large representative group of people, from different regions of the island of Santiago 
(where the city is located) as well as from other islands of the country.
114
 Given the fact 
that the peripheral areas of the city are inhabited from people from different areas of the 
country, a random sample of participants proved to be the mechanism that brought 
representativeness to the study. 
A total of six focus groups interviews were conducted. The focus groups 
consisted of six people. Meetings were held at different locations, private homes and 
public spaces, provided that the used space was isolated from external interferences.
115
 
The goal of the focus group interviews was to capture political perspectives from 
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different socio-economic groups. I used the following criteria for the selection of the 
members for the focus group interviews: level of education (ranging from those with no 
formal education to college-graduates), age (as young as 19 years old to citizens in their 
sixties), origin and place of residence (from different islands and residing in major 
neighborhoods of the capital city) and gender (an equal representation of men and 
women).  
 In order to guard their privacy, participants in the focus group were identified by 
numbers (participant 1, participant 2, and so on). On my notes, in order to avoid 
confusion, I identified participants by combining a Roman number for the cycle of the 
focus group interview with the Latin number for the individual participant (e.g., 
participant I.1, for the individual who participated number 1, for the first focus group 
interview).     
 I conducted the focus group interviews with three main goals in mind: first, I 
needed to understand how the average citizen constructed and perceived the current 
linguistic situation of the country, where one language, the one that is not their everyday 
language, is clearly dominant. Questions were made to bring in the perceptions and their 
general feelings about the diglossic situation of the country as well as to understand the 
political consequences of this situation. Second, it was also my goal to understand how 
political knowledge—the idea of the processes and operations of politics in everyday 
life—is constructed among the average citizen. Given that the media, the elite and the 
state in general almost always make use of the Portuguese language as the medium of 
  
48 
communication, I want to learn about the extent that an “enlightened understanding” of 
politics is actually possible.  
 In some instances, I employed the method of direct observation. I chose one state 
agency where much engagement with citizens could be observed—the chosen agency 
was the Conservatory of the Registry, in the neighborhood of Txada Santu Antoni. 
Through an on-site observation, the goal was to capture how people behaved 
linguistically and the extent that this impact on the quality of services provided.  
On different times, I also enjoyed of many dialogues, online and face-to-face, 
with what can be called “language activists,” that is, individuals who write extensively, 
mostly on the local newspapers, with the goal of promoting the national language.  In this 
regard, I have taken advantage of social media connections and interviewed or discussed 
with key linguists and linguistic activists. While my original plans included interviewing 
several key informants, I decided to follow a bottom-up approach: focus, thenceforth, 
was to be on the ordinary citizens, the major actors of everyday politics.   
 
The Choice of Cape Verde as the Case Study  
Cape Verde is a micro-archipelagic state, made up of nine inhabited islands and several 
uninhabited small islands and islets, with a population of about half a million.
116
 After 
some five centuries of Portuguese colonial domination (whose settlement began in 1462), 
the country became independent in 1975.  
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Two languages dominate the linguistic landscape in Cape Verde, the Portuguese 
language and the Cape Verdean language—also known as the Cape Verdean Creole (or 
“Kriolu”).117 The history of the Portuguese language in Cape Verde, in a way, is weaved 
with colonialism. Like other former colonies, an imposition of the European language 
was carried out by the colonial state, particularly during the period of modern colonialism 
(after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 to the mid-twentieth century). Through social 
and political institutions, which often made use of physical violence, the Portuguese 
language became the socially and politically dominant language in the islands—the 
language of the elite and the educated.  Since independence, the position of the 
Portuguese language was reinforced with the post-colonial state reaffirming the social 
and political predominance of that language. Still to this day, to be able to speak fluently 
in the Portuguese language is a marker of social distinction. In spite of great investments 
in mass education, which is entirely conducted in Portuguese, the number of totally fluent 
speakers of Portuguese is relatively low: a fluent speaker of the Portuguese language is 
almost always a highly educated individual (with college degree).  
The Cape Verdean language is the national language and mother tongue to almost 
all. It is a Creole language, that is, a language whose origins and development are tied up 
to the historical mixture of the European and African languages.
118
 In the case of the 
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Cape Verdean language, it forms through the interconnection between Portuguese with 
several languages from West Africa, mainly Wolof, and Mandinka, dating back to the 
early sixteenth century.
119
 In sociolinguistic terms, the Portuguese language is the lexifier 
of the Cape Verdean language: the former furnishes the lexica that forms the lexical 
corpus of the latter.
120
  
The term “Cape Verdean language” was first created around the time of 
independence. Hitherto the language was often referred to as Creole, “Dialect-Creole,” 
but never as a language. In this doctoral dissertation the phrase “Cape Verdean language” 
is preferred as it is more precise in terms of the description (given the fact that “creole” is 
still a term that brings in a lot of controversy). Data from the Ethnologue point that in 
2010, the year of the last census, little less than 492,000 speakers of the Cape Verdean 
language, of which 325,000 spoke the Sotavento dialect and 167,000 spoke the 
Barlavento dialect.
121
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It should be noted that the Cape Verdean language is not confined to the islands 
of Cape Verde. Given the history of international migration, the language can be found in 
different parts of the Atlantic world, from Western Europe to North America, from West 
Africa to South America.
122
 As a consequence, the Cape Verdean language is the 
language of transnational and diasporic communication, either between the people from 
the homeland with the diasporic sites or among different diasporic communities 
themselves. Interestingly enough the Cape Verdean language gets far more attention 
among some of the countries that host the Cape Verdean communities than in the islands 
of Cape Verdean themselves. It suffices to say that in southern New England (particularly 
in the city of Boston), for the first time ever, the language has been used in bilingual 
education and some key information from the city government is actually translated into 
the Cape Verdean language.
123
 
It should also be noted that the post-colonial language policy that was in Cape 
Verde was based on the dominant state ideology, historically constructed by the 
European socio-political history, according to which each state should and must have 
only one official language. The modern state-building process in Europe, which started in 
late medieval ages, was based on the principle of dominance of a single language over the 
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territory. The language (more properly the dialect) of the kings became the language of 
the state. In time, through political communication, mass mobilization and education—or 
what Benedict Anderson calls “the revolutionary vernacularizing thrust”—that language 
became the language of the nation.
124
  
At the time of independence (1975), the state elites in Cape Verde, qua social 
agents—and, thus, taking cues from experiences of elites elsewhere—understood that 
state-building could not be based on the principle of bi-lingualism (or multi-lingualism). 
The debate in the early independence was fundamentally about replacement (Portuguese 
or Cape Verdean language) and never about complementarity (Portuguese and Cape 
Verdean language). Given the low social status of the Cape Verdean language, the power 
structures sided with the monopoly of the Portuguese language—while advocating for the 
status of national language to be given to the Cape Verdean language, in order to placate 
the few linguistic nationalists.   
In spite of its smallness, the islands have attracted a lot of international attention. 
Scholars, development experts and lay people alike, all make the claim that the country is 
an example of democracy for the continent.
125
 The dissertation challenges this and notes 
that in spite of the relatively pacific transition of power following elections, the ordinary 
citizen is yet to feel and act as an integral part of the system. The gap between the elite 
politics and the participation of the common citizen is perpetuated by the combination of 
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government-sanctioned language policies and the linguistic social practices that, in effect, 
limits the scope of participation.  
 Three main reasons have dictated my choice of Cape Verde as the case study for 
the analysis of quality of democracy. For one, for the past decade or so, the country has 
been hailed as the example of democratic experience in Africa and in the developing 
world in general. An aerial view of political democratic experiments in the country seems 
to agree with the overall statement that Cape Verde is a fully democratic nation.
126
   
Second, there is a line of political argument with a long history that ranges from 
Jean Jacques Rousseau to the most recent empirical studies of Robert Alan Dahl 
and Edward R. Tufte to Dag Anckar that contends that small political communities 
produce a more vibrant and efficient democracy than bigger units.
127
 By including a 
linguistic dimension to the political phenomenon, I also seek to scrutinize this theory. In 
theory, smallness of the political unit may be a powerful variable forcing the intensity 
and extensity of citizens’ participation in the political business of the polity. The 
argument goes that living in small polities should imply, logically, more direct contacts 
and communication—which, as it will be seen below, is not the case in Cape Verde.   
Third, studies of the quality of democracy, while having provided valuable 
knowledge in the subfield, are mainly characterized by superficiality. A major 
disadvantage of large-N studies is that breadth takes over depth. As such, particularities 
are often lost in the process of analysis. That is to say that reliance on the statistical data 
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often makes the analysts neglect the role of history and social ideologies in the formation 
and development of patterns of political behavior. The uncovering of these patterns of 
behaviors is facilitated by an analysis that focuses on “thick description,” as noted by 
Clifford Geertz.
128
 Political agents behave within cultural and sociological contexts, if 
scholars fails to examine the context, they may produce erroneous, if not fatally flawed, 
understanding of political behavior. Finally, as a native of Cape Verde islands I have the 
benefit of having an insider comprehension of the cultural and sociological context, 
within which politics takes place. Being socialized in the culture, I can easily discern 
some social and political behaviors which may take an outsider some time to grasp. 
Moreover, as a fluent speaker of both Portuguese and Cape Verdean Creole I can easily 
decipher communications, speeches and utterances in general, produced in those 
languages. The threat of what can be called “insider’s bias” is combatted throughout the 
dissertation by taking a critical attitude of the self.  
This study allows one to understand the extent that language policy and practice 
and their impact on the intensity and extension of political participation—and, ipso facto, 
the quality of democracy. The key element of this study is the uncovering of the 
mechanisms and processes that hinder or limit ordinary citizens’ political participation. 
By so doing it becomes easier to understand political participation and democracy in 
Creole societies (particularly those from the Caribbean) and in the third wave electoral 
democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Organization of the dissertation  
Apart from this extensive introduction, this dissertation includes five more different 
chapters and a section devoted to the general conclusions.  The second chapter outlines a 
description of the political history of Cape Verde. Such a description is important as it 
provides the contexts that help us understand the developments of language policy as 
well as how certain language ideology becomes dominant. The chapter provides a 
description of the political history of the islands from a longue durée perspective, from 
the colonial period to the contemporary epoch.    
 Since the dissertation seeks to understand the impact of language policy on the 
quality of democracy, chapter three outlines the development of dominant language 
ideologies and policies in Cape Verde. It starts with the analysis of the Portuguese 
colonial system and policies and how these informed the language-in-education policies 
in colonial Cape Verde.  The chapter analyses the extent that the development of anti-
colonial nationalism in Cape Verde did not translate into linguistic nationalism. Rather on 
the contrary, mainstream anti-colonial nationalists, chiefly the ones attached to the 
African Party of Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) maintained 
from the get-go that the main language of the organization as well as for the state in the 
construction is the Portuguese language. This line of thought, the chapter demonstrates, is 
still pervasive among Cape Verdean political and cultural elite.  
 The corpus of the dissertation includes chapters four, five, and six. In chapter four 
I demonstrate that the state in Cape Verde is surrounded by a linguistic bubble, namely 
the Portuguese language. Its institutional memory, the operations of power and political 
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procedures are constructed and disseminated mainly—if not totally—through the medium 
of the Portuguese language. This situation is particularly profound in the written realm. In 
this realm, documentations, memoranda, laws and regulations, and like, are entirely in 
Portuguese.  In spite of the fact that the Portuguese is a language that has been in the 
islands for over centuries, it is nonetheless a language that one acquires only through 
educational training. The national language, that is, the language that is spoken by the 
citizens in their informal and daily social interactions is the Cape Verdean language. As 
most Cape Verdean citizens do not possess the adequate mastery of the Portuguese 
language, I contend that the state is made inaccessible to them. To say this differently is 
to claim that the state in Cape Verde is “illegible.” Subsequently, an “unreadable” state 
is, as such, a state that one cannot keep track of its actions and omissions. Therefore, the 
activity of citizen’s surveillance of the state is drastically limited.  
In chapter five, I analyze the impact of current language policy in the ordinary 
citizen’s overall initiatory participation, mainly those citizens who are not proficient in 
the official language, Portuguese. I argue that through politics of ridicule and politics of 
inaudibility ordinary citizens’ opinions and overall participation in the public debate is 
severely curtailed and limited. I note that the local elite are fundamentally Schumpeterian 
in terms of political outlook: the masses of the people’s political participation are, 
effectively, limited to electoral participation.  
Chapter six of the dissertation compares Cape Verde with the cases of Tanzania 
and South Africa. The three countries do have the same history of colonial domination—
though the South African case, for most of the twentieth century, was more a situation of 
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internal colonialism. As a consequence, the language of the former colonizer (English 
and Afrikaner) became hegemonic in the post-colonial period. Tanzania is one of the few 
sub-Saharan African states to have used a native language, the Swahili language, as the 
language of education and public political matters. Post-colonial South Africa language 
policy was formulated on the principles of multi-lingualism and linguistic human rights. 
As such, the country is rather exceptional at the global level with its eleven official 
languages, sanctioned by the country’s constitution. 
In the concluding chapter, I highlight the major points raised throughout the 
dissertation. I make the case that ordinary citizens’ extensive political participation has a 
direct and positive impact on the overall quality of democracy. I also emphasize that 
political participation in the public sphere is correlated with the language policy and 
practices, which can either be a hindrance or an impetus to further partaking in the 
political affairs of the community. To eradicate the diglossic language policy—at the 
state and societal levels—I conclude is a necessity of democracy. In the last section of the 
conclusion I provide an outline of language policy recommendation for Cape Verde—
that can also be applied to many other Creole island-states, facing similar diglossic 
language policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL HISTORY OF CAPE VERDE: FROM A 
COLONY OF PORTUGAL TO A MICRO-ISLAND STATE  
 
 
The political history of Cape Verde is all but a history of citizens’ political participation 
in the formal realms of politics and policy making. Throughout its five hundred years of 
existence, tightly controlled formal institutions and venues of political participation 
characterized the islands. Modern colonialism, from the late nineteenth century to the 
mid-twentieth century, was essentially based on the principles and practices of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism. Since independence in 1975, the country has known two 
different types of political regimes: party authoritarianism from 1975 to 1990, and 
electoral democracy, from 1991 onwards. These two regimes essentially maintained the 
limited spheres and venues for citizens’ engaging political participation, in spite of the 
self-characterization as a democracy.
1
  
 The political history of Cape Verde resembles many other sub-Saharan African 
states.  Until 1975, Cape Verde was a colony of Portugal. As was the case with other 
former colonies of Portugal, political independence and sovereign statehood came after a 
protracted war of national liberation, which resulted in the total collapse of the 
Portuguese authoritarian regime. The twin processes of state-building and nation-building 
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started during the colonial period. Crawford Young notes that continuity from the 
colonial to the post-colonial states, defined in terms of political behavior, institutions and 
socio-political practices, is the norm.
2
   
In this dissertation I follow the historical institutional approach. This means that I 
categorically maintain that “history matters.”3 Historical processes and developments are 
extremely important and of high analytical value to the researcher as they permit one to 
grasp contemporary state of affairs and patterns of behavior.  How people respond 
politically today can be answered by looking at the institutional arrangement and social 
practices of the past. For this reason, historical contextualization of the case under study 
is warranted.   
 This chapter is divided into three main sections, corresponding to a major 
historical era. The first section provides a brief description of the colonial history, 
focusing in the last fifty years of the colonialism (1926-1974). Then, I depict the rise and 
fall of the one-party state in Cape Verde, the political regime that was constructed right 
after the fall of the Portuguese rule in 1975. This section is best organized as a 
comparative study because it allows better understanding of the regime.  The third section 
of the chapter highlights the process of democratic transition in Cape Verde, which 
started in 1990, and the rise of electoral and pluralist democracy.  
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From the Early Years to the fall of Estado Novo 
The archipelago of Cape Verde is a reversed C-shaped constellation of ten islands and 
several islets off Coast of Senegal—more specifically the Cap Vert promontory, from 
which the name of the islands derived. Its total area is 4,033 km
2
, roughly the same size 
as the state of Rhode Island. Relatively to their position to the dominant winds, the 
islands are divided into two main groups: Leeward islands (Maio, Fogo, Santiago, and 
Brava) and Windward islands (Santo Antao, Sao Vicente, Sao Nicolau, Santa Luzia, Sal, 
and Boavista).  
The Portuguese, moved by earlier experiences of creating plantation economies in 
other Atlantic islands (Azores and Madeira), were the first to permanently settle in Cape 
Verde, in 1462.
4
 In order to foster the settlement of the Iberians and other Europeans in 
the islands the Portuguese royal authorities granted to the residing European population 
special rights of trade with West Africans, which included slave trade.
5
 The participation 
in the Atlantic slave trade brought great riches to Cape Verde, to the point that the islands 
were frequently assaulted by French and English privateers. Experiences with setting up a 
plantation economy were not successful and, thus, re-exportation of seasoned slaves 
became a major industry. This process of arrival, seasoning, and re-export of African 
slaves resulted in two major historical developments. On the one hand, it made the 
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islands what Bentley Duncan calls the “crossroads of the Atlantic.”6 The islands became 
a central port of call to the trans-Atlantic maritime navigation and trade, attracting ships 
and pirates from all of the European talassocratic powers in sixteenth through nineteenth 
centuries. On the other hand, it led to the development of a Creole society. This was 
essentially characterized by a hybrid culture and language—in which the Creole 
language, a mixture of Portuguese and main West African languages such as Mandinka 
and Wolof, became the main linguistic medium. Given the scarcity of European women 
in the tropics, Portuguese men, often through employment of physical and symbolic 
violence, eventually released their sexual desires onto African slave women.
7
 In time, a 
tripartite racial composition of the islands developed: the few and dominant whites, the 
many African slaves and mulatto population.  
 The end of the Atlantic slave trade in the early 1800s, enforced by the British 
navy, resulted in economic decay and abandonment by the Portuguese authorities. During 
the first quarter of the 19th century, the Portuguese royal authorities grew obsessed with 
Brazil, the jewel of the crown. Cape Verde and other Portuguese possessions in Africa 
were deemed of less strategic and financial value. As a consequence, throughout the 
nineteenth century, Cape Verdean society suffered from various social problems. Many 
who visited the islands around this period noted famine, petty criminality and other social 
diseases.
8
 Politically, the regime in the islands resembled that of an oligarchic system. 
The actual power-bearers of the islands were the wealthy families involved mainly in 
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legitimate and illegitimate trade with West Africa.
9
 Foreign actors seeking to engage in 
commercial activities in Cape Verde—or any other significant activity, for that matter—
understood that the shortcut to success was to befriend the local power holders rather than 
seeking to court the established political authorities.
10
 
 By the mid- to late-1800s, as imperialism and modern colonialism became the 
dominant political force in European and global politics, Portuguese authorities began to 
pay more attention to their African possessions. Whether because of politics of prestige 
or motivated by economic imperialism, Portuguese modern colonialism in Africa had a 
new momentum.
11
 Institutional and social reforms were carried out with the intent of 
reinforcing imperial rule. Thus, political reforms were formulated to extend colonial 
oversight and rule from the metropolis to the colonies. To further the reach of imperial 
rule and to advance the penetration of royal authority in the colonies, Lisbon mandated 
the establishment of a printing press in the colonies in the mid-1800s—through in loco 
publication of the royal decrees and other juridical norms. The printing press, coupled 
with the development of a small-scale public education, led to the development of a local 
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intelligentsia and, in time, the construction of an “imagined Cape Verdean community.”12 
By the end of the nineteenth century, fierce competition among European powers resulted 
in a new course of action in Africa. Following the footsteps of other imperial powers, 
Portugal brought in modern technologies of power, incorporated in the modern colonial 
state, in order to facilitate the political economy of extraction. 
The third quarter of the nineteenth century was an era of great imperial 
competition among European powers. Portugal, in spite of its smallness and 
powerlessness—often labeled in the press of the era as the “sick man of Europe”—
entered the competition. In order to maintain and extend Portuguese rule in Africa, the 
rulers of Portugal understood that major political, administrative and colonial reforms 
were needed. As such, the whole colonial administrative and political enterprise was 
shuffled. Colonial boundaries were defined and redefined. For instance, what was then 
called Province of Cape Verde was dismembered in two distinct colonies in 1879, the 
islands of Cape Verde and the possessions on the West Coast of Africa (what became 
known as Portuguese Guinea—today’s Guinea-Bissau).13 At the same time, efforts were 
taken towards creating a new institutional and political environment of colonialism. In 
1892, the government in Lisbon approved the Administrative Organization of the 
Province of Cape Verde. This new law effectively established the roots of modern 
colonial state in the province, by creating the governing bodies, their political authority 
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and power. It suffices to say that the new model of organization established the governor 
as the paramount power in the colony—a political principle that posterior regimes, 
regardless of their ideological and political inclination, would continue.
14
 
Modern colonialism was backed by what can be properly termed the “knowledge-
industrial complex.” European countries devoted a sizeable portion of their public and 
private resources towards establishment of a colonial knowledge center. Edward Said 
calls the whole process orientalism, “the corporate intuition for dealing with the Orient 
[and] a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient.”15 Similar modes of thought were also applied to the case of Africa. African 
subjects, as such, went through a process that Gayatri Spivak calls “othering.”16 All of 
this was accomplished through establishment and institutionalization of a body of 
knowledge about the colonial others.
17
 In the case of Portugal, several institutions were 
created with the goal of constructing, amassing, and disseminating knowledge about the 
colonies. It suffices here to note the cases of the Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa 
(Geographical Society of Lisbon) and the Escola Superior Colonial (Colonial Higher 
School), founded in 1875 and 1906, respectively.
18
  
 Change in the metropolitan political regime, with republic supplanting monarchy, 
did not result in a change of life conditions for the colonized Africans. Thus, with the fall 
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of the monarchy in 1910 and the institution of the republic, Portuguese political elites 
maintained the same discourses and practices of domination that the earlier generations 
experienced. In other words, Portuguese republicanism, while claiming its adherence to 
values such as equality, freedom and fraternity, was not extended to Africans. Rather, the 
level of economic exploitation was expanded.
19
  
  In 1933, another major political rupture took place in Lisbon. The First Republic 
(1910-1926) gave way to the Estado Novo (“New State”), officially created with the 1933 
Constitution.  The Estado Novo’s colonial policy essentially brought highest levels of 
imperial domination. Ideologically, the new regime was an eclectic combination of 
traditional values, family and the Catholic Church, blended with modern ideas and 
practices of right-wing dictatorships of the 1930s Europe, chiefly German Nazism and 
Italian Fascism.
20
 The Estado Novo, under the authoritarian command of António 
Oliveira Salazar, reformulated and rationalized the colonial state, stretching the scope of 
domination and extraction of resources. Tighter and more centralized control of the 
colonies became the official colonial policy. To that objective, new regulations, laws and 
decrees were enacted with the purpose of increasing and reinforcing the absolute control 
of Lisbon over the colonies. The Colonial Act of 1930 was an example of this trend. 
Imbued with empire-building ideology and nationalist phraseology, it was effectively a 
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supra-constitutional law that re-constructed the notion of Empire and the Portugal’s 
historical duty and mission in the tropics.
21
 
 The Estado Novo stretched from 1933 to 1974. For analytical purposes the period 
can be further subdivided into two major epochs. In the first phase of the Estado Novo 
(1933-1951), coinciding with the rise and fall of European fascism, colonial policy was 
informed by a mística imperial (imperial ethos). Portuguese political elites became 
gripped with finding a position within the concert of the European powers. At the 
discursive level, the regime propaganda highlighted the notion that “Portugal is not a 
small country,” as its empire cover large territories in Africa and small holdings in Asia 
and Pacific (Macao, East Timor and Territories in the Indian subcontinent). Propaganda 
campaigns, such as colonial expositions, were carried out, both in the metropolis and 
abroad, to spread the image of a gigantic Empire. In the colonies, the policy of 
assimilation, whose legislation was basically borrowed from the French colonial thinking 
and practices, was given a truly legal corpus and actual enforcement.
22
  
 Following the end of the World War II, the characteristics of global politics 
radically changed. Therefore, the Estado Novo felt compelled to undergo reforms that 
were at least nominal. At both political and discursive levels, the Estado Novo made an 
abrupt 180-degree turn, designed to appease Portugal’s international critics and African 
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anti-colonial nationalists. From the 1950s to the end of the colonial system in 1974, the 
lusotropicalist ideology became the official ideology of the Estado Novo, which sought to 
transmit the idea of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism, based on humane and caring 
relationships with the tropical peoples.
23
 
The changing realities of the post-World War II world meant that concepts such 
as “colony” or “empire” became political liabilities. This led Portugal to radically change 
its legislation and constitutional terminology. These concepts were simply erased and 
substituted for supposedly more politically neutral ones, such as “overseas province.”24 In 
the years preceding World War II, the notion that Portugal was not a “small state” was 
the dominant political discourse. In the post-World War II era, the official discourse 
began to stress the notion of a pluri-continental nation by noting that African territories 
were integrally Portugal. This was basically compiled under the ideology of Isto é 
Portugal (“This is Portugal”). Ideologically, the regime embraced the “theory” of luso-
tropicalism, first developed by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s.
25
 
According to this theory Portugal’s colonization in the tropics, unlike those of other 
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Europeans, was based on humane and cordial relationship between the Portuguese and 
tropical peoples. The belief that the nation had territories in other parts of the world, 
mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, fed the impression that the nation must be defended at all 
costs. Thus, Portugal stubbornly opted to fight a three-front war against the anti-colonial 
African nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s.  
The discourse of lusotropicalism, aimed to whitewash the Portuguese colonial 
presence in sub-Saharan Africa, was categorically rejected by anti-colonial nationalists. 
As in the case of other colonies in empires in Africa, Africans from the Portuguese 
Empire began to challenge the colonial status quo.
26
 Amilcar Cabral from Cape Verde 
and Guinea-Bissau and Mario Pinto de Andrade from Angola were the two of the most 
articulate, vocal and cogent critics of the lusotropicalist ideology.
27
  
The modern colonial history of Cape Verde cannot be understood in isolation. As 
a part of a large but underdeveloped and extremely authoritarian empire, Cape Verde was 
linked to Portugal and her other colonies. The movement of people and ideas, as well as 
the establishment of formal and informal alliances against Portuguese colonialism in the 
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post-World War II, made Cape Verde a piece in a bigger puzzle. As in the case of other 
African colonies, the 1950s was a period of blossoming for anti-colonial organizations.
28
 
Several political organizations were created by Cape Verdeans in the 1950s and early 
1960s, including the PAIGC, the most successful. It was a bi-national anti-colonial united 
front, formed by people of different social backgrounds from Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde and led by Amilcar Cabral, up to his assassination in 1973.
29
 PAIGC’s main 
political objectives were the national independence of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau 
and, then, the fusion of these two states into a federal political unit.  
In 1972, while still waging an anti-colonial armed struggle, the PAIGC carried out 
elections for the setting up of a National Assembly, which would unilaterally declare the 
independence of Guinea-Bissau in September 1973. A few months following the 
declaration of independence, the new state of Guinea-Bissau was recognized by more 
than eighty states. In fact, Guinea-Bissau was Portuguese colonialism’s Achilles’ heel for 
the war in that West African territory proved extremely burdensome, in human and 
material resources, for the Portuguese state. This situation eventually led to the coup 
d’état in Lisbon in 1974 and the subsequent fall of the Estado Novo.30 The fall of the 
regime opened the path towards formal recognition of independence of Guinea-Bissau by 
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Portugal in September 1974.  After that, Portugal and the PAIGC went on to resolve the 
question of Cape Verde.  
In the islands of Cape Verde the fall of the Estado Novo provoked a major 
political earthquake, as new political organizations were formed and appeared in the 
public sphere.  Besides the PAIGC, which maintained secret cells in Cape Verde, the 
Union of the Independent People of Cape Verde (UPICV), and the Democratic Union of 
Cape Verde (UDC), were other major parties that flourished in the second half of 1974. 
Like the PAIGC, these two parties embarked in a process of mass mobilization for their 
respective causes. Political rallies, meetings, and other mechanisms of mobilization were 
the main tools of these parties in order to stir the population toward their respective 
political goals and objectives. It should be noted that, in spite of the conspicuous presence 
of the general population in the sphere of politics, one cannot talk about political 
participation. Rather, the appropriate concept is mobilization. The general population’s 
entrance into political realms was not autonomous but guided and controlled by the 
political leadership of these three parties.
31
  
The UPICV, formed in the late 1950s, disappeared much of the 1960s only to 
resurface in May 1974. At this time, their political view had radicalized. Inferring from 
its political discourse and judging from the UPICV’s written record, the party leaned 
towards Maoism and Pan-Africanism. UPICV categorically rejected the PAIGC Cape 
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Verde-Guinea-Bissau federalist project, defending, instead, a “sole Cape Verde.”32 This 
political project was essentially about a “go-alone” independence: a sovereign state of 
Cape Verde politically uncommitted to any other state. This political proposal, obviously, 
was particularly aimed at combating the PAIGC’s aspirations of creating a federal union 
between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.
33
 
 The UDC’s political position on the independence question was rather 
ambivalent.
34
 Unlike the other two parties, whose political activities resorted to 
mobilizing followers towards the goal of a total and immediate independence, the UDC’s 
political leaders, believing that the country might have some economic and social 
difficulties standing on its own, sought a rather gradual approach. Instead of a radical 
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political solution as, the UDC favored the maintenance of political linkage to Portugal, 
whereby the islands would get relative autonomy.   
For the PAIGC and UPICV there was a direct connection between Pan-
Africanism and independence. Independence meant the reinforcement of a putatively 
repressed African identity by the colonial authorities. As a creole society with two poles 
of cultural reference (Europe and Africa), independence meant emphasizing the African 
cultural references. The UDC was a political organization formed by the local social and 
economic elite and members of the colonial bureaucracy, whose social identity was that 
of a cultural connection to Portugal.  To these Cape Verdean elite, Cape Verde and its 
people and culture were an exemplary case of a “romance experiment in the tropics.”35 
This explains the rejection of any political or cultural linkage to mainland Africa. The 
UDC portrayed itself as longing for political autonomy within the new political regime 
constructed in Portugal following the revolution of April 1974.
36
 Political 
decentralization and autonomy—and not independence—were the ultimate political goal.  
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century.  On this subject, see Henrique Teixeira de Sousa, Cabo Verde e o seu Destino Político (São 
Vicente, Cape Verde: Edição do autor, 1974).  
The idea of autonomy, it should be noted, has a long history among Cape Verdean political and 
social elite. During the late colonial period, Duarte Fonseca, as the deputy in the Portuguese National 
Assembly in the 1950s and 1960s have advocated the need for granting the status of “adjacent islands”—
the same legal figure applied to the archipelagos of Madeia and Azores. General Spinola, Portuguese ruler 
following the revolution, talked about a Portuguese federation—influenced by De Gaulle’s Communauté 
française—where autonomy, and not political independence, was to be granted to the African territories.  
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 The second half of 1974 was a period of complex and multifaceted political 
competition between these three political organizations. A veritable war of propaganda 
developed among them. This war of propaganda occurred mainly in through various 
pamphlets, posters, brochures, and flyers that were distributed in urban areas. The 
propaganda war was also in terms of “occupying” the public space with political 
message. Political Graffiti on the walls throughout the country became a major vehicle of 
disseminating political messages. For the educated people, the “war” was essentially at 
the level of the newspaper with the articles of opinion. Through dissemination of word of 
mouth, pamphlets and other oral and written media, each party was representing itself as 
the defender of the interests of the Cape Verdean people. At the same time, each of these 
parties was accusing the opponents as serving the foreign interests. By the end of 1974, 
the PAIGC had subdued both the UPICV and UDC. These circumstances, facilitated by 
the radical section of the Portuguese military who maintained strong sympathies and 
respect for PAIGC, can be explained by the following factors. First, the PAIGC was far 
more organized than the unstructured, understaffed and disorganized UPICV and UDC. 
The higher level of political organization is often correlated with political success.
37
 As a 
political organization with more than a decade of active political experience that included 
leadership in an anti-colonial war, the PAIGC had clearly-defined structures and 
hierarchy, with its members aware of their roles and functions. Second, in structural 
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terms, the UDC and the UPICV resembled the elite party, detached from society.
38
 The 
UDC was more a political gathering or association of the members of the cultural and 
political elite of the late colonial society. The UPICV, on the other hand, was a political 
organization centered around one figure, José Leitão da Graça. Unlike the case of the 
PAIGC, these two parties lacked a critical component, that of the intermediary political 
entrepreneurs who could mobilize and link the masses to the party elite. These 
intermediate leaders were among the first to stimulate the political consciousness of the 
people, in the aftermath of the April Revolution in Portugal.
39
 Incidentally, many PAIGC 
sympathizers and associates were behind the formation of the Grupo de Acção 
Democrática de Cabo Verde e Guiné-Bissau (GADCV, Group of Democratic Action of 
Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau), a civic organization formed around May 1974 that 
demanded independence to both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. 
Third, given the fact that PAIGC led a successful campaign of national liberation, 
it enjoyed wide international recognition. It suffices here to note that the United Nations 
General Assembly and the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) considered 
the party as the “sole and legitimate representative of the people of Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde.”40 As such it was relatively easier for the PAIGC to mobilize external 
resources for the independent state of Guinea Bissau, created in September 1973, as they 
could rely on diplomatic connections established during the war. With the PAIGC as a 
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government in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC in Cape Verde had unconditional support from 
its sister party, which could use political or financial resources in Cape Verde. 
 
The First Republic, 1975-1991 
Capeverdianists often speak of two different post-colonial epochs: the First Republic, 
from 1975 to 1991, the period of one-party regime, and the Second Republic, following 
the multi-party elections of 1991. According to Richard Lobban, the First Republic is 
further divided in two sub-periods: from 1975 to 1981, the “one party, two states” 
regime, as the PAIGC monopolized all the political power in both Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde. I call this period the “First Republic, part I” (or “Primeiríssima República,” 
in Portuguese). The decade of 1981 to 1991 is the period of “one party, one state,” as the 
PAIGC ceased to exist in Cape Verde, and in its place a new party, the African Party of 
of Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) formed the government.
41
 The first five years 
of post-colonial state is here labeled the very first republic is in order to make a 
distinction with the subsequent period. The transition from “one party, two states” to 
“one party, one state,” was at different levels: first, a symbolic transition, with the 
changing of the name of the ruling party from PAIGC to PAICV, by dropping “G”, 
which represented Guinea-Bissau. Second, there was a constitutional and political 
reform, as the Constitution of 1980, approved few months before the breakup of the 
PAIGC, went through a cosmetic cleaning process, whereby all references to the political 
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principle of unity with Guinea-Bissau were completely removed. Third, at the 
institutional levels, both at the level of the party and of the state, all of the bi-national 
political and bureaucratic structures, such as the inter-governmental conference or the 
free trade zone, developed and constructed from 1975 to 1980, were completely 
dismantled after the November 14
th
 coup in Guinea-Bissau (of which more below).
42
  
 When the Estado Novo regime fell in Lisbon, in part as the consequence of the 
colonial wars, anti-colonial struggle took a new shape. From being covert and mainly in 
the countryside, the struggle moved to be about open mobilization of the population, 
particularly in the urban areas. The situation in Cape Verde was no different. Before the 
April Revolution that toppled down the dictatorship in Lisbon, anti-colonial politics in 
the islands was basically limited to clandestine political activities by the PAIGC cells.
43
 
With the fall of the Empire, different political forces, from within and without, emerged. 
The history of the PAIGC in Cape Verde is quite interesting. The party was basically a 
political coalition of those seeking to end Portuguese colonialism in Cape Verde. Within 
its ranks it was possible to find people from different cultural backgrounds as well as 
with different—and something competing if not antagonistic—political ideologies. 
Starting in May 1974, three different groups within PAIGC emerged—and, in time, some 
of them competed for control of the party, and, ipso facto, of the state. The PAIGC in 
Cape Verde was made up of a constellation of three different socio-political factions, 
with different political agendas, who engaged in an internal competition for power. These 
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three groups were: the “combatants” (the Guinea-Bissau or the mainland segment), the 
technocrats (the Lisbon segment) and the activists (that is, the activists whose terrain of 
political activity was Cape Verde).
44
  
The PAIGC segment from the mainland was made up almost exclusively by the 
historical leadership of the party who participated in the liberation struggle in Guinea 
Bissau. This group included figures such as Aristides Pereira, who succeeded Cabral in 
the leadership of the party, Pedro Pires, who became the first Prime-Minister of the 
country, Abílio Duarte, and Silvino da Luz. Politically, they were more pragmatic and 
less influenced by ideological idealism.
45
 The experience of the liberation struggle had 
made them seasoned political activists who understood the weight of political dogmatism.   
However lacking technical expertise or cultural capital, as most of them did not 
have any college-level training and were aware of this shortcoming, the “combatants” 
held significant political capital. The combatants’ legitimacy to lead the party supposedly 
derived from party history.  Some of the combatants were the initial leaders of the party 
(e.g., Aristides Pereira, Abilio Duarte). Other joined the party during the early stages of 
the liberation struggle, becoming high ranking member of the party, such as the case of 
Pedro Pires, who would become the head of the PAIGC Cape Verde National Committee. 
The fact that they worked together or under direct leadership of Cabral implied their 
legitimacy and predominance within the party. The party’s incessant discourse of 
maintaining the ideological and political legacy of Cabral essentially meant that it should 
be ruled by those who were most familiar with those ideas and practices. That is to say 
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that those who were closely in touch with Cabral and his political thought.  Moreover, 
and as a consequence of their direct participation in the liberation struggle, they enjoyed 
great prestige and status among the people of Cape Verde (and in Guinea Bissau for that 
matter), for they were perceived as the liberators. Furthermore, these men were directly 
involved in the diplomatic negotiations between the PAIGC and the new post-revolution 
regime in Portugal leading to the independence of Cape Verde.  
 The technocrats constituted the group of Cape Verdeans whose personal 
connections among them were created and reinforced during their experience as college 
students in Portugal, mainly in Lisbon and Coimbra. They were known as the group of 
Lisbon, insofar as its members were university students PAIGC sympathizers and 
members who met in the capital city of Lisbon in the 1970s, right before the fall of the 
dictatorship.  The group is called “technocrats” for two main reasons. First, these were 
individuals who had college degrees or were in the process of getting college education. 
They entered into the politics of national liberation while as university students in 
Portugal. Second, and given the fact that they had higher education training, they shared a 
perception of themselves as better equipped with the analytical and theoretical tools 
necessary to understand and act upon the modern world. The group’s key capital was 
cultural, sustained by an advanced technical expertise that a college education provides.  
With the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974, the members of this group 
moved back to the islands and occupied leading positions in the political process of 
independence transition.  
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The third group within the PAIGC was the Cape Verdean group. These included 
political activists and party propagandists who had acted in the islands since the early 
1960s. Their main site of political action was the countryside of the island of Santiago, 
the biggest island, where class relations between landlords and peasants had been 
conflictive.
46
 Their key role was to secretly disseminate the message of the party among 
the population as well as to recruit new members to the cause. Most of the individuals of 
this group had no college education—thus, they lacked technical and cultural capital. And 
because they were far from the center of the actual political and military conflict, they 
could not amass a significant amount of political capital within the party. Following the 
party reorganization in Cape Verde, preceding independence, the group was almost 
completely cast out in the intra-party political game.
47
 
In spite of the social and political differences from within, a measure of unity was 
reached and the party could thus rule the state. After independence in 1975, one of the 
first measures of the PAIGC was to translate the international recognition as the sole 
representative of the peoples of Cape Verde (and of Guinea Bissau) into a political 
reality. The Law on the Political Organization of the State, known by its Portuguese 
acronym LOPE, a provisional supreme law in place of a constitution, confirmed the 
absolute political predominance of the PAIGC, institutionalizing political monolithism:  
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 The Sovereignty of the People of Cape Verde is exercised in the interests of the 
 working masses, who are strictly linked to the African Party of the Independence 
 of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which is the leading force in our Society.
48
 
 
The LOPE, as such, was de jure birth certificate of the one-party state in Cape Verde. The 
origin of one-party state in Cape Verde, and in the former Portuguese Africa in general, is 
different from the patterns that emerged in other parts of Africa. In the former British and 
French colonies, independence came through “constitutional decolonization.”49 
Independence took place with the opening of the political sphere and the extension of the 
suffrage to the masses. From the late 1950s and early 1960s, multi-party politics, 
however frail, were a reality in francophone and anglophone Africa. African nationalists 
were particularly electoral entrepreneurs insofar as they proved capable of mobilizing the 
electoral bases and capitalizing on the votes of the masses for their own political projects.  
Political constitutions, modeled after French and British political systems, were hurriedly 
adapted by the departing colonial powers. In some cases as in Ghana, the establishment 
of the one-party rule takes place gradually. Through a combination of coercion and 
positive incentives, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana dismantled the British legacy of 
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Westminster democracy and, in its place, instituted one-party state in 1964.
50
 In the case 
of Tanzania, institutionalization of the one-party state in 1965 was simply a confirmation 
of the electoral hegemony of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The one-
party state did not start with independence in the former British and French colonies. 
Rather, the establishment of the one-party state was a calculated effort of the post-
colonial leaders to cling to power and to keep potential and real opposition at bay.  The 
construction of the one-party state, in its de jure and de facto aspects, took place months 
or even years after independence.
51
  
In Portuguese-speaking Africa, the one-party state was instituted, de facto and de 
jure, before or at the time of the formal declaration of independence.
52
 One-party rule was 
instituted at the same minute that the post-colonial flag was raised to symbolize the birth 
of an independent African state. The period of transition, that is, the period between the 
Revolution of April 1974 and the actual declaration of independence on July 5
th
, 1975, 
was essentially a period in which a silent pact was firmed between the key nationalist 
party and the departing Portuguese forces. In Cape Verde, in spite of the voices of 
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UPICV and UDC, Portuguese forces aided PAIGC, to the extent that by December 1974, 
the month of the agreement between Portugal and PAIGC on the Cape Verdean question, 
the opposition was almost completely silenced.
53
 
 Early post-colonial high politics in Cape Verde had a distinctive configuration. It 
was essentially two-dimensional, branching out between party and state politics. The 
PAIGC, as noted above, was a supra-national party with political and institutional 
tentacles both in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The party’s top structures such as the 
Congress (the party’s highest body), the Higher Council of the Struggle and the 
Executive Council of the Struggle were bi-national, with representatives coming from the 
two territories. Important decisions were not taken at the level of the state, but rather at 
the level of the party.  On the other hand, there were politics at the level of each state—
mainly through National Commissions of the PAIGC. These institutions were the policy-
making bodies, while the state institutions, such as the People’s National Assembly, 
essentially took the role of a rubber stamp institution.  
 Profound changes in the party and in the regime happened with the Third 
Congress of the PAIGC in 1977. In this meeting, political vanguardism was officially 
embraced.
54
 Party membership was to be tightly controlled. Ultimately the party’s top 
leadership had total control over who gets to be admitted. The Third Congress, the first 
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post-colonial congress of the party, was fundamentally characterized by an ideological 
eclecticism: references to nationalism, pan-Africanism, third-worldism, and Marxism. 
Notwithstanding all the Marxist-Leninist phraseology the PAIGC fell short of declaring 
itself a Marxist-Leninist party, a position that was taken by other liberation movements in 
power in Angola (MPLA) and Mozambique (Frelimo) in the same year.
55
  
While in control of the state, the party faced a series of political crises from 1975 
to 1981.
56
 Power in post-colonial states is often frail. Threats against the state, whether 
originating domestically or beyond the borders, are all present in the first few years of 
independence. In spite of the politics of anti-colonial nationalism and its rhetoric of 
equality, realpolitik becomes the dominant approach following independence. Factions 
are created and a zero-sum game among factions ensued. Early post-colonial politics in 
Cape Verde is no exception. A series of political crises developed in the first five years of 
the post-colony. Three important political crises have defined politics of the post-colony: 
the “Trotskyist” crisis of 1979, the crisis of political unity with Guinea-Bissau of 1980 
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and the agrarian reform crisis of 1981. These crises can be classified into two major 
groups: intra-party crises (domestic and transnational) and crises of state authority (or 
crises of society disengagement from the state).
57
 It is important to emphasize these three 
crises as they defined the contours of Cape Verdean politics. Today’s political discourses, 
from different quarters, are filled with references to these crises. The crises meant the 
redrawing of the boundaries of institutions as well as the new definition of political 
actors—which would impact politics of democratic transition in the late 1980s.  
The “Trotskyist” crisis was the first major political crisis in Cape Verde.  This 
crisis was a domestic intra-party crisis insofar as it deals with the development and rise of 
a faction within the Cape Verdean section of the party. Power struggles within the party 
were mainly between the combatants (the “Guinea group”) and the Lisbon group. The 
origins of the struggle can be traced back to the early days of anti-colonial struggle in 
Cape Verde, following the fall of the Estado Novo (1974-1975).   
Besides different level of technical expertise, the two groups were also split along 
age and ideological lines. Thus, one can speak of a generational and ideological conflict 
between the two groups.
58
 The intra-party political conflict was essentially presented as a 
clash between those defending the ideological party line that derives from Cabral’s 
thought and those proposing an alternative and more radical ideology. In time, the Lisbon 
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group would be labeled by the party leadership as “Trotskyist.”59 This label derives 
mainly from the fact that the most outspoken members of the group developed a political 
discourse that embraced Trotskyist phraseology.  
The two groups were aware of their differences and both sought key positions 
within the structures of the party and the state. Yet, overall decision-making power rested 
in the hands of the combatants, who constituted the majority within the leadership 
PAIGC-Cape Verde. Those outside the main circles of power, mainly the Cape Verdean 
and Lisbon factions, basically had three alternatives. First, there was a choice between 
political apathy and withdrawal. Second, political nepotism, that is, by making 
themselves out to be a political client or protégé to the party’s notables. The third option 
was voicing. This was the option taken by the Lisbon group.  
The Secretary General of PAIGC, Aristides Pereira, noted the problems of 
ideological divisionism in his report to the Party Congress two years following 
independence.
60
 By the time of the Third Congress of the PAIGC, in 1977, the 
combatants had totally assumed the leadership of the party in Cape Verde. The party 
highest bodies were kept away from those perceived to be affiliated with the Trotskyists. 
Little by little, the political arena of action for the “Trotskyist”, within and without the 
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party, began to shrink.  Exit, and not voice, began to appear as the most viable 
alternative. In 1979, the final blow took place as the two members of the government, 
affiliated with Trotskyism, renounced to their position.
61
 Such a move prompted two 
outcomes: tightening of party structures and purge within the party and state. 
 With the “rectification” campaign that followed the crisis, controlled admission to 
the party was put into effect. Total commitment to the ideas of the party, that is to say, 
the ideological line as defined in the party’s main bodies, was to be a key condition for 
admission. Political factionalism in Cape Verde was relatively mild: it did not result in 
any murder of those perceived to have deviated from the party line. This places Cape 
Verde in stark contrast to the other one-party states in Portuguese-speaking Africa. In 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, dissent within the ruling party had basically 
resulted in massacres.
62
 
 The second major political crisis of post-colonial Cape Verde resulted from the 
coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau, led by Nino Vieira on November 14, 1980. For the 
Guinean section, the party had traditionally benefited the Cape Verdean section, since the 
days of the liberation struggle. Coupled with this supposed political advantage of the 
Cape Verdean section within the party was the fact that political leadership in Guinea-
Bissau, under Luiz Cabral, had a terrible record of economic management and wrong 
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development policies.
63
 Moreover, by the end of the 1970s, a power struggle had ensued 
between Luiz Cabral, the president of the country, and Nino Vieira, the country’s prime 
minister. In fact, it seemed that the former was doing all that he could to strip the latter of 
all effective political power. The constitutional reform, announced by the Guinean 
president Luiz Cabral on November 10
th
, 1980, was the last straw. Basically the powers 
of the president were to be strengthened while the position of principal commissioner 
(prime minister) was to be eliminated.
64
 
 The November 14
th
 (1980) coup essentially meant two things: a) the political 
death of the federalist project (the union of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau) and b) the 
end of the PAIGC in Cape Verde. The crisis started as intra-party conflict and later 
became a diplomatic crisis between the two states. At first, the Cape Verdean section of 
the party —particularly the Secretary General of the party, Aristides Pereira, who was at 
the same time the president of Cape Verde—approached the coup as an issue of 
disrespect of the party statutes and practices.
65
 On January 20, 1981, the Cape Verdean 
wing of the PAIGC, in a national conference, turned into a constituent congress, founded 
the African Party of Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV). The formation of a new 
party led to a review of its political structures, goals and objectives.
66
 Yet, at the level of 
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the state nothing much changed. Political authoritarianism, under the one-party model, 
was maintained in spite of the reforms made to adapt to the post-coup situation.  
 The third crisis with deep political implication was the crisis of the Agrarian 
Reform Law in 1981. The question of agrarian reform was one of the key contention 
points between the state and the society. This question constituted one of the key policy 
goals of the PAIGC in Cape Verde following independence. When the PAIGC took 
power in Cape Verde, the majority (60%) of the people lived off the land. Agriculture 
was one of the main economic activities of the country and the one that employed the 
most people. According to the official view at the time of independence, however “the 
actual agrarian structures serve neither the objectives of production, nor the social 
objectives of the regime.”67 Confusion and misinformation, particularly disseminated by 
those opposing the PAIGC/PAICV rule in Cape Verde, coupled with naiveté of the ruling 
group, increasingly delinked from society, led to the failure of the agrarian reform and 
further isolated the regime to the eyes of some sectors of the people. The public 
discussion of the proposed bill of agrarian reform led to a manifestation of force between 
the security forces and the rural population in the island of Santo Antao in August 1981. 
The actual clash between the rural population and the security forces resulted in one 
death. However, what followed was worse. Those thought to be the organizers and/or 
involved in the revolt against the agrarian reform were illegally arrested, detained and 
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tortured for months.
68
 The whole event in Santo Antao indicated that the “high 
modernist” regime in Cape Verde, like all others in Africa and elsewhere, did not want to 
leave any room for dissent in its top-down developmental projects.
69
   
In the first few years of the First Republic, the party’s rhetoric of “national 
reconstruction” could mobilize the rural population behind its developmental project, 
chiefly through propaganda and other means of penetration into society. By the mid-
1980s, particularly in urban areas, society had become “delinked” from the state and the 
party.
70
 The state, under total control of the party, increasingly lacked effective means to 
mobilize and capture the urban population.
71
 A crisis of legitimacy ensued as the society 
became increasingly disengaged from the state.
72
 
 Since its formation in 1975, the regime survived a succession of crises, both at the 
party, state and societal level. A quick glance at the electoral results indicates the growing 
erosion of the regime’s legitimacy. Like other one-party states, Cape Verde held regularly 
single-list legislative elections.
73
 These elections were essentially non-competitive and 
plebiscitary in character. Two national elections were held, in 1980 and 1985.
74
 The 
graph (figure 2) presents the actual number of elections in Cape Verde. Two general 
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conclusions can be made by looking at the graph: first, the gap between the registered 
voters and the voter turnout increased significantly from 1975 to 1985. The percentage of 
those participating in the electoral activities is represented by a declining line. Second, 
the voter turnout is almost directly associated with the number of those voting “yes” for 
the regime. This is so because those who were against the regime simply preferred not to 
cast ballot as they had no other political alternatives to choose from. Thus, abstention can 
be understood as a type of vote against the regime. Urban areas, mainly the capital city 
Praia and the second most important city Mindelo, registered higher numbers of electoral 
abstention. It was in the latter that the highest number of ‘no’ was casted.75 
 
Figure 2. Legislative Elections in the First Republic 
 
Source: African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/) 
 
By the late 1980s, the signs of “the third wave of democratization” were clearly 
visible. Like elsewhere, the regime came to face a major political dilemma: either to open 
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the political sphere to competition or augment its authoritarianism. In light of the global 
rise of a discourse of democracy and human rights, the regime first tried to duck from the 
growing diasporic and international pressures. In this aspect, Aristides Pereira, the 
president of the republic and the secretary general of the PAICV, speaking to the 
National Assembly in December 1987, mentioned that “the Cape Verdean democracy is 
not dictated by “fashion” [modismo].”76 By “fashion” he meant contemporary global 
discourse and practice of multi-party democracy. Yet, the juggernaut of democratization 
was too strong for a small, aid-dependent island-state to duck.  
During the Third Congress of the PAICV, in 1988, earlier divisions between 
softliners and hardliners surfaced. Softliners of the regime rehearsed some opening, 
however timid. In this aspect, one of the major political principles presented to the 
Congress was the thesis on civil society, drafted by João Pereira Silva and Jacinto 
Santos.
77
 This principle was rejected by the hardliners of the regime. Nonetheless, it 
became clear to all that some liberalization was warranted as to support the regime itself. 
Against this backdrop, the regime opened the economic realms with the so-called strategy 
of extraversion that permitted the free flow of foreign direct investment in Cape Verde.
78
 
Economic liberalization was only the first step in what would be the total process of 
dismantling the one-party state. By the end of the decade, pressures from domestic and 
international quarters were amounting. In 1990, the one-party state was formally 
dismantled and new institutions were created to facilitate the transition towards multi-
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party democracy. Domestic and international forces influenced the political turn in Cape 
Verde. As early as 1987, the political leadership of the PAICV noted that changes in the 
political and economic structures were in order, if the goal was to save the state and/or 
the regime. The Third Congress of the PAICV, understanding that international political 
economy had changed and this would impact the country, decided for liberalization of the 
economy, by opening to foreign private investment—the policy of “extraversion of the 
economy.” 
 
Transition to Multi-Party Electoral Democracy in Cape Verde  
At the end of the 1980s, political dissatisfaction was high among the growing college-
educated urban class who were kept outside the main circles of power. Political power 
entrenched in the hands of the old generation, who came from the continent after the 
liberation struggle. At the same time, urban youth population had grown restless and 
inpatient given high levels of youth unemployment and lack of socio-economic 
opportunities. In urban areas such as the capital city of Praia and Mindelo, some 
confrontation between the youth and the security forces were registered. Ironically, the 
youth, who were the force behind the political ascendancy of the PAIGC in 1974-75, 
became the gravediggers of the incumbent party, once the political arena had been 
opened. Furthermore, from about 1987-1988, a number of anti-regime underground 
pamphlets and brochures, highlighting the pitfalls of the “Pirestroika,” were secretly 
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distributed.
79
 Similar to the cases of democratization in Latin America, economic 
liberalization preceded political democratization.
80
 
In the early months of 1990, domestic political opposition, hitherto covert and 
private, became public and organized into a political movement. The Movimento para a  
Democracia (“Movement for Democracy”, known by its acronym MpD), created 
formally in March 1990, was an umbrella organization gathering middle-class 
intelligentsia from different social ideological background and whose common 
denominator was the opposition to the one-party regime of the PAICV. This political 
organization became the main escape valve for all those who had past or present conflict 
with the regime. In its founding document, the Declaração Política (Political 
Declaration) of March 1990, the MpD pressured for reform of the political structures of 
the state towards multi-party electoral democracy.
81
  
The 1990 political transition in Cape Verde was essentially a top-down process, 
taking place without much control and participation of the society at large. The regime 
engaged the organized opposition parties and political pacts about the whole process 
towards multi-party electoral democracy were agreed upon between the governing and 
opposition parties. The processes, institution design and implementation were the 
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consequence of the pact between the PAICV and the opposition parties, MpD and 
UPICV. It was a case of what is known in the literature as a “pacted transition.”82  
The process of democratization, as such, came about with minimal—or perhaps guided—
participation of the ordinary citizens. The institutional design of the electoral democracy 
to be created in Cape Verde was the result of the political game between the incumbent 
party and the MpD. These negotiations not only established the “rules about the rules,” 
but also created the new institutional arena within which the electoral combat was to take 
place. The general citizenry was kept out of the loop—only to be informed, and never 
asked about their opinions—once the political deal was affirmed. This situation was a 
typical application of the Schumpeterian model, according to which democracy is no 
more than a “political method” of choice of which section of the elite is to rule.83 
Accordingly, the general citizens’ political participation is confined to choose, via voting, 
who gets to form the government.  
The founding elections of 1991 provoked a political dismissal of the PAICV—
which lost all three of the elections, the legislative, presidential and municipal elections 
to MpD. As in some countries in the continent (e.g., Zambia), multi-party electoral 
democracy resulted in a change of the regime and government. The MpD won with over 
66% of the votes, controlling over two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. The 
assumption of power by the new party led to the process of total revision: political, 
economic, and symbolic. In control of the parliament, the MpD went on to craft new 
                                                        
82 Roselma Évora, Cabo Verde: a abertura política e a transição para a democracia (Praia: Spleen 
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political structures for the country. The new constitution of 1992, heavily infused with 
liberal concepts and language, moved away from the 1980 constitution.   
The 1980 constitution—approved in October 1980, a month before the coup d’état 
in Guinea-Bissau that dismantled the federation utopia between the two states—was 
essentially a catalog of radical political ideology.  For instance, in its first article, the state 
of Cape Verde was defined as a “sovereign, democratic, laic, unitary, anti-colonialist and 
anti-imperialist republic.”84 In political economic terms, while private property was 
guaranteed under the constitution, the state was guaranteed the role of main and central 
economic actor (something that would be changed in the late 1980s, with the reforms 
following the Third Congress of the PAICV in 1988). Moreover, the constitution was 
silent in terms of the civil and political liberties.
85
 Aristides Lima, a constitutional scholar 
linked to PAICV, argues that the fact that the 1980 constitution directed to the socialist 
path did not mean a thing. The pays légal did not coincide with the pays reel. He 
maintains that the system was basically what he calls “an administrative and paternalist 
system of power.”86 From the economic perspective, the new regime created by the 1992 
constitution moved rapidly to embrace the market economy against the perceived state-
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controlled economic system of the 1980s. The neo-liberal idea of the better state the less 
state became the dominant discourse of the state.
87
  
As noted above, the founding elections of January 1991 produced powerful 
shockwaves throughout the system. The opposition, under one umbrella organization, the 
Movement for Democracy (MpD), a loose coalition of anti-PAICV establishment, won 
the legislative elections, capturing, as such, more than two thirds of the seats at the 
National Assembly. Such an outcome (62% of the votes) provided the MpD with 
extensive powers to revise the system.   
As a consequence, a series of systemic revisions were carried out. It should be 
noted that MpD had campaigned under the banner of mudança (“change”).  Change was 
thus proclaimed as this party held radically distinct political worldviews compared to the 
PAICV. If one takes seriously the political discourse of its leadership and the documents 
that emanated from the party, the party was basically a liberal political organization. It 
sought, therefore, to put forth a program of liberalization of politics and economy, once 
in power.  
 The September 1990 reforms of the 1980 Constitution, which formally topped 
down the one-party regime and paved the way to multi-party electoral democracy, had 
instituted a semi-presidentialist system, modelled after the cases of France and Portugal. 
                                                        
87
 Beyond political and economic reforms, the new regime also embarked into a set of new reforms on the 
symbolic fronts. The country’s independence flag, arms and national anthem, often taken to be 
representative of African heritage of the people and culture, were all dropped for a new set of symbols that 
would place the country closer to Europe. National days were changed and many of the streets and roads’ 
names were changed to the colonial times. Old statues and monuments, erected by the Portuguese in the 
late colonial period, particularly from the 1940s onwards, were brought back to their ‘rightful’ place, re-
inventing thus the tradition.   
 
  
97 
For the MpD that system was not the most appropriate for Cape Verde. The party had 
long argued against the system of semi-presidentialism and proposed in its place what 
they called a parlamentarismo racionalizado (“rationalized parliamentarism).”88 The 
semi-presidentialist system, as laid out in the constitutional reforms of September 1990, 
placed great governing powers to the president. This is to say that the power pendulum 
tilted towards the President. For the MpD, the parliament should be the “vital center of 
the political system,” and, ipso facto, the president was not have any governing functions 
or to have the powers to intervene in the governing processes.
89
 
  In spite of the resistance by the part of the PAICV, the opposition party, which 
argued that the MpD should simply reform the 1980 Constitution, the National Assembly, 
now under qualitative control by the MpD, went on to discard that constitution and to 
produce a new one (the 1992 Constitution, which is still in force). The new constitution 
(1992) represented an ideological rupture. First, it completely rejected the structure and 
phraseology of the 1980 Constitution, which, in its original format, was basically 
informed by soviet constitutionalism.
90
 As noted above, in the first fifteen years of 
independence, the country was basically rule under one-party regime. In spite of the 
discourse of non-alignment and the fact that it had good relations with both the West and 
the Communist bloc, the regime inclined towards the latter. Second, it fully embraced the 
                                                        
88
 Mario Ramos Pereira Silva, “Sistema de Governo: A singularidade Cabo-Verdiana,” in Jorge Bacelar 
Gouveia, ed.,  I Congresso do Direito de Língua Portuguesa (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010), 199.  
89
 Ibid., 200.  
90
 Jorge Carlos Fonseca, Cabo Verde: Constituição, Democracia, Cidadania (Coimbra: Almedina, 2011), 
37, footnote 39.  
  
98 
Portuguese constitutionalism to the point that a Cape Verdean legal scholar writes that 
the 1992 Constitution “has as its main direct source the 1976 Portuguese Constitution.”91  
 According to the 1992 Constitution, there are four “bodies of sovereignty:” the 
President of the Republic, the Government, the National Assembly and the courts of 
law.
92
 The president is elected through direct suffrage, without any direct affiliation with 
the political parties.
93
 In political terms, the presidential powers are more or less 
ceremonial. Yet, the president can nonetheless influence policies mainly through two 
channels. First, the president can exercise political influence over the government and the 
parliament. While the president does not have any role whatsoever in the process of 
policy making, he or she can signal which paths can be taken, if the policy is to have 
his/her approval. Second, and related to the first, the president is still the last approving 
institution of major laws or policies.  
 The government in Cape Verde, like in any parliamentary system, is a section of 
the parliament. The most voted party gets to form the government—and its leader is to be 
appointed as the Prime Minister by the President. In formal terms, the parliament (the 
National Assembly), elected directly by the people, is the locus of sovereignty and 
political power.  In actuality, the government is the true center of all political power. This 
is because of several reasons. First, given the tight party discipline that characterizes the 
political system in parliamentary electoral democracy, the governing party almost never 
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gets to be challenged by its own members in the parliament. Thus, the parliament, in 
several aspects, becomes the rubber stamp institution of the government. Second, the 
government is in almost total control of the resources of the state. In Cape Verde, like 
most of the states in sub-Saharan Africa, the state is the main employer and basically the 
major locus of economic activity.
94
 To control the state is often translated into controlling 
the access to it (jobs, importing licenses, contracts, and so on).  
The MpD political leadership was ideologically and socially eclectic, resembling 
a political constellation of anti-PAIGC/PAICV individuals. That is to say, the cement that 
glued them together was less the ideology but rather their dislike of the previous regime. 
While in opposition to the regime of PAICV, the organization held itself together. 
However, once in power, it became clear that the organization was basically a weak 
coalition of anti-PAICV politicians. Intra-party differences, caused by ideological 
differences and by the politics of personality, surfaced and were poorly managed. As a 
consequence, it was just a matter of time before irreparable fissures started to be noted 
within the party. Politics of personality was an important factor in the fractures that 
characterized the MpD in the 1990s. Soon after gaining power, politics of personality 
dominated within the party. Carlo Veiga, the party leader, practiced a strong and 
centralized control of the party and government, creating fissures among other high-level 
party members. Personal differences soon became the key political feature within the 
party. Ascension within the party ranks depended upon personal linkages to the party 
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bosses.  In 1994, after three years in power, the inevitable happened. A faction of the 
MpD, led by Eurico Monteiro and Jorge Carlos Fonseca, broke away from the party and 
formed a new political organization, the Party of Democratic Convergence (PCD).
95
 The 
authoritarian leadership style of the president of the MpD, Carlos Veiga, was presented as 
one of the key motives for such a political move. A similar thing would happen some six 
years later, when a new faction of the MpD, led by Jacinto Santos, again opposing Veiga, 
would break away from the MpD. When, in 2000 DATE, Veiga announced that he was 
running for president of the country, two different lists were created within the MpD, 
competing for the votes of the party congress delegates in order to form the next party 
directing body.
96
 On the one hand, there was the list led by Gualberto do Rosario, a list 
with close links with Veiga. On the other hand, there was the list of Jacinto Santos, one of 
the key founders of the movement. The fact that Veiga used his position in the 
government to favor his chosen candidate led to the faction led by Santos to break away 
from the MpD. As a consequence of the internal struggle within the MpD, Santos and his 
colleagues and supporters broke away from the MpD and created a new party, the Party 
of Democratic Renewal (PRD).   
Party politics and formation of political parties in Cape Verde have been less 
influenced by ideology than by personal differences among the political elite. The case of 
MpD is itself an example of this trend. It first started as a civil society coalition, whose 
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primary objective and common denominator was the so-called “anti-PAICVism.”97 By 
2001, the year of elections, the MpD was a fragmented party with a shattered social credit. 
Poor management of the country’s economy, a succession of political scandals and 
rumors of corruption, a divided party, coupled with the fact that the PAICV brought in 
new and more vibrant blood resulted in the defeat of the incumbent party during the 2001 
legislative elections.
98
 The elections of 2001, unlike those of 1991 and 1996, had quite a 
low turnout. The general population dissatisfaction and disillusionment vis-à-vis the 
political class resulted in almost fifty percent of voters not going to the pools. The 
elections resulted in PAICV returning to power, which has managed to maintain the 
electoral gains since. If one follows Huntington’s criteria of democratic consolidation, the 
return of the PAICV to power in 2001 is the mark of such consolidation. 
 Since the first multi-party elections in 1991, the trend had been for the same party 
and its supporting presidential candidate to win the same electoral cycles. The 1990s, as 
noted above, was the decade of the MpD. In the same period, the two presidential 
elections were won by the candidate (António Mascarenhas Monteiro) favored by that 
party. Likewise, the first decade of the 2000s saw the return of the PAICV to power. 
Pedro Pires, the former prime minister during the one-party state and former leader of the 
PAICV, and, thus, supported by this party, won the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections. 
However, the 2011 elections provoked a rupture with this trend. For the first time, the 
party that won the legislative elections (PAICV) failed to have its candidate to win the 
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presidential elections—which was won by Jorge Carlos Fonseca, favored by the 
opposition, MpD.  
 How can the political system in Cape Verde be characterized since the turn 
towards electoral democracy? Matthew S. Shugart notes that semi-presidentialism can be 
aptly classified as a political system in which three major characteristics are to be 
observed: “A president who is popularly elected; The president has considerable 
constitutional authority; There exists also a prime minister and cabinet, subject to the 
confidence of the assembly majority.”99 As such, a pure semi-presidentialist system, in 
which the case of France is perhaps the best example, is fundamentally characterized by 
what has been called as dual executive.
100
 Yet, all the other characteristics of semi-
presidentialism are found in the Cabo Verdean political system. It can be argued then that 
the case of Cabo Verde is a situation of soft semi-presidentialism. According to the 
definition proposed by Shugart, Cabo Verde cannot be fully classified as a semi-
presidentialist regime, insofar as the president lacks “considerable constitutional 
authority.”101  
 Matthew S. Shurgart and John Carey consider that semi-presidentialism can be 
divided into two main sub-groups: president-parliamentarism and premier-
presidentialism.
102
 In the first sub-category, the main distinguishing feature is the fact that 
the head of government (the prime minister) and his/her team (the cabinet) report to both 
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the president and the parliament. In the case of premier-presidentialism, the government 
is almost entirely controlled by the parliament—at least, in principle. Institutionally, Cape 
Verde’s case approximates the latter classification: government is formed from within the 
parliament and the president of the country has the power to appoint the head of the 
executive and his/her team.  
 
 
The State of Electoral Democracy in Cape Verde  
In general terms, the party system in Cape Verde is a de facto two-party system, 
dominated by the two main parties, the PAICV and MpD (see table 1).  Giovanni Sartori 
argues party system assessment should take into consideration only those parties that 
have either blackmail or coalition potentials.
103
 Since the political opening 1991, the two 
parties (MpD and PAICV) have maintained at least 70 out 72 seats in the parliament—
making the system a concentrated party system. It meant that to form or to block the 
government, it was not necessary to court other parties. As the PAICV won the elections 
for the third time in a row, the dominant party system is in the making. 
  
Table 1. The electoral dominance of the PAICV and MpD 
 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 
Percentage 
MpD+PAICV 
Total  
 
100% 
100% 
 
91.05% 
100% 
 
90.05%/ 
100% 
 
96.30% 
100% 
 
94.95% 
100% 
MPs  
MpD+PAICV/ 
Total 
 
79/ 
79 
 
71/ 
72 
 
70/ 
72 
 
70/ 
72 
 
70/ 
72 
MP: Member of Parliament  
Source: African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/)  
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Popular participation in the elections has not been constant. In the first multi-party 
elections, a little more than 75% of the registered voters went to cast their votes. One 
interesting thing about electoral politics in Cape Verde is the vote of the Cape Verdeans 
immigrants. Since 1991, Cape Verdeans residing abroad not only have the right to vote 
for the legislative and presidential elections but also the right to elect their own 
representative to the National Assembly—yet, they cannot vote for local government.104  
Post-colonial politics in Cape Verde has been entangled with diaspora politics. 
From liberation struggle to the processes and the struggle for democratization, the 
communities of Cape Verdean abroad have played an important role.
105
 Unlike those in 
Cape Verde, the immigrant communities, particularly in Western Europe and North 
America (that make up the bulk of the voting Cape Verdeans abroad) are less dependent 
on the Cape Verdean state, having built their own autonomous sources of income. 
For this reason, parties are increasingly seeking to tap the financial resources of 
the immigrants as to better their electoral fight. This provides them with some leeway to 
combat electoral clientelism. At the same time, the votes of the immigrants have become 
crucial and determining in some of the elections.
106
 The growing electoral importance of 
the diaspora led to the two parties agreeing that a new electoral census among Cape 
                                                        
104
 According to the current Electoral Code, there are three extra-territorial electoral districts, representing 
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PAICV, resulted in the defeat of the former when the immigrant votes were counted (as he won in Cape 
Verde).  
  
105 
Verdeans abroad was to be made. In the elections of 2005, the two main parties mutually 
accused each other of corrupting the electoral census for their own advantage. By 2008, 
the MpD and the PAICV reached an agreement to have a new electoral census among 
Cape Verdeans abroad (the previous ones were nullified). The new census proved a 
drastic reduction in the number of registered voters abroad (see Figure 3). 
 
Table 2. Multi-party elections in Cape Verde (from 1991 to 2011) 
Parties/Year 1991 1995 2001 2006 2011 
MpD 78,454  
(66.41%) 
56 
93,249  
(61.30%) 
50 
55,586 
(40,55%) 
30 
74,909  
(44.02%) 
29 
94,674  
(42.27%) 
32 
PAICV  39,673 
(33.59%) 
23 
45,263  
(29.75%) 
21 
67,860 
(49.50%) 
40 
88,965 
(52.28%) 
41 
117,967 
(52.68%) 
38 
PCD  n/a 10,211  
(6.71%) 
1 
n/a n/a n/a 
UCID n/a 2,369 
(1.56%) 
0 
n/a 4,495 
(2.64%) 
2 
9,842  
(4.39%) 
2 
PSD n/a 1,030 
(0.68%) 
0 
620 
(0.45%) 
0 
702 
(0.41%) 
0 
429 
(0.19%) 
0 
ADM  
(Coalition 
PCD/UCID) 
n/a n/a 8,389 
(6.12%) 
2 
n/a n/a 
PRD  n/a n/a 4,630 
(3.38%) 
0 
1,097 
(0.64%) 
0 
n/a 
PTS n/a n/a n/a n/a 1,040 
(0.46%) 
0 
PAICV: African Party of Independence of Cape Verde; MpD: Movement for Democracy; PCD: Party for 
Democratic Convergence; UCID: Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union; PSD: Social 
Democratic Party; ADM: Democratic Alliance for Change; PRD: Party of Democratic Renovation; PTS: 
Labor and Solidarity Party 
Source: African Elections Database  
 
In spite of the discourse of democracy and the institutional innovations brought by 
the implementation of liberal democracy in the country, political participation is limited 
to electoral participation. Other forms of political participation either are non-existent or 
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insignificant. In two decades of liberal democracy, citizens rarely challenged the policies 
and/or the rules decreed by the government. A culture of political passivity still exists 
among a significant portion of the population. Collective actions, particularly in the form 
of peaceful political protest, are infrequent, sporadic, and characterized with low turnout.   
 
Figure 3. Legislative Elections in Cape Verde in Numbers (absolute numbers)
 
Source: African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/) 
 
   
Moreover, other forms of political participation, chiefly those that require far 
more resources and time, such as contacting, in written format, the representatives or the 
state officials, are nonexistent. Other forms of participation such as taking part in public 
debate and discussion are limited by the institutional constraints. At the same time, 
mechanisms of open political debate such as public hearings on a legislative bill or 
political consultations are almost inexistent in the country. Other instruments of active 
and engaging citizenship such as initiative of law, while mandated by the Constitution, 
are yet to be implemented.  
0
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Theorists of democracy point out the direct link between the robustness of civil 
society and high levels of political participation and democracy in general.
107
 One of the 
key measures of the strength of civil society is through participation in civic and 
professional organizations. Data from the Afrobarometer, which measures participation 
in secondary organizations, clearly indicate that civil society in Cape Verde is feeble.  
At the realm of civil society organizations, close to three out of four Cape 
Verdeans do not take part in any secondary group.
108
 72% of the respondents of the 
Afrobarometer survey responded that they have never been part of any civil society 
organization.
109
 The data provided by the Afrobarometer allow us to draw two 
observations: on the one hand, there is a trend for the percentage of those who are not a 
member of a community organization to decrease. In the first rounds, 82% of the 
respondents responded they did not belong to any of these organizations. By round five 
of surveys, the number dropped ten percent, to 72%. On the other hand, those who 
identified themselves as active members of a community-based organization has doubled, 
from 8% in the second round to 16% in the fifth round. Nonparticipation is the norm—or, 
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according to Suzano Costa, “civic lethargy” has been the norm.110 At the same time, 
many of the civil society organizations that have been created are falling prey to the state 
or to the political parties.
111
 
One of main reasons for lethargic civil society in Cape Verde has to do with the 
long history of political authoritarianism and rigid control of society. As noted above, 
During the late colonial period, the institutionalization of the Estado Novo in Portugal—
and subsequently its tentacles in the colonies—whose key political principle was the 
more state the better state and corporatism basically blocked attempts to create an 
autonomous and independent civil society. Even professional and socioeconomic 
associations were under tight control of the corporatist state. The colonial state in Cape 
Verde, the reflection of the metropolitan state, was fundamentally an example of what 
Philippe C. Schmitter calls state corporatism.
112
  
Independence did not translate in either autonomy or liberation of civil society. 
The corporatist control of society and its organization was simply changed in the 
predominance of the party over both the state and society. As noted above, the party 
(PAIGC/PAICV) was legally and constitutionally represented as the “guiding force of 
society and the state.”113 Societal organizations were only permitted under the guidance 
of the party. In a way, Cape Verde, from 1975 to about 1990, was basically a 
“conscription society:” society,  that is, its constituent groups—children, youth, women, 
                                                        
110
 Suzano Costa, “Sociedade Civil, Estado e Qualidade da Democracia em CaboVerde: entre a Letargia 
Cívica e a Omnipresença do Leviathã”, in Cristina Montalvão Sarmento and Suzano Costa, ed., Entre 
África e a Europa: Nação, Estado e Democracia em Cabo Verde (Coimbra: Almedina, 2013) 
111
 Ibid.    
112
 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?,” The Review of Politics, 36, 1 (1974): 85-131. 
113
 See “Lei de Organização Política do Estado,” Boletim Oficial, July 5, 1975. Also see Aprovada a I 
Constituição da República de Cabo Verde,” Voz di Povo, 22 October 1980.  
  
109 
labor, peasantry, neighborhood—was submitted to administered mass organizations, 
under tight and direct control of the party.
114
 
 Another factor that militated against the formation of robust and autonomous civil 
society in Cape Verde was the rise of clientelist politics. While some scholars note that 
the state in Cape Verde may not be neo-patrimonial—at least not in the same fashion as 
continental African polities—electoral democracy may have provided a fertile ground for 
the development of clientelism.
115
  Electoral politics are increasingly mixed the clientelist 
politics. According to Herbert Kitschelt three major patterns of voter-politician linkages 
can be discerned: charismatic, clientelist, and programmatic (policy-based) linkages.
116
 
Cape Verdean electoral politics and participation in general orbit around the charismatic 
and clientelist linkages. This situation not only impedes the development of an 
autonomous civil society but also has led to a phenomenon of capture community-based 
organizations by the political parties.  
 
 Conclusion  
Major political processes in the islands of Cape Verde, from the anti-colonial struggle for 
independence to the more recent political processes of democratization were almost 
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always controlled and dominated by the local social and political elite. In spite of the 
discourse of popular participation, with a widespread use since 1975, the local political 
elite always assumed the command of major political changes. The general population 
was given the role of spectator, observing from a safe distance all the major changes 
occurring. As power runs in the number, the general population was kept at arm's length 
to be mobilized whenever possible so as to demonstrate to the opposite side the capacity 
to draw power and legitimacy from the general population.  For instance, all the 
negotiations toward opening the political system in 1990 were among the elite, that is, 
limited to the political leadership of the government and the recently formed political 
organizations. Yet, both sides resorted to public rally and street gatherings in order to 
mobilize their respective portion of the population.  
 Throughout much of the Cape Verdean colonial political history, active 
engagement in politics was reserved only to a handful. The general population had no 
other options but to resort to “everyday forms of resistance.”117 As noted above, 
community-based organizations have been captured by political parties and used as a 
political tool for patronage and clientelism. This has resulted in the lack of autonomy and 
independence of the civil society in face of the political actors and the state in general. 
There is, as such, a deficit of a culture of active participation. Having being socially 
trained that politics is the realm of the few, a number of citizens have yet to break the 
psychological prison. The political elite, through discourse and practice, nurture the idea 
that politics at the level of the state and policy making in general is the realm of the 
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experts and professional politicians—something not to be left in the hands of the general 
population.  
Moreover, during the first decade and a half of the post-colonial period, 
autonomous political participation was not only discouraged but also severely controlled. 
On the contrary, the Cape Verdean one-party state, like all other states of its genus, 
emphasized public display of authority and power. The regime was characteristically 
founded on the notion of appeal to the people. For this reason, it may be classified as a 
populist socialist regime.
118
 Any major political event and/or holiday were the 
opportunity to draw the people around the flag. Mass meetings and commemorations 
were quite common during the dictatorial years of PAIGC/CV.  
  During this period, citizens’ political participation was strictly controlled, guided 
and limited. For instance, the law limited the rights to assembly and organization of 
political organizations. It was controlled in the sense that the venues, functions and 
domains of participation were tightly guarded by the political elite and the state 
ideological and security apparatus. It was also limited in scope, time, and domains. This 
means that the process of participating in the political affairs was restricted to the modes 
dictated by the state (e.g., voting, participating in a political rally led by the party, and the 
like); time (the electoral period, that comprises the electoral campaign, the election itself 
and the period right after elections); domains (restricted to the casting of votes). 
The 1990s meant the transition towards multi-party electoral democracy. This 
means that the citizens could enjoy the opportunity to make a choice in the elections, 
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between two or more sets of policy alternatives or parties—unlike the elections during 
the First Republic, which were essentially plebiscitary. Since the founding elections of 
1991, the country has managed to have five rounds of elections (legislative, presidencial 
and municipal elections). These elections have resulted in the peaceful transference of 
power, from one political party to another (from PAICV to MpD in 1991, and from the 
latter to the former, in 2001). Prima facie, Cape Verde is an example of democracy.
119
 
The country has been hailed as exemplary democracy, for elections generally were 
peaceful and apparently “free and fair.”    
 
  
 
  
                                                        
119
 See, for instance, Meyns “Cape Verde.”  
113 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE POLICY 
IN CAPE VERDE  
 
 
 
 
In 1986, in the local weekly state-owned newspaper, Voz di Povo an interesting debate on 
the language question developed. The debate first started with an op-ed piece by Daniel 
Benoni, entitled “O Crioulo, Língua Oficial Porque? Par que?” (translatable as “The 
Creole language, official language: Why? For What?”).1 The author’s key argument—
and fear—is that any state-sanctioned policy of making the Cape Verdean Creole into 
official language would result in the total abandonment of the Portuguese language. The 
author feared the “substitution” of Portuguese by Cape Verdean Creole.  To this author 
and to many that shared his ideas, the Cape Verdean language is not a modern language 
and, for this reason, its use may lead to regression in the development path. The key point 
was that there can’t be room for an actual bilingualism, since the outcome of any 
language policy is always a zero-sum game. He further argued that the key proponents of 
the policy were those who “express[ed] badly in Portuguese.” Benoni’s article provoked 
an avalanche of criticism, mainly from those with some inclination for linguistic 
nationalism.
2
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The importance of this debate cannot be overstated. In spite of the authoritarian 
regime in place, this 1986 debate on the language question took place in almost complete 
freedom of expression and thought. At the same time, the debate brought in the major 
issues about the language question in Cape Verde, particularly the issue of the 
relationship between the vernacular and the Portuguese language and the question of the 
functional roles to be accomplished by the Creole language. It is also interesting to note 
how colonial language ideology, informed by social Darwinism, could still find adherents 
in the post-colony. And lastly, this was the very first time that an open debate on the 
Cape Verdean language question in the post-colonial period occurred. 
 This chapter outlines the development of the language ideologies in a historical 
perspective.
3
 It first starts with a description of the colonial language policy and seeks to 
understand the extent to which the colonial policy of the Portuguese Estado Novo in 
general might have been “glottophagic,” that is, the systematic and calculated removal of 
the vernaculars from the colonial public sphere. Then, I depict the development of the 
language debate from the perspective of the colonized. That is to say, I embark upon a 
critical discourse analysis of major political and social documents that deal, directly or 
indirectly, with the issue of languages. I also provide a descriptive explanation for the 
post-colonial language policy, from independence to contemporary days.    
                                                        
3
 In the literature of sociolinguistics there is the employment of concept of “language ideology,” to refer to 
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Colonial Language Policy in Cape Verde: The Ideology of Empire  
Many scholars who study post-colonial politics and society in Africa agree that there is 
an institutional continuity between the colonial and the post-colonial states.
4
 
Notwithstanding the revolutionary and radical rhetoric of rupture with the colonial state 
that many African leaders espoused, the truth of the matter is that the post-colonial state 
rests on the debris of the colonial state.
5
 The process of institutional continuity is 
particularly observable in language educational policy, that is, the choice of the language 
to be used as the medium for schooling. Through corporal and symbolic violence, this 
rule was reinforced among African children.
6
 This situation, in a way, contrasts to the 
case of British colonial policy of indirect rule in Africa that sustained, to some extent, the 
preservation of indigenous language. In the former Portuguese colonies—and to some 
extent former French colonies in Africa—the colonial public sphere was the reserved 
domain of the Portuguese language, the only medium of education, from primary through 
university-level learning. Thus, it becomes imperative to look at colonial history and its 
development if one seeks to understand the development of politics and policy making in 
post-colonial Africa.  To understand the development of language ideology, practices, 
policy and planning in the post-colonial state, one must look at its colonial dimension, 
insofar as the former is greatly informed by the latter.  
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While the Portuguese had settled the islands since the second half of the 1400s, it 
was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that a modern and rationalized 
state, the outcome of modern colonialism, was erected in the islands.
7
 From this point on, 
and particularly in the twentieth century, Portuguese authorities designed and 
implemented a planned policy of domination that included linguistic domination. Thus, it 
is important to describe the colonial language policy from a historical perspective. Yet, 
the focus here will be on language policy in the late colonial period (1930s-1970s), for 
this was the period of greatest political, social and linguistic control.   
The native languages in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, in contrast to 
many indigenous African languages in Southern and West Africa under British 
colonialism, were not the target of language planning (particularly corpus planning—i.e., 
graphization and lexical modernization), in part as the consequence of Portugal’s own 
colonial policy.
8
 Modern Portuguese colonialism was fundamentally based on the pillars 
of assimilation and the central role to be played by the Catholic Church. Assimilation 
policy, or the process of turning Africans into acculturated Portuguese, was a double 
sword policy that involved a total commitment to the Portuguese culture and, 
concomitantly, a categorical rejection of the native culture and language. In its turn, the 
Catholic Church, particularly in the last half-century of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, 
enjoyed moral and material support from the state—making it, as such, as the religious 
arm of Portuguese colonialism. Therefore, the Catholic Church was to play a central role 
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in the diffusion of Portuguese culture and language among the Africans to be 
evangelized.     
Alastair Pennycock, while focusing on the British example, suggests that the 
analysis of colonial language policy must pay close attention to the issues of its 
complexity and contextuality. The analysis of colonial language policy is but a piece in a 
web of relations and, as such, it has to be done in connection with development of other 
discourses and practices of domination (e.g., the discourses of civilizing mission, 
white/Western superiority, colonial peace, and so on). The contextuality of language 
policies refers to the fact one must carefully study the local conditions and the extent that 
they produce unique situations in the promulgation and/or application of the stated 
language policy.
9
   
 The study of colonial language policy is of an analytic value insofar as it allows 
learning about the formation and development of a dominant language ideology in the 
post-colonial context. Language ideology refers to the attitudes, beliefs and myths 
constructed about language(s).
10
 We all espouse such attitudes and values. Often, these 
values and attitudes are informed more by stereotypical and prejudiced views about the 
role and domains of a language. Yet, these belief systems influence and, to some extent, 
inform the formation, development or even change of institutions—to include language 
                                                        
9
 Alastair Pennycock, “Language, Ideology and Hindsight: Lessons from Colonial Language Policies,” in 
Ideology, Politics, and Language Policies Focus on English, ed. Thomas Ricento (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Pub, 2000), 49-66.  
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policy.
11
 Language policy, after all, has been defined as the “manipulative tool in the 
continuous battle between different ideologies.”12   
 
Portuguese Colonial Language Policy and Planning    
In this section, I critically look at the development and the contours of the colonial 
language policy. I seek to look beyond the language issues. To that desideratum I make 
connections between the language and other aspects of social life, chiefly politics. 
Therefore, I follow the ecology of language approach.
13
 Einar Haugen, one of the first 
proponents of this approach, defines it as “as the study of interactions between any given 
language and its environment.”14  I tackle the colonial socio-political structures in general 
in order to better grasp the language question. Only by presenting the whole picture of the 
colonial policies and practices can one aim to understand the impact of the colonial 
language in the minds of the colonized and in the colonized societies in general. 
One of the outcomes of colonialism and colonial language policy in particularly 
was bifurcation of the society and the rise of a diglossic situation. The sphere of the 
formal power and authority became extremely rigid and rock-hard linguistic domain, 
reserved, socially and legally, for the colonial language. In other words, the realm of 
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colonial politics, public administration, schooling, and the administration of justice 
became the domaine réservé of the European language. The encounter with these 
institutions meant that one needed to use the socially dominant language—the European 
language. Yet, the dominant language was an idiom foreign to most. As such, the 
Africans who mastered the colonial language became the social intermediaries between 
the great masses and the colonial state. During this process these Africans could 
accumulate economic, social and symbolic capitals. The situation created incentives to 
maintain the linguistic status quo.  
Portuguese colonial authorities had never instituted an autonomous language 
policy. By the term of autonomous language policy I simply mean the enactment of 
legislations and institutional practices and procedures of the state that focus primarily and 
ultimately on the language issue. One cannot find a piece of legislation directed at the 
language issue.  Rather, in the Portuguese colonial context, language policy was a 
subsidiary of other specific policies (such as native policy, education policy, and so on). 
Thus, one finds indications and signs of promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese 
language in legal documents such as the Colonial Act of 1930 or Organic Charter of the 
Portuguese Empire of 1933.  
 While Portuguese maritime explorers might have reached the shores of what is 
today the islands of Cape Verde around 1460, and shortly after the king ordered the 
settlement of Cape Verde, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
modern colonialism was implemented in Cape Verde—as well as in other parts of 
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Africa.
15
 The few Europeans (Portuguese mostly) who settled engaged in slave trade, 
forcefully importing West Africans into Cape Verde—as early as in the first half of the 
1460s. Scarcity of European women led to the violent control and enjoyment of the 
African women’s body.  This essentially produced the mulatto population in Cape Verde.  
Until the second half of the nineteenth century there was no clear institutional 
articulation of a colonial policy. Extraction of material benefits, mainly via trade with the 
coastal areas of West Africa, was the primary and the only objective of the Portuguese 
royal authorities. By the second half of the eighteenth century, as Brazil rose to become 
the jewel of the empire, the islands were pretty much left to their own. At that time, the 
effective and capable state in Cape Verde was absent. Powerful social forces not only 
competed with the instituted legal authorities; but at times, superseded the role of the 
public authorities. The actual power of the governors, coming from Europe, depended 
much from the local notables than from the authorities in Lisbon which had the power to 
nominate the governors and other high ranking officials of the state.
16
   
Though the Portuguese had been in contact with Africans and had maintained 
some territorial possessions in coastal areas of the African continent since the late 
fifteenth century, it was only in the late nineteenth century that it started to apply the 
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principles and the practices of modern colonialism in Africa.
17
 It was during that period 
that the processes of rationalization of the colonial state were carried out: the edification 
of a modern state apparatus, with a clearly defined territory and population over which it 
enjoys jurisdiction. The apparatuses of colonial power, in order to magnify its efficacy 
and capacity of domination, developed and sustained an industry of scientific knowledge, 
fundamentally focused on analyzing and understanding of the non-European peoples. 
Across Western Europe imperial expansion was concomitant to the expansion of the 
industry of knowledge on non-European peoples and cultures. Portugal was not 
indifferent to this trend. The last quarter of the 1800s and early 1900s was the era of 
development of colonial science in Portugal—or what is often called as the colonial 
knowledge.
18
 It suffices here to note that the creation of key institutions of colonial 
knowledge such as the Lisbon Society of Geography (1875), the School of Tropical 
Medicine (1902) or the Higher Colonial School (1905). 
Colonial institutional building fed the totalitarian drive insofar as the colonial 
state sought to maintain control in different sectors and aspects of public life in the 
colonies. The colonial project sought mainly to create a new (African) man, delinked 
from its past and native culture, who had been perceived to constitute a social liability. 
The new man to be constructed was to be in the image of the European—thus, the 
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narcissism of colonialism. Language was one of the key tools employed in this process of 
social engineering. In the case of France and Portugal, it was assumed that their 
respective language has a value other than facilitating communication. Their language, 
insofar as being the language of culture and civilization, leads to behavior modification. 
It is against this backdrop that one must understand the contours of language policy in the 
colonies. Colonial policies and practices often change in function of the international 
environment or the domestic causes from the colonies themselves and/or from the 
metropolitan power domestic politics.  
 Modern bureaucratic rationalization of the Portuguese colonial state in Africa was 
carried out mainly through two fundamental pillars. First, through the exportation of 
printing press technology from Portugal to its African colonies, the legislations and other 
decrees of the kingdom could properly be disseminated to the overseas subjects. 
Arguably this was as an attempt of the royal authorities in Lisbon to regain authoritative 
control in the African colonies, so as to avoid another debacle as in Brazil, which became 
independent in the first quarter of the century. Lisbon’s attempts to regain penetrative 
control over the colonies were mainly directed against two different types of threats: 
against those who were undermining the colonial authority within the colony, and against 
external powers—chiefly United Kingdom and Germany—who coveted Portuguese 
territories in Africa. Printing press technology, which reached Cape Verde in 1842, 
played a pivotal role in entrenching the position of the Portuguese language as the 
dominant language. In the realms of the written sphere, the Portuguese language became 
overwhelming. Reports written by public administrators and travelers to the islands in the 
123 
 
 
 
first half of the 19
th
 century provide evidences of a conspicuous character of the Creole 
language in the public sphere.
19
 By the late nineteenth century and throughout the 
twentieth century, systematic colonial policy would not only halt language development 
of the vernacular but also hinder its use in the colonial public sphere.  
The second major development was the formation of a public school system in the 
colonies. Until the late nineteenth and mid-nineteenth century education in Portuguese 
African colonies—and in Portugal for that matter—was an enterprise of the Catholic 
Church. Instruction was mainly about training the locals to become, or to assist the priest 
in his religious functions. In the nineteenth century, the Portuguese authorities instituted 
public schools in the colonies to advance the “civilizing mission” and to train local cadres 
to fulfill the lowest ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. Ultimately, this situation led to the 
entrenchment of a dominant position of the language of the colonizer vis-à-vis the local 
languages. The school, as such, became the site of social mobility, permitting the 
attainment of the two vehicles for social success in the colonial society: the technical 
know-how, essential for certain positions within the imperial and local bureaucracy, and 
the Portuguese language, the language of empire, which little by little became the marker 
of social status and prestige. The advancement of the Portuguese language in Cape 
Verdean public space was followed by the rise of a language ideology that debased the 
Cape Verdean language. The native language, labeled as a corrupt version (corruptela) of 
the Portuguese language, was deemed unworthy for any serious public function—from 
public administration to schooling.  
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Modern colonialism is a system of domination embedding a legitimizing 
ideology.
20
 Notions such as the French mission civilisatrice, the Portuguese missão 
civilizadora or the Anglo-Saxon white man’s burden were employed to justify the 
colonial penetration and the establishment of colonial rule in tropical Africa—and other 
parts of the world.
21
 Colonial enterprise was self-portrayed as a duty of the civilized to 
bring up the “primitive” and the “backward” to the path of modernity. It subsumed a 
cultural superiority of the West over the non-Western people.  
For the British, the English language was too complicated for the minds of the 
“primitive” people. Therefore, their language was to be kept away from the majority of 
Africans. Exception was to be made for the selected few who would be taught the English 
language, in accordance with the British doctrine first put into force in India—the so-
called Macaulay Doctrine.
22
 The system of indirect rule seemed to favor the development 
of the indigenous languages and their employment in the public. In British Africa 
particularly, these situations ultimately led to the development of “vernacular 
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newspapers.”23 For the French, on the other hand, civilization is expressed solely in the 
French language, the language of high culture and arts par excellence. The theory behind 
the French model was essentially to civilize the uncivilized through the means of 
language and culture. In reality the situation did not diverge as much from the British 
colonies: training a small number of middlemen who could mediate between the colonial 
authorities and the great African mass.  Fluency in the French language was in one of the 
core elements deciding the social status of the African people.
24
 The Portuguese followed 
a similar model as the mastery of its language became one of the preconditions and 
prerequisite for the African to transition to a higher social and legal status, from the 
condition of native to that of assimilado.
25
  
  To understand the history of predominance of the Portuguese language in Cape 
Verde—as in other former Portuguese colonies—one must necessarily look at the 
development of colonial legislation and practices. From the mid-nineteenth century, as 
the colonial state began to modernize and to develop itself along the lines of the modern 
European state—that is, with capacity to enforce rules and laws over a population within 
a given territory—there seems to be a concerted and organized “attack” against the 
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vernacular. Informed by the dominant social ideology of the time, according to which 
different people correspond to different stage of cultural and civilization development, 
the “attack” against the vernacular was perceived ultimately as an offensive against 
obscurantism, primitiveness and backwardness of the African culture. The process of 
civilization was understood to be essentially of two main stages: in the first instances, 
there is the destruction of all the obstacles imposed by tradition and primitiveness, and, 
then, in the second phase, the tabula rasa would be inscribed the values, norms, and 
principles of civilization.  
As early as the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the colonial state expressly 
prohibited the use of the Cape Verdean vernacular in the education of children. In 1921 a 
colonial law, informed by the assimilation ideology, was established that basically 
eliminated the use of the African vernaculars as a medium of education,  with the 
exception of teaching religion and the Portuguese language in the first years of primary 
education. As noted by Eduardo Ferreira, in the last instance, such a regulation gave 
comparative advantage to the Catholic Missions, who, unlike the various Protestant 
missions, were filled with Portuguese nationals.
26
 
In 1933 an authoritarian regime was established in Portugal, which finally put an 
end to the democratic experiences carried out by the so-called Portuguese First Republic 
(1910-1926).
27
 The military had trusted the power to the civilians, who, under the 
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leadership of Antonio Salazar, instituted the (in)famous Estado Novo (literally the “New 
State”). The Estado Novo was essentially characterized by centralizing tendencies. All 
the power and authority were concentrated in Lisbon. In order to better understand the 
Estado Novo’s colonial language policy it is important to study the anatomy of that 
regime. Salazar’s regime, chiefly in the first two decades, was essentially conservative 
and heavily influenced by the doctrine of the Catholic Church.
28
 The linkage between the 
State and the Church was particularly noticeable in what concerns the development of a 
new colonial policy. It has been suggested that the “Social Catholics” constituted the core 
ideologues and politicians of the Estado Novo, to include the regime’s supreme leader, 
Salazar himself. Like many dictatorships in 1930s Europe, the regime instrumentalized 
nationalist feelings as to strengthen national cohesion while diverting society’s attention 
from the problematic conditions of the economy. The organic elements of the nation, 
chiefly the language, culture and history, were calculatingly (ab)used as to instill national 
pride among the masses.
29
    
The Colonial Act of 1930 is the foundation of the regime’s colonial policy, 
radically changing the political architecture of the empire.
30
 Drafted by the three main 
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ideologues of the regime, Antonio Salazar, Armindo Monteiro and Quirino de Jesus, the 
act sought to design and implement administrative centralization, whereby Lisbon, 
through a Ministry of the Colonies, would assume total and absolute control over the 
colonies. The Colonial Act instituted, officially and formally, the Portuguese Colonial 
Empire—later to be reinforced by the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire 
of 1933. These two legal documents all sought to sustain the political discourse that 
“Portugal não é um país pequeno” (Portugal is not a small country).31 The discourse of 
Empire was often used by the Portuguese elite to compensate for the economic 
backwardness within the European context. Unable to fully explore the colonies to prop 
up the industrial sector in the metropolis, the rationale for the empire was essentially 
spiritual. The empire, as such, is “a task of transcendent meaning in the spiritual order”32  
The politics of international prestige informed colonial legislation, policies and 
social practices of the first two decades of the Estado Novo. In the early years of the 
Estado Novo there was a conspicuous and generalized preoccupation with theoretical 
notions of a “Greater Portugal.”33  Portugal’s nineteenth-century image as the Europe’s 
“sick man” was to be dismantled and it was through imperial grandeur that such objective 
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could be attained. At the same, and in relation to what was said in the previous sentence, 
it became a political and ideological necessity of the ruling elite of the Estado Novo to 
reclaim a presence within the concert of European powers.   
 The regime of Estado Novo was conservative and traditional at its core. To the 
political elite of the Estado Novo—particularly the supreme leader of the regime, 
António Oliveira Salazar—traditional Portuguese values could only be found in the rural 
villages and small towns.
34
 The Portuguese peasant embodied the ideal-typical 
representation of the traditional values and worldview. This explains the constant praise 
of the Portuguese commoner by the elite of the Estado Novo. As more and more 
Portuguese colonists moved to Africa hoping to make their fortune, the official discourse 
of the Estado Novo began to highlight the Portuguese common man as a key agent of 
colonization in Africa. These were thought to be a mirror for the indigenous people. 
Portuguese colonizers in Africa were to “reflect the noblest Portuguese virtues.”35 Such 
an ideology finds its way to in the colonial legislation that reserves critical roles to be 
developed by the common Portuguese colonist in the moral expansion of the empire and, 
by extension, the Portuguese culture and language.   
As a constitutive element of the strategy of predominance of Portugal in the 
overseas territories, the Estado Novo designed policies and started political practices 
conducive to the spreading of the Portuguese culture and language. To that end, different 
and various vehicles were to be utilized. Thus, apart from the state institutions of the 
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Estado Novo, the Portuguese settlers themselves were considered to constitute a valuable 
vehicle of language and culture diffusion in the tropics.
36
 Such thinking basically meant 
two things: first, no matter the social and educational background of the Portuguese 
settler, he was placed on a higher position vis-à-vis the African native (or even over the 
assimilados) and, second, that the settler was the moral and civilization mirror to the 
native—thus, the settler was the model from whom the native would copy and mimic 
cultural norms and values of a “civilized” people.    
World War II changed the structures of international relations radically. The 
epicenter of world power, hitherto in Western European capitals such as London, Paris 
and Berlin, moved to the East in Moscow and across the Atlantic to Washington, DC. In 
East Asia, the British soon realized that they could not bear another war and had to agree 
on the independence of their possessions in the Indian subcontinent. Decolonization 
became thus a key political concept in global political affairs and it spread like fire across 
from the Asian to other parts of the world. By the late 1940s and the 1950s, political 
agitation became a constant in the then French and British Africa, leading eventually to 
the withdrawal of those colonial empires.
37
   
 In the early 1950s, as a response to this changing international reality, the 
Portuguese governing elite embarked in the double and reinforcing processes of 
legislative cosmetics and ideological reformulation. Colonial legislation and regulations 
                                                        
36
 As in the articles 233 and 237 of the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire. See Wilensky, 
Trends in Portuguese overseas legislation for Africa, 130.  
37
 See, for instance, David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African Nationalism (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1998); Prosser Gifford and WM. Roger Lous, ed., The Transfer of Power in Africa. 
Decolonization 1940-1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 
131 
 
 
 
were stripped of the terms such as “colony,” or “empire”, as they started to have 
pejorative connotations. Ideologically, the regime embraced the Brazilian sociologist 
Gilberto Freyre’s theory of Lusotropicalism.38 This theory, adapted to become the 
Portuguese regime’s official ideology, was constructed over three key pillars (or myths): 
miscegenation, profound humanism and a true universalism. In a nutshell the theory of 
lusotropicalism posited that the Portuguese, unlike other European colonial powers, had a 
better and a more humane relationship with the people of the tropics—thus, Portuguese 
colonial “exceptionalism.”39 This explained why the Portuguese were to engage the 
tropical people both culturally and biologically leading, as a consequence, to a rise of a 
truly hybrid and miscegenated society (the “lusotropical”).40 In other words, the 
Portuguese colonial project was truly open, racially blind, and assimilationist.
41
  
Against this backdrop, the Portuguese language was given the task of fostering 
loyalty to a pluri-national and multi-racial nation. Marcello Caetano, one of the leading 
organic intellectuals of the regime, saw in the Portuguese language as the medium to 
connect diverse people that make up the empire. He argues that “the principle of spiritual 
assimilation demands an easy communication among all members of the Portuguese 
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community”42 Needless to say the instrument of communication among the members of 
the supposedly culturally united community was the Portuguese language. The use of 
other languages within the Espaço Luso (Luso Space) was not an obstacle to the principle 
of unity of the Nation/Empire but also a powerful obstacle to a supposedly eventual 
assimilation into Portuguese culture.  
 Notwithstanding the late colonial discourse of lusotropicalism and assimilation, 
the reality was quite different. Statistics of the late colonial period, for instance, 
undoubtedly indicate the failure of the colonial assimilation policy. The Portuguese 
colonial system was inherently contradictory. While professing a civilizing mission and 
the necessity to bring up the “uncivilized” African, the system permitted few escape 
valves for the Africans themselves to escape the domination trap. Rather than permitting 
the opening of the public sphere, the system enclosed itself. Fluency in the Portuguese 
language was a key element for social and economic upward mobility. Such a thing could 
be only attainable through schooling—public or carried out by the missions.  Judging by 
colonial statistics (table 3), it is easy to conclude that the poor performance of the 
Portuguese colonial system. The table indicates that only a minority had access to 
education (public or ecclesiastic): less than 5% of the total African population, and about 
22% for the case of Cape Verdeans. In other words, this means that only those 5% had 
any chances to participate in the colonial sphere—by attaining the status of assimilados.43 
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Table 3. Illiteracy in then Portuguese Africa (1960) 
   Total Population  Illiterate Population  Percentage of Illiterate  
Angola         4,145,266           4,019,834                96.97% 
Cape Verde        148,331           116,844                78.50% 
Guinea-Bissau        510,777           504,928   98.85% 
Mozambique        5,738,911           5,615,053                 97.86% 
Sources: Anuário Estatistiro do Ultramar, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Lisbon, and calculations by the 
author. 
 
The situation in the Portuguese colonies would improve a little from the late 
1950s as external and domestic pressures were amounting. Similar to other European 
colonial powers, Portugal had to embark upon colonial developmentalism, that is, 
concerted policies designed to finance public infrastructure in the colonies to foster 
economic development and overall quality of life to the colonial populations.
44
 For 
instance, it was only in the late 1950s that the first high school was to be opened in 
Guinea Bissau (while the second high school was opened in Cape Verde in 1960). In 
spite of these efforts, which were too late and too little, organized military resistance by 
radical anti-colonial nationalists led to a three-front war in Angola (1961), Guinea (1963), 
and Mozambique (1964). As a last minute attempt to appease the Africans, the colonial 
developmental machine was put at work. During the campaigns against national 
liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, as part of the strategy to conquer the hearts 
and minds of the rural population, more social projects that included public health and 
schooling opportunities to Africans were created.
45
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The Catholic Church and Language Diffusion Policy 
A more complete understanding of the reach of the colonial language policy implies that 
we should also look at an important agent of language diffusion, the Catholic Church, 
chiefly its missionaries. Colonial domination was multifarious and diverse tactics and 
instruments were employed to manufacture consent among the dominated. Christian 
missions were but another tool at the disposal of the colonial state to such an objective 
while, at the same time, they were also used in the training cadres for the lower echelon 
of the colonial bureaucracy. As a consequence, the colonial state sought to maintain a 
tight control and supervision of the works of the missions within its border, particularly 
those coming from other states.
46
  
In the case of Portugal under Estado Novo, the Catholic Church was clearly 
utilized as the religious wing of colonialism. This institution was charged not only with 
the diffusion of the Catholic faith but also with the propaganda of the Portuguese culture 
and language. From the discursive and symbolic points of view, the regime insisted in its 
historical role of Padroado Português (Portuguese Patronage) and the planned use of the 
Cross of Christ to represent the state. The missions, therefore, were privileged agents of 
language spread policy in the colonies. Through a combination of positive and negative 
reinforcements—easing of the conditions for the Portuguese Catholic missionaries who 
would serve as a cultural and linguistic agents while making difficult for non-Portuguese 
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missionaries to exercise their duty in Portuguese-controlled Africa—the regime aimed to 
limit the scope of other European languages in its colonies.
47
  
Compared to the northern European and American Protestant missions, the 
Catholic Church enjoyed relative sympathy from the regime. As early as October 1926, a 
few months after the end of the First Republic, the new regime, controlled by 
conservative military officers, showed clear favoritism to the Catholic Church in the 
context of the overseas possessions.
48
 The 1926 Estatuto Orgânico das Missões Católicas 
Portuguesas de África e Timor (Organic Statutes of the Portuguese Catholic Missions in 
Africa and Timor), the 1940 Concordat between the regime and Vatican and the same-
day Missionary Agreement, all worked to help establish a predominant position of the 
Church in colonies. In addition, the primus inter pares position of the Catholic Church 
was already guaranteed in the political constitution of 1933. For instance, the article 140 
basically considered Catholicism as the informal religion of the regime. The Constitution 
considered that: 
The Portuguese Catholic missions overseas and the establishments for training 
personnel for their services . . . shall be protected and assisted by the State, as 
being institutions of education and assistance and instruments of civilization.
49
  
 
The 1941 Estatuto Missionário (Missionary Statutes) made clear that the Church was 
religious wing of the colonial enterprise: the Catholic missions were considered the 
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“institutions of an imperial utility and of eminently civilizing sense.”50 Furthermore, the 
unholy alliance between the colonial state and the Catholic Church was expanded with 
the creation of the Junta das Missões Católicas Ultramarinas (Board of the Overseas 
Catholic Missions) in 1941. The law establishing such an institution states that the 
ultimate goal was to “to develop the collaboration spirit which, in the name of higher 
colonial interests, has to orient the State-Missions relations.”51 All the above-mentioned 
laws and regulations indicate how the Catholic Church had almost a monopoly of 
proselytizing souls in Portuguese African territories. While in the cases of Mozambique 
and Angola, the Portuguese could not do much and they had to accept non-Portuguese 
and non-Catholic missions, in Cape Verde, the Catholic Church had almost a complete 
monopoly—though there were other Christian denominations in the islands but without 
any significant social and religious significance.
52
  
A proper assessment of the impact of the Catholic missions in the language 
question in Portuguese Africa warrants a comparison with other missions in British 
territories, where, up to a point, a religious laissez faire policy was put into force. This 
comparison permits one to uncover the development of language practices and ideologies 
that would inform post-colonial language policies in different parts of the African 
continent. Risking oversimplification it can be stated that Protestant missions tended to 
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favor the use of the native languages for the purpose of the evangelization.
53
 Their 
reliance on the vernacular as the medium of religious proselytizing paved the way for 
many African indigenous language development and modernization—standardization and 
graphization. Due to the theological differences between the Catholic Church and the 
Protestant missions, vernacular languages from areas in which the former was dominant 
or held monopoly in terms of evangelization were very unlikely to have been developed 
or used for the goal of religious missions. This should not be taken to mean that the 
Catholic Missions in colonial Africa relied entirely on the language of the colonial 
powers for the purposes of evangelization. First, the native language had to be used, at 
least in the early contacts between the priest and the native population. Second, it was 
relatively easier and cheaper, at least in the first moments of the encounter, to use the 
vernacular. Instead of having the whole village to learn the language of the colonizer, the 
missionaries themselves, a few of them, learned the language of the people to be 
evangelized. Yet, the goal was not to maintain the vernacular as the medium of 
proselytizing.
54
  
 A typology of Christian missions in Portuguese colonies may be suggested: 
colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique,  in which the Catholic Church was 
preponderant but Protestant and other denomination missions were also present; Cape 
Verde and the islands of Sao Tome and Principe were colonies in which the Catholic 
Church had absolute or close to absolute religious monopoly, and the case of Guinea-
                                                        
53
 On the protestant missions’ influence over use of the vernaculars, see John P. Ragsdale, Protestant 
Mission Education in Zambia, 1880-1954 (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1986), chapter 2. 
54
 See Estatuto Missionario, decreto-lei nº 31.207, de 5 de Abril de 1941. Also see Moreira, O Novissimo 
Principe, 166.  
138 
 
 
 
Bissau, where the Catholic Church had total monopoly in areas where Islam did not 
establish itself.  
 The case of Southern Africa indicates that the protestant churches, with their 
bottom-up approach to religious activities, relied extensively on indigenous languages.
55
 
With such a decision, there were the earliest attempts and practices to create and 
alphabet, codify, and modernize certain languages in Southern Africa. A number of 
indigenous languages in Southern Africa owe their written forms to the efforts of the 
missionaries themselves.  In a way, the Catholic missions in Cape Verde had fewer 
incentives to work on towards the linguistic modernization of the Cape Verdean 
language. Rather, on the contrary, the Church became one of the pillars of the colonial 
power structures propagating the dominant language ideology.
56
  
 
 
Nativist Linguistic Nationalism  
Earliest nativist defenses of the Cape Verdean language can be traced back to the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. As noted above, modern Portuguese colonialism of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century was particularly imbued with scientific racism 
and European/Portuguese supremacy. The other side of the colonial ideology and practice 
was the categorical debasement of the indigenous culture and language. These represent 
the opposite side of the evolution continuum, where the European culture was placed at 
the top of the scale. Binary thoughts so typical of colonialism were applied in the 
                                                        
55
 Samarin, “The Linguistic World of Field Colonialism.” 
56
 Moreira, O Novissimo Principe, 166. 
139 
 
 
 
language sphere, whereby the dichotomy primitive/civilized is constructed at the 
linguistic level by the African vernacular/European language dichotomy.  The nineteenth- 
and twentieth-descriptions of the Cape Verdean language attest to this beliefs. Often it 
was labeled and called as “língua de trapos,” (language of rags) “corruptela,” (little 
corruption [of the Portuguese language]) “lingua infantil” (child language) and other 
derogatory terms.
57
 Civilization, modernity, citizenship and development, therefore, 
cannot be attained via African vernaculars. Needless to say, this ideology was accepted 
and even promoted by some of the colonized intelligentsia. As noted by Isabel Feo 
Rodrigues the mid-20
th
 century Cape Verdean colonized intelligentsia made tremendous 
intellectual contribution to the colonial domination project.
58
  
 The earliest defenses of the Cape Verdean language were carried out by the 
nativist liberal thinkers such as António de Paula Brito (1852-1894), Eugénio Tavares 
(1869-1930) and Pedro Cardoso (1890-1942).
59
 Through artistic expressions such as 
music and poetry and other activities such as op-ed pieces published in the colonial 
newspaper, these two thinkers were zealous defenders of the native language. Pedro 
Cardoso, one of the first to make public defense in favor of the native language, noted the 
inestimable value of the mother tongue as a medium of education—some thirty years 
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before the famous UNESCO’s position that children education bear better fruits when 
conducted  in the mother tongue.
60
   
The generation of Claridade, the literary cultural movement that spanned, 
intermittently, for almost 15 years (1936-1960) also had a say in the language question. 
Metalinguistically, the review promoted the native language. On its first number, a poem 
written in Cape Verdean Creole made the cover page. The fact that the cover of the 
journal had a poem in basilectal Creole is in itself a socio-political statement. The context 
of the text illustrates the significance of having a cover, of a first number of a major 
journal of the colonial elite, published in 1936. The second half of the 1930s was the time 
that the Estado Novo began to affirm itself as the new regime in Portugal and in the 
Empire—once all the opponents were almost totally neutralized and crushed. As an ultra-
colonialist, nationalist, and conservative regime, the Estado Novo was essentially about 
glorification of Portuguese culture and language. Accordingly there was no room for any 
exhibition of the colonized languages in the public realm. The colonial public sphere, 
chiefly in the urban areas, was to be completely exorcized of the native languages, 
leaving it open for the complete and hegemonic domination of the Portuguese language.
61
  
Baltazar Lopes da Silva, one of the most prominent members of the Claridade 
Movement, took an important step towards the affirmation of the language. His 1957 
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study of the Cape Verdean language, the first scholarly study done by a native speaker, 
brings much insight to the understanding of the social roles of the language.
62
 Yet, Lopes 
da Silva could not dissociate himself from the dominant colonial language ideology. For 
once, he maintained the colonial label that insisted that the Cape Verdean language was a 
dialect—and not a language on its own right. The employment of this label is politically 
consequential, as it aims to describe a certain identity point of view.  In other words, the 
Cape Verdean creole is taken to be a dialect of the Portuguese language, the language that 
provides most of its lexicon. If follows, thus, that the two languages (Portuguese and 
Creole) are closely and intimately related, to the point that one cannot speak of an 
autonomous linguistic system in Cape Verde. Subsequently, the people of Cape Verde, 
like their language, were unbreakably tied up to the Portuguese culture and nation.
63
  
Anti-colonial political nationalism of the late 1950s through 1970s was not 
accompanied by a fervent linguistic nationalism. In spite of declaratory exaltation of the 
native language, the nationalists of the 1960s did not pay as much attention to the 
language question. Anti-colonial activists were far more interested in the question of 
political independence and the issue of national development, minimizing thus the issue 
of language. The PAIGC, the party which led the liberation struggle and would in time 
form the post-colonial government in Cape Verde, did not have a rigorous and explicit 
language policy. Rather on the contrary, its language policy in many instances was built 
on the footsteps of the colonial language policy—e.g., the predominance of Portuguese in 
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education and public administration. The party’s position on the language question can be 
found in Amilcar Cabral’s own writing. In his Análise de Alguns Tipos de Resistência, 
Cabral laid out his thinking on language. He takes a purely instrumentalist approach, 
arguing that a language is no more than “an instrument for the men to relate among each 
other, an instrument, a means to speak, to express the realities of life and of the world.”64 
Colonial language, as an instrument, does not lead in itself to political and social 
alienation. Cabral argues rather on the contrary that the colonial language can be put at 
the service of the goal of national liberation and development insofar as it is the language 
of modernity.
65
 At the same time, Cabral, like many other African nationalists of the 
time, was rather skeptical of any socio-economic and political value of the vernaculars—
at least, right away. Fears of ethno-nationalisms and what he calls “opportunism”—
defense of one’s own ethnic language by many ethnic entrepreneurs—might have 
dictated his rather ambiguous position on the various indigenous languages.
66
 
Taking the distinction made by Eric Hobsbawm between mass, civic political and 
ethno-linguistic nationalism, it can be argued that PAIGC's nationalism was essentially 
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civic-territorial.
67
 Unlike ethno-nationalists, whose idea of nation is based on essentialist 
notions such as ethnic belonging, civic nationalists construct the nation based on the 
already defined territory. All of those who reside within the limits of the territory are, 
ipso facto, part of the nation—regardless of their ethnic origins. As a territorial and civic 
nationalist organization, PAIGC aspired to construct a new State—a federal state—that 
made up of the two colonies, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau. As such, the new post-
colonial state would have to be fundamentally multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic. The two 
territories share two common languages: the Portuguese language, the language inherited 
from colonialism, and the Portuguese-based Creole language. It should be noted that 
Cape Verdean Creole, chiefly the southern dialect (Sotavento), is mutually intelligible 
with the Guinean Creole (Kryol). Yet, while in the case of the former it is a native 
language of the people, in the case of the former Creole had essentially performed the 
role of communicative instrument across ethnic boundaries. In other words, Creole is 
nativized in Cape Verde—which is not the case in Guinea. This situation guarantees a 
comparative advantage to Cape Verdeans in the post-colonial federalism, should the 
Creole language was included as the official language.    
The period between the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship on April 25
t
, 1974, and 
the Independence on July 5, 1975, can be said to have been the zenith of cultural and 
linguistic nationalism in Cape Verde. While the official historiography has tended to 
show that the key political actors of this period were, in a way or another, linked to 
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PAIGC, spontaneous civic organizations were created, mainly in the urban areas, to 
buttress up the Cape Verdean language. For the first time, a heated debate on the 
language question took place in the public sphere, particularly via the written press and 
within civil society organizations. High school students of the capital city of Praia, for 
instance, demanded that the national language be used, in substitution of the Portuguese 
language, as the medium of instruction.
68
 New forms of writing Creole were put forth that 
would graphically augment the linguistic distance between the language and its lexifier.
69
   
The new post-colonial government, led by the revolutionary PAIGC, maintained 
the policy of “Portuguese-only” in education, media and public administration. Carlos 
Reis, the first minister of education in the post-colony, considered “indispensable the 
teaching of Portuguese.”70 The Ministry of Education’s decision was the result of the 
youth—particularly students from the high school in the capital city of Praia—reluctance 
to retain the Portuguese language as the medium of education.
71
  
The fact that many high school students were on the forefront of linguistic 
nationalism is not purely a historical accident. The precinct of high school, first in 
Mindelo (island of São Vicente, since 1917) and later in Praia (island of Santiago, since 
1960), was a major linguistic battleground. The high school, taken to be the ideal typical 
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area of modernity and cultural advancement, was supposed to be a “Portuguese-only” 
site. State and high school norms and regulations outlawed the used of the Cape Verdean 
language within the areas of high school. For this reason, Dulce Almada uses the 
expression “field of the linguistic exclusion” to refer to the ideologies and practices 
within the hig-h school precinct.
72
 
The main argument of the Ministry of Education was based on two main 
propositions. First, there was the influence of the colonial evolutionism, according to 
which the Cape Verdean language was supposedly as not developed as Portuguese.
73
 
Second, there was the idea that the Cape Verdean language was not unified given the 
plurality of dialects.
74
  
The Ministry of Education’s decision to follow a “Portuguese-only” education 
language policy can be interpreted in terms of political motives. To submit to the 
pressures of the students to institute the use of Cape Verdean language as a medium of 
education corresponds to submitting to societal demands. This would have created a 
terrible political precedent, which would create great political problems in future. It 
should be noted that the regime’s political creed was that the party guided society—and 
not the other way around.  
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At the same time, and related to the above explained reason, the decision for 
“Portuguese only” in education may be explained as a political strategy to undermine 
societal linguistic nationalism. Societal autonomy was something that the regime did 
neither want nor tolerate. If left unchecked linguistic nationalism would eventually 
evolve into political nationalism. In spite of its anti-colonial nationalist record, the 
PAIGC was moved by political pragmatism. Uncontrolled societal nationalism—
linguistic or otherwise—would eventually clash with political pragmatism of the regime.  
The importance of this decision cannot be overstated. It was a path-dependence 
changing moment. Ruth Collier and David Collier note that institutions endure 
throughout time and it is during the periods that they call “critical juncture” that 
institutional reforms are made possible.
75
 
This political decision, however, did not deter the language debate, which 
prolonged for another two to three years, after independence.
76
 In the end, the post-
colonial government followed a formula that was already entrenched in most of states in 
the region: the distinction between official and national languages, whereby Portuguese is 
granted the status of the former and the Cape Verdean language the status of the second.
77
 
In spite of this purely “declaratory” policy on the national language, it is not until the late 
                                                        
75
 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991). For an insightful analysis of the literature on critical juncture see Giovanni Capoccia and R. 
Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical 
Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, 3(2007): 341-369. 
76
 See for instance, among others, Luis Romano, “Luta de nôs Letrad,” Voz de Povo, May 3, 1976; “A 
Distinção entre Língua e Díalecto tem uma Base Política,” Voz de Povo, May 13, 1976; Mariano Verdeano 
Raimundo, “O Crioulo e o Português no future de Cabo Verde,” Voz de Povo, June 26, 1976; Artur Vieira, 
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1990s that some attempts were made towards changing the political status of the mother 
tongue in Cape Verde.  
Political discourse in post-colonial Cape Verde, as in other parts of Africa, was 
fundamentally based on the notions of economic development, leading the language 
question as a secondary issue. The ideology of “National Reconstruction”, put forth by 
the PAIGC in both Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, attests to this situation. Within the 
new post-colonial government, there were some linguistic nationalists who wanted to see 
the status of the language—or the language question—brought in to the fore. In spite of 
this, there were some attempts towards language corpus development.
78
  
In 1979, under leadership of Dulce Almada Duarte and financed by UNESCO, a 
linguistic colloquium took place in Mindelo (Cape Verde). The goal of the meeting was 
to bring Cape Verdean and international scholars, writers and educators, to discuss the 
language issue—pertaining to the Cape Verdean language. A chief outcome of the 
meeting was the establishment, for the first time in history, of a standard orthography for 
the language, based on the phonetic-phonological model.
79
 Given that the model made 
extensive use of diacritics, particularly circumflexes, critics labeled it as the “alfabeto de 
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chapéu” (translatable as the hat’s alphabet, given its overuse of the diacritical marks, 
chiefly the circumflex).
80
 
In 1989, another meeting was convened, which brought in those engaged in 
literacy campaign and education. Given the level of criticism of the model adopted in 
1979, the meeting radically changed the alphabet to be proposed for the writing of the 
Cape Verdean language. Unlike the model of 1979, fundamentally informed by linguistic 
theory, the new system adopted in 1989 relied on the sociolinguistic aspect of it—
particularly whether it would be accepted or rejected by the community.
81
   
Multi-party electoral democracy, instituted in 1991, has given new impetus to the 
language debate. In 1993, under the aegis of the Linguistics Department of the National 
Instituto of Culture (INAC), a new writing proposal was considered--the Unified 
Alphabet for the Writing of the Cape Verdean language, known by its Portuguese 
acronym ALUPEC. The new model was so-called as unified alphabet given the fact that 
it sought to create a consensus between the two previously adopted models (1979 and 
1989).  In 1998, the government approved, for experimental use, a new orthography 
called ALUPEC (Unifed Alphabet for the Writing of Cape Verdean Language).
82
 A “war 
of orthography” ensued, as those opposing ALUPEC criticized and debased it for it being 
de-linked with the Portuguese etymology. Debate on the language question in Cape 
Verde has always been with Portuguese as the reference: either for linguistic distancing 
or closeness. Moreover, as those leading the project decided to choose the basilectal Cape 
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Verdean Creole, this has further augmented opposition among the cultural elite, still 
attached to the Portuguese language.   
 Constitutional reform debates of the following year simply made clear that the 
political elite were not really interested in granting the status of official language to the 
mother tongue. Party politics, in a way, dictated the outcome, as it had created a “winner-
take-all” aura. Almost on every issue, including the language question, the two parties 
were irreconcilable. In the end, the Constitution was amended to dictated a Portuguese-
only official language—though there is a clause mentioning that the state would take 
measures towards advancement of the mother tongue (again a mere declaratory policy). 
Incompatible political perspectives between the two parties would play again in the 2010 
Constitutional reforms debate. As a decade earlier, nothing had changed in the 
Constitutional approach to language policy: the same old principle, established in 1999, 
was kept almost intact.  
 The issue of process of officialization of Cape Verdean Language has been eroded 
by two inter-related forces, one endogenous and the other exogenous. At the endogenous 
levels, there has been a language conflict regarding which dialect of the language to be 
chosen as the standard norm. Some linguistic nationalists from the island of Santiago, 
such as Manuel Veiga or Marciano Moreira, believe that the dialect of Santiago is an 
ideal choice, because of the island’s demographic, political and economic weight. Focus 
has been, for symbolic reasons, on the basilectal Creole of Santiago, the one that is 
farther from the lexifier. Local elites mainly from Sao Vicente, the second most 
important island of Cape Verde, were those who are expressing dissent against such a 
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move.
83
 As far as the exogenous threat that account for the subordinate position of the 
mother tongue in the formal public sphere, it can be found in the global politics of the 
Portuguese language, which is developed below.  
 
The Creole Language, Race, and Social Classes 
Language is more than a simple communicative device. Its functions are not merely 
related to the conveying of expressions, ideas, ideals and emotions. A language is also an 
index of social standing, distinction and power. The language that one talks often brings 
paralinguistic assumptions about the speaker. In this section I seek to highlight the 
historical connections that exist between the Creole language, social classes, and race.  
 One way to properly analyze the connection with the above-mentioned variables 
is to create temporal classifications about social perceptions on the Cape Verdean 
language. In other words, a periodic cataloguing can be established depending on the 
predominance of a certain language ideology. It should be pointed out that this 
periodization is purely analytical and the time slots are not to be taken as written in stone. 
In fact, as it will be shown below, representations about the language from one stage 
often finds it being reproduced in the following stages. In the first stage, from the 
beginning of colonization and slavery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to the 
development of modern colonialism in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
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 Creolists talk about Creole continuum to refer to the different levels of the Creole language, ranging from 
the basilect, that is, the Creole dialect far removed from the lexifier (the acrolect or the European language 
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approximate, in lexicon, phonology or even syntax, the lexifier. For more on this see Derek Bickerton, 
Dynamics of a Creole System (Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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Creole language was classified as the “language of the blacks.” In the second stage, from 
the late nineteenth century to the 1930s and 1940s, the central representation on the Cape 
Verdean language was that it was a language of low and uneducated social classes. Since 
the independence, the Cape Verdean creole was given the status of a national language.  
 Earliest records about description of the Cape Verdean language, as previously 
noted, were basically derogatory and deprecating. In the early nineteenth century the 
Creole language was a national language, spoken by almost all—including those coming 
from Europe. This situation would change with the advent of modern colonialism in the 
mid-1800s. The deleterious descriptions about the Creole language of the second half of 
the nineteenth century onwards became were given “scientific” support, as they were 
influenced by the theories of scientific racism and Social Darwinism. The discourse of 
civilization and primitiveness—the central element in the colonial discourse and 
practice—extended to the camp of linguistics: non-European languages, particularly 
Creole and African languages, were taken to be without any social and cultural value.
84
 
Early scientific description of the Creole languages categorized them as a construct of an 
inferior race.
85
  In Portugal, the idea of Creole as a product of an inferior race was also 
developed by several scholars. Thus, Vasconcelos wrote that Creole languages were 
“modifications that the European civilized languages suffered in non-European lands, in 
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 For an example of 19
th
 century French scholarship on the development of Creole languages see Salikoko 
S. Mufwene, “Race, Racialism, and the Study of Language Evolution in America,” in New Perspectives on 
Language Variety in the South: Historical and Contemporary Approaches, ed. Michael D. Picone and 
Catherine Evans Davies (Tuscaloosa : University of Alabama Press, 2014), 450. 
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the month of the people of inferior civilization.”86 The baby talk theory of development 
of Creole found its heyday around this time. According to this theory, Creole develops as 
the minds of the slaves/Africans were similar to that of a baby. For this reason, the 
slaves/Africans, were thought to be equipped with “primitive” minds and, as such, could 
only distort the European languages.
87
  
 Modern Portuguese colonialism in Cape Verde (mid- to late nineteenth century) 
produced radical social changes. First, little by little the power of the landed class was 
drastically reduced.
88
 Second, and as noted above, there was a renewed attempt of the 
colonial state to penetrate and truly control and manage society. One of the mechanisms 
to such a desideratum was the implementation of public education in the colony. Third, 
these new developments eventually led to the formation of what can be called a colonial 
public sphere—a site of dialogue and interchange among the local elite. The colonial 
public sphere included not only actual physical spaces such as clubs, libraries, theaters 
but also “virtual” areas such as newspapers. The development of these institutions is 
dated back to the mid-1800s.
89
 The ultimate consequence of these developments was the 
reinforcement of the Portuguese language—at the expense of the Creole language, which 
was pushed out of the public arena.  
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 Vasconcellos cited in Luiza Castello Branco, “A palavra crioulo em discursos sobre a Língua de Cabo 
Verde,” Fragmentum 33 (2012), 35.    
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 See Holm, An Introduction to Pidgins and Creoles, 33.  
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 In terms of racial composition, Cape Verde is divided into three large groups: 
whites (about 1%-2%), blacks (about 30%) and mulattoes (about 68%).
90
 The dominant 
racial ideology in Cape Verde, since the late colonial period, heavily influenced by 
Brazilian ideologies of Lusotropicalism, racial democracy and mestiçismo, maintains that 
the country is a colorblind society.
91
 The ideology of mestiçismo, the cult of the mulattoes 
and miscegenation, has since the 1930s became the dominant social ideology in Cape 
Verde. The nation has been imagined as a Creole or mulatto society, which presupposes 
that cultural marks taken to be quintessential African to be suppressed.
92
   
Under close scrutiny this idea of a colorblind society easily breaks apart. For one, 
a form of cultural racism persisted according to which European systems of values, 
aesthetic forms and ideas of human beauty superimpose African’s. Second, the positions 
of authority and power are often occupied by those of light-skin color. The few blacks 
that are in these positions may well be a form of token representation. Black Cape 
Verdeans, particularly those from the countryside, face more obstacles to social upward 
movement than other social categories. While other racial categories can be found among 
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 It is to be noted that racial classification in Cape Verde, which inherited from Portugal colonial 
classification, differs from that of the United States. In the former, a racial continuum exists and the 
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lower classes, a large percentage of black Cape Verdeans, descending from the former 
slaves and/or poor peasants, make up the bottom of the social ladder.  
 In terms of social classes, society in Cape Verde can be categorized in three major 
social classes: upper class, middle class and lower class. Given the diglossia since the 
colonial times, coupled with the fact that the state is still the major employer, social 
mobility is dependent on cultural and linguistic capitals (formal education and Portuguese, 
respectively).  Upper classes have more contact with the Portuguese language. Family 
and professional reasons permit the members of this class to use the Portuguese language 
on a daily basis. Among members of this class one finds a particular sub-category that I 
call “Afro-Lusitans” (of which more below).   
 
Table 4. Social Class and the Main Language of Communication 
Social Class   Members    Medium of Communication  
Upper Class   Liberal professional    Bilingual: Portuguese and Creole  
   Medium to High-level    Public Sphere: Portuguese  
State Employees    Private Sphere: Portuguese/Creole       
Big-Medium Business  
 
Middle Class  Low-echelon state employees  Creole (sermo politicus)  
   Private business employees  
 
Lower class  Peasantry     Creole (fundo) 
   Urban working people  
   Urban and Rural unemployed 
Source: Baltasar Lopes da Silva, O dialecto crioulo de Cabo Verde.  
 
    
Upper and middle classes have far more contact with the Portuguese language—
either in their public and private lives. The predominance of this language has resulted in 
a new type of Creole, heavily influenced by the morphology, syntax and neologisms from 
Portuguese. Baltazar Lopes da Silva noted in his study of the Cape Verdean language 
more than half a century ago of the existence of two types of the Cape Verdean Creole: 
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the “crioulo fundo” (literally “the deep Creole”), the traditional Creole, and what he 
termed sermo politus, used among the culturati and intelligentsia.
93
   
The current linguistic situation in Cape Verde can be further understood with the 
resource of the functions carried by the two languages (see table 5). Albert Valdman, in 
his study of Haiti, considers different situations in which the two languages (French and 
Haitian Creole) are used as the medium.
94
 The vernacular function refers to the 
application of the language for day-to-day communication with those who are part of the 
intimate circle (friends, family, and neighbors). The vehicular function, as the name 
indicates, is about establishing a communicative bridge with other social groups, within 
or outside the community. The third aspect discussed by Valdman is the referential 
function: which language is employed for the transmission of the cultural heritage of the 
society. The magico-religious functions have to do with the application of the language 
for extra-earthly forces. The case of the functions of symbolization of power has to do 
with the fact that a language is a marker of social status and an instrument of social and 
political power.  
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 Baltasar Lopes da Silva, O dialecto crioulo de Cabo Verde  ([Lisboa]: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 
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Table 5. Modes of language functioning in Cape Verde 
Language Functions   Monolingual Community  Bilingual Community 
Vernacular    CVL     CVL/PL  
Vehicular  
      within Cape Verde  CVL    CVL/PL 
      outside Cape Verde  CVL    PL/FL/EL/CVL  
Referential    PL     PL   
Magico-Religious   CVL/PL    CVL/PL  
Symbolization of Power   PL     PL  
PL: Portuguese; FL: French; EL: English; CVL: Cape Verdean Language.  
Adapted from Albert Valdman, “Diglossia and Language Conflict in Haiti,” International Journal of the 
Sociology of Language 71 (1988), 70. 
 
Many among the political and economic elite believe that language does not have 
any real impact onto one’s socio-economic upward mobility—and, at the same time, 
political aspirations. For instance, Victor Borges, a former minister of education and 
foreign affairs, during the 2000s, claims that technical knowledge, resulting from college 
education, and not fluency in the Portuguese language, as the main root cause for social 
advancement.
95
 He pointed out that there are many Cape Verdeans, raised in non-
Portuguese speaking countries (but in a western European language such as English or 
French), who returned to Cape Verde and yet made it.
96
   
 This argument has two main faults. First, the relationship between Portuguese and 
other European languages, such as French and English is not the same as that vis-à-vis 
the Cape Verdean language. Given the power and economic structures as well as 
international prestige that underpins those two languages, their speakers are more often 
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 Victor Borges, interviewed by Abel Djassi Amado, Bridgewater State University, September 27, 2011.  
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 Victor Borges uses the case of José Brito, as an illustrative example. Brito was born and raised in Cote 
d’Ivoire, of Cape Verdean parents. When he first moved to Cape Verde, in the 1980s, to become part of 
government, his knowledge of the Portuguese language was inferior of a typical member of the political 
and cultural elite. One fact that cannot be neglected is that he was fluent in another European language 
(French), which carries as much power and prestige as the Portuguese language.  
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than not embraced with social prestige and distinction. Second, knowledge production 
and dissemination has been tied up with these European languages.  
 
 
Creole Societies and the Politics of Language  
The islands of Cape Verde are one of many sovereign and dependent territories in which 
a creole language is widely spoken by its population. Jamaica, Haiti or Mauritius are 
examples of independent and sovereign states with a Creole language spoken throughout 
the territory. The cases of Martinique and Guadeloupe (integral part of the French 
Republic), or the called ABC islands—Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao—part of the 
Netherlands, are examples of dependent Creole societies. The politics of the Creole 
language, whether in independent sovereign states or in dependent territories, can be 
analyzed in terms of similarity or difference.  
 One common point, which can be applied to all societies with a Creole language, 
is the legacy of the colonial language ideology, in which Creole is considered all but a 
language. Without exception, these different creoles were labelled as “broken,” 
“degenerate,” “corrupt” languages. Needless to say that these Creoles were—and still 
are—thought not to have the properties to serve in certain, official and public domains—
such as education, public administration, and the like. Diglossia, the social and political 
superimposition of one language over another, is a sociolinguistic condition common to 
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most of creole societies.
97
 Given the fact that a large segment of society stigmatizes the 
Creole language, the process of its officialization and/or use as a medium of education 
has often been controversial and difficult.
98
 
 If one takes the current “co-habitation” with the lexifier language, two main types 
of speech communities can be found (see table 6). The first situation is related to the 
cases in which the Creole language “cohabits” with its lexifier. This category can be 
further broken down in two distinct subcategories: a) the cases of Cape Verde, Jamaica or 
Haiti, in which the lexifier is the official language of the state, the main language of 
politics and the main language of education; b) the cases of Mauritius or Seychelles 
where the lexifier (French in this case), while still in use, is not the language of power, a 
position that is held by English. The second category corresponds to situations where a 
Creole language “cohabits” with another European language as the high language, which 
is not its lexifier. The examples of the ABC islands (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao) are 
illustrative examples of this categories. As these islands are politically dependent and are 
an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch is the main language of power. 
The lexifier of their creoles (Spanish and Portuguese) are absent in those speech 
communities.  
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Table 6. Creole Languages and the Lexifiers 
Country  Lingua Franca   Lexifier   Official and Political Language   
Haiti  Haitian Creole   French    French/Haiti  
Jamaica   Jamaican Patwa   English    English  
Cape Verde C.V. Creole   Portuguese   Portuguese  
ABC  Papiamentu   Portuguese/Spanish Dutch/Papiamento  
Mauritius  M. Creole   French    English/French/Creole  
Seychelles  S. Creole   French   English/French/Creole    
ABC islands: Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao.  
Source: Compilation by the author. 
 
With this this typology in mind it would easier to concur with C. Jourdan’s 
argument that when the Creole language and its lexifier share the same speech 
community, the former often lacks linguistic and sociocultural legitimacy.
99
 In order 
words, the process of making the Creole languages official and/or upgrading their social 
status (status planning) in their respective habitat depends on the existence of the 
lexifier—or lack thereof. Social and political recognition of the Creole languages have 
been more forthcoming in the second subcategory—as in the islands of Mauritius or 
Seychelles—and in the second category (the ABC islands).  
 In the cases of Cape Verde, Jamaica or Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, given 
the presence of the lexifier, particularly in the realm of the officialdom, has made the 
process of turning their respective creole into a medium to be used in education and other 
formal domains extremely difficult. For one, given the fact that the Creole lexical corpus 
borrows extensively from the base language, historically there has been a social stigma 
attached to the Creole, which considers it as an erroneous way of speaking the high 
language.  
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Moreover, language conflict has also been observed within the Creole language itself, 
relatively to corpus planning (standardization and graphization of Creole). Several 
scholars have noted that the campaign for standardization and graphization of different 
Creoles are indeed a linguistic battleground. The choice for an orthography, more than a 
simple choice of which symbols should be used to write the language, is above all a 
political statement. Those proposing a pro-etymology orthography seek to strength the 
links between the Creole language and its lexifier. On the other hand, those seeking to 
construct a more phonological orthography aim precisely the linguistic independence by 
increasing the symbolic differences with the lexifier.
100
 Given the situation, these post-
colonial Creole islands have developed into a system of mandarinate, in which the 
defining element is the knowledge of the lexifier.
101
 This is because the state has been 
controlled by a tiny linguistic elite.
102
 
 
The International Weight of the Portuguese Language  
The legacy of the Portuguese colonial language policy has resulted in two interrelated 
phenomena, lusophilia and the Afro-Lusitan identity. I define the concept of lusophilia as 
as a set of beliefs and attitudes considering the superiority of the Portuguese culture and 
language, particularly in the context of colonized culture. This concept explains the 
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reasons why the Portuguese language has become a target of exaltation and adulation in 
the post-colony. The adulation of the Portuguese language is either direct, through 
statements exalting the putative qualities of the language, such as its lyricism and 
aesthetics, or indirectly, through continuous efforts to invest far more time and resources 
into mastering that language (vis-à-vis native language).  
 Adulation of the former colonizer’s language is something that can be observed 
across post-colonial Africa. No other example fits better here than Senegal’s first 
president, Leopold Senghor. Senghor, a man of letters, was widely known for his love, 
worship and admiration of the French language. This explains why he was behind la 
Francophonie project. Noting the differences between the French and African languages, 
Senghor writes that:   
Because we are cultural half-castes, because, although we feel as Africans, we 
express ourselves as Frenchmen, because French is a language with a universal 
vocation, because our message is addressed to the Frenchmen of France as well as 
to other men, because French is a language of “graciousness and civility.” ... I 
know what its resources are because I have tasted and digested and taught it, and 
it is a language of the gods. 
103
 
  
Senghor is not alone in this. Several other post-colonial intellectuals and political 
activists have also shown same adoration for the language of the former colonial power. 
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For instance, for the Haitian writer Léon Laleau, the knowledge of the French language 
and its figures of speech is equivalent to “belong[ing] to a kind of international order.... 
Even in a country of racial discrimination the biggest doors hesitate to close to a black 
man who can use French elegantly.”104  
Similar patterns of thinking are seen in post-colonial Cape Verde. It is not 
uncommon for the literati, intellectuals and intelligentsia, to declare public adulation for 
the Portuguese language. Ondina Ferreira, for instance, a former minister of culture 
during the 1990s, and perhaps one of the most ardent proponents of a Portuguese-only (as 
official language) policy, writes that:  
A calamity, because [the Portuguese language] is the richest communication 
medium that we have in terms of the development of logical, philosophical, 
ontological, existential, technological and scientific thinking. Because it is a 
source of communication forged for such and stands to lose this wealth of 
communication with a “laissez passer” and some contempt to his intellectual 
community that does not leave the arena in defense of the Portuguese language.
105
  
 
 
Ondina Ferreira thinks that the wave of Creole as an official language is very powerful to 
the point that it may force the Portuguese language out of the islands. In fact, elsewhere 
she talks about the dangers of the “impurity” of the Portuguese language as it is spoken in 
Cape Verde. The confluence of the two languages in a small space would lead to negative 
interferences of the subordinate language onto the dominant, official language.  
                                                        
104
 Léon Laleau cited in Brian Weinstein, “Francophonie: A Language-Based Movement in World Politics”. 
International Organization, 30, no. 3 (1976): 500.  
105
  Ondina Ferreira, “A Comunidade Intelectual não sai em defesa da Língua Portuguesa,” Expresso das 
Ilhas,  April 1, 2009, http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/pt/noticias/go/ondina-ferreira---a-comunidade-
intelectual-nao-sai-em-defesa-da-lingua-portuguesa> (accessed May 2, 2013, my translation) 
163 
 
 
 
Ondina Ferreira adopts a superstratist approach to the Cape Verdean language, 
according to which there is a close and direct genetic linkage between the Cape Verdean 
Creole and the Portuguese language.
106
 She states that “Portuguese paternity of our 
language cannot be negated.”107 This is a common notion accepted by most of Cape 
Verdean lusophile superstratists: the understanding of the language is made static at the 
level of the lexicon, and conveniently casting aside other linguistic aspects such as syntax 
and morphology, which approximate the language to West African linguistic systems.
108
 
How a Creole language is constructed becomes, as such, an ideology of identity.   
 The second outcome of the modern colonial language is the formation of a social 
group who I call the Afro-Lusitans. I adopt this from the insight of Mazrui’s concept of 
Afro-Saxons, an African social group who increasingly use English as the main vehicle 
for daily and private communications.
109
 My concept of Afro-Lusitan refers to the 
Africans who have Portuguese as their mother tongue or have opted to make the 
Portuguese language as the language of the private sphere—that is, the language used 
within the realm of friends, family and intimacy in general.  For the Afro-Lusitan, the 
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Portuguese language is not only a medium of societal (and private) communication. It is 
the identitary element par excellence, which permits the distinction to other social 
groups. The use of the Portuguese language in private sphere reinforces their special 
identity.  In the post-colonial context, in which there is a premium on fluency of the 
European language, this group is very well positioned as it has complete mastery over the 
dominant language.  
  Historically, several voices among Cape Verdean intelligentsia have long argued 
that the Portuguese language was the essential and the only plausible medium capable of 
fully inserting the country in the proposed Luso-Brazilian community. The Afro-Lusitan 
and the lusophiles may have been the social strata that most supported the maintenance of 
special relations with the former colonial power.
110
 Their privileged position in the post-
colony, as agents of the state and/or members of the local intellectual and intelligentsia 
community, simply reinforces the Portuguese language domination, particularly because: 
a) they are social role models and the group as a whole establishes what is socially 
acceptable; b) their close relations with the metropolitan elite, who make use of this 
connection to further and deepen the relations between the post-colony and the former 
metropolitan power.  
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 More recently, the political and social predominance of the Portuguese language 
was reinforced with the institutionalization of a language-based international organization, 
the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP, in its Portuguese acronym).
111
 
The constituting document of the CPLP considers that the group constitutes 
“geographical discontinuous space but identified by a common language [i.e., the 
Portuguese language].”112 Underpinning the CPLP is the ideology of Lusofonia. It is, in a 
way, a newer version of the lusotropicalist ideology, seeking to whiten history by 
completely erasing the legacy of violence and imposition that was part of the colonial 
experience. Lusofonia, as an ideology and an institution finds its predecessors in the 
colonial period: arguments for the establishment of Luso-Brazilian Community; 
Lusotropicalism; Zona Escudo (monetary and fiscal unity).  The key tenet of the ideology 
of Lusofonia is the notion that the Portuguese language constitutes a “historical link and a 
common patrimony resulting from the multi-secular coexistence.”113  
Organizations such as la Francophonie or the CPLP reproduce the dominant 
position of the European languages in the former colonies. At the same time, they create 
new structures for “strategy of extraversion” that is, the instrumental attachment to the 
                                                        
111
 The CPLP was officially created in Lisbon in 1996 by the head of states of the seven states that have 
Portuguese language as the official language: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
Portugal and Sao Tome and Principe. While it is based on the principle of equality, Portugal and Brazil are 
clearly the two countries that could reap the most benefits from the organization that supports and spread 
the language. It is important to note, however, that the CPLP pretends to be an organization that is beyond 
linguistic promotion/protection. The objective is the edification of a moral international community based 
on liberal values (e.g., one of the conditions for membership is that the candidate-state must have the rule 
of law). La Francophonie was created in 1973. Weinstein defines it as “a worldwide movement of 
interlocking elites working toward permanent association on linguistic grounds […] seek[ing] to advance 
the use of French for the sake of the language and to pursue political and economic interests in and between 
states.” See  Weinstein, “Francophonie.”, 485.    
112
 CPLP, “Declaracao Constitutiva,” http://www.cplp.org/Default.aspx?ID=48 (accessedJanuary 3, 2012).  
113
 Ibid.  
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former colonial powers to gather resources to be used for neo-patrimonial politics or for 
blocking domestic opposition.
114
   
 
 
Conclusion  
The aim of the chapter was to present a short description of the Portuguese colonial 
language policy as well as the development of a nativist discourse on the mother tongue. 
Looking back to the past is a mechanism that allows us to uncover present social forces 
and the extent to which these forces might have gathered momentum over the years. 
From the historical institutionalist approach, the colonial language policy can be well 
characterized by path dependence: the cost (political or otherwise, for the local elite or 
others) of changing it may be well over the costs of maintaining.  
 The study of the colonial language policy permits one to better understand how 
the institutions of the state and other non-state institutions, particularly the Catholic 
Church, embed the European language in their core. The institutional linkage between the 
colonial and post-colonial states implied that the language of the former colonizer would 
maintain a privileged status within the society. As the status of the colonial language 
suffers minimal or no change within the configuration of the post-colonial society, post-
colonial politics resembles much of the old political structures of the colonial period: the 
splitting of two different realms, the state and the society, defined, among other things, by 
                                                        
114 On the notion of “strategy of extraversion” see Jean-François Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of 
Extraversion,” African Affairs. 99, no. 395 (2000): 217-267. 
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the prevailing language in each domain. The linguistic divide, as such, reinforces the 
distance and curtails the people’s participation in the processes of controlling the state.   
The colonial language policy still has an impact on the dominant language 
ideology. The post-colonial elites’ beliefs and attitudes towards language have been 
described as biased in favor of the former colonial language (and, not infrequently, biased 
against the indigenous languages). Often, the former colonizer’s language is exalted and 
constructed as the only viable means towards social, political and technical modernity. 
Subsequently, efforts are constantly made to block any attempts to promote the 
indigenous languages.  
The Portuguese language is the sole official language of the state. Revolutionary 
enthusiasm of 1974 and 1975 did not translate in the higher status for the Cape Verdean 
language. Such a situation may be the result of the fact that the PAIGC, the party that 
fought for independence and controlled power after independence, supported territorial 
nationalism that did not much emphasize the language as a symbol for mobilization. It is 
also the result of the fact of the political objective of unification of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde. In the event of such a unification, making the Cape Verdean language an 
official language in Cape Verde would have given a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the 
Bissau-Guineans  
The post-colonial state building and its emphasis on nation-building paid no 
serious attention to the language question. While political discourse emphasized the 
national language, political practice seemed to condemn the Cape Verdean language to its 
secondary status and role. During the first fifteen years, the language question was not 
168 
 
 
 
placed among the key issues in the governmental agenda. It suffices to note that 
government and/or party documents included no design for status planning of the Cape 
Verdean language. The elites’ linguistic conservatism prevailed.  
The opening of the political realm and the subsequent transition to electoral 
democracy in the early 1990s created new opportunities for the national language. 
Attempts were made towards corpus planning of the Cape Verdean language—through 
the creation of an official alphabet, the so-called ALUPEC. In spite of these 
developments, current language policy in Cape Verde remains that of a diglossia, with 
the predominance of the Portuguese language guaranteed in the domains of authority and 
power. It is not uncommon for the elites to defend the higher status of Portuguese, often 
at the expense of the mother tongue.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ILLEGIBLE STATE AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL   
 
 
 
 
To many citizens, the state in Cape Verde is concealed because it is illegible. To 
understand this situation I developed the concept of illegible state, which, as it will be 
seen below relates to the fact that the common citizens find it quite difficult to supervise 
the state, its institutions and personnel. This is so because of the linguistic gap between 
them. The state has developed a linguistic shell difficult to be penetrated in by a sizeable 
proportion of its citizens. This means that the comprehension of the state and its 
operations is a herculean task for the many. Yet, the process of gathering information on 
the state is a sine qua non for the citizens’ proper supervision and democratic control. The 
use of the Portuguese language, in spite of its linguistic proximity to the Cape Verdean 
language, the people’s mother tongue, provokes a political short-circuit between the state 
and a significant number of population, whereby the power of control of the latter over 
the former is greatly reduced.  
 The chapter argues the state’s almost sole reliance on the former colonial 
language impairs the ability of the monoglot citizen—those who are not proficient in the 
Portuguese language—to grasp its operations, procedures, and processes. The difficulty 
of understanding the nuts and bolts of the state is in part caused by the linguistic 
differences. This, in turn, negatively impacts the citizens’ overall ability to exercise 
vertical accountability over the state’s elected and appointed officials. Moreover, the 
media, a channel that could simplify the state for the citizens, is linguistically allied to the 
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state. Media information is overwhelmingly in the high language (Portuguese), which 
hinders the enlightened understanding of politics. This, in the last instance, translates as 
an overall decrease of the quality of democracy insofar as a sizeable portion of citizens 
can’t access the performance of the state from which they are linguistically isolated.  
 This chapter is divided into four main sections. Following the introduction, I 
examine the people’s own perception and mental constructions regarding the state and its 
agents—particularly the high-level state agents. Then, I proceed to look at the 
relationship that exists among the state, media and the citizen. My point is that the media 
is not helping the process of making the state legible for the common citizen insofar as it 
allies linguistically with the state. I introduce the media and their role in this linguistic 
divide and the extent that they may contribute to further isolation of the state vis-à-vis 
society. In the third section, I explore the state illegibility, weak democratic control and 
its impact on the quality of democracy in Cape Verde. Then I analyze all the linguistic 
strategies of the state elite. In the conclusion where I critically highlight all the major 
points throughout the chapter.  
 
Citizens’ Perception about the State in Cape Verde 
In this section, I will start by describing how the common citizen perceives the state, 
from the linguistic point of view. In other words, my key objectives are to: a) highlight 
the dominant language ideology that pervades the Cape Verdean society—though most 
are unaware of it; b) demonstrate the extent that this ideology truly informs the way that 
people see the state.  
171 
 
 
 
The further up a state agent is in the administrative ladder the more the linguistic 
distance that he or she has vis-à-vis the common citizen. Certain offices of the state are 
more linguistically friendly to the citizen than others. I often asked my informants about 
their linguistic interaction between with the state’s offices. During one of the focus 
groups interviews, a male high school graduate, in his early twenties, told me:  
There are state agencies in which if you can’t speak Portuguese you would not go 
further. I have been through so many constraints for not knowing to speak 
Portuguese correctly.
1
 
 
 The state agents, particularly those placed in high echelon of the public 
administration bureaucracy, use primarily Portuguese. For instance, in the courts the 
working language is Portuguese, even when the defendant does not speak the language 
(in which case, he or she must count on the translation or explanations from his or her 
attorney). In some other agencies, particularly those that deal with the average citizen on 
a daily basis communication takes place in the Cape Verdean language. As part of my 
research, I visited some of the state’s agencies to observe how people behaved socio-
linguistically. One of the state offices I often visited was the Conservatory of the Records 
in the neighborhood of Txada Santu Antoni. Primary communication between the citizen 
and the clerk was in the native language. In other institutions, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, the encounter takes place in Portuguese. Yet, even when Portuguese is 
used the trend, people tended to respond in their native language. A young female 
informant told me that in the state offices where Portuguese is the primary language use, 
                                                        
1
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cabo Verde), 
August 11, 2011. The focus groups interviews were all conducted in the Cape Verdean language. All 
translations of the interviews were done by the author.  
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many of the citizens conducting business with the state would retort in the Cape Verdean 
language. She said that:   
Creole has a lot of [social] weight. It is difficult to go to the [public] 
administration [offices] and to speak Portuguese. Even when we are 
communicated with in Portuguese, we often respond in Creole.
2
 
 
Bilingual citizens do not face similar constraints. Their being fluent in the high 
language is a form of symbolic capital that can be used to their advantage. To be 
proficient in Portuguese is to be fully equipped with what Pierre Bourdieu calls linguistic 
capital, that is, high social value and distinction deriving from being proficient or a native 
speaker of a dominant and prestigious language.
3
 This ultimately results in preferential 
treatments by the state agent. Language is understood by all as a marker of social identity 
and status within society. Being fluent in the language is an asset that can be translated in 
tangible advantages. Speaking the dominant language often means a drastic improvement 
in the services provided by the state. To put it differently linguistic differences incur 
different levels of access to the state. A female informant, in her mid-twenties working 
for the community radio station, recounted an experience she had at the Conservatory of 
the Records in the neighborhood of Txada Santu Antoni (in the city of Praia):  
Like everybody else, I was waiting for my number to be called to be attended by 
the clerk. Then, a gentleman came in and went straight to the clerk. He began to 
speak in Portuguese and things changed automatically. The clerk became 
friendlier. About ten minutes later he took the paperwork he came in for and 
left—while we were all waiting for our turn.4 
 
                                                        
2
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.    
3
 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. 
4
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Achada Santo Antonio-Artica 
(Praia, Cabo Verde), August 2011.   
173 
 
 
 
Similar situations are common, I was told by many. It was no surprise for me to learn that 
they either had experienced directly or have heard of it. In fact, being myself a native of 
the islands, I recall how speaking Portuguese in public was an asset that opened doors 
and made services go faster. Situations like this create a perception that the state 
categorizes and creates a hierarchy among its citizens. It leads to a common perception 
that some citizens are effectively more equal than others. 
This type of situation can also be extended to the access of information about the 
state.  The monolingual citizen is doubly disadvantaged. For one, he or she cannot access 
the information about the state directly for not having the proper skills to grasp the 
information which are locked in a language that is different from what he or she uses. 
Even worse, as a speaker of subordinate language, the language of low prestige, the 
ordinary citizen may find him/herself with a limited capacity to extract information 
from/about the state—and/or from its agents.   
My informants were aware of the linguistic distance that exists between the 
vernacular and the language of power. In spite of the fact that Creole derives from the 
Portuguese language, it is an entirely different.
5
 The use of one language or the other 
result in either political inclusion or exclusion. A young man told me that  
I believe that [communication] in Cape Verdean language is far better […] some 
of my colleagues may understand it better when it is in Cape Verdean language 
than in Portuguese. [Moreover] there are many words in Portuguese that many 
people often don’t get to understand what it is discussed.6 
  
                                                        
5
 Macedo, A Linguistic Approach to the Capeverdean Language; Manuel Veiga, Diskrison strutural di 
lingua kabuverdianu (Praia, Cape Verde: Institutu Kabuverdianu di Livru, 1982).    
6
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.   
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Another young male, with high school diploma and searching for job, went further:  
I also believe that in Cape Verdean language people understand better [… and] 
interpret better the sentences [uttered]. The Portuguese language has many words 
that one has hard time understanding them. So, when you are around a politician 
[who speaks in Portuguese language] you are pointlessly clapping your hands as 
you may have no idea what you are supporting.
7
 
 
A third informant, a young woman in her early twenties, commented:  
I believe that both the Portuguese and the Cape Verdean languages should be 
made official languages. Sometimes, many people face embarrassment as in many 
state’s offices as they can’t speak Portuguese.8 
 
Many of my informants (and I have observed similar situations) have told me that 
the use of different languages in the public administration means different treatment. 
Some of them have even recounted their own experiences regarding this. One of the 
experiences that is quite anecdotal is worth sharing here:   
My friend [who is a proficient bi-lingual] asked me to go with him for some 
errands—that included various stops at different state offices for certain 
documents that he need to take to the port authorities as to get some of his stuff he 
imported from Portugal. In the first few offices we went my friend spoke Cape 
Verdean language with the clerks. While he obtained the necessary paperwork he 
needed, they gave him some hard time. He then decided that thenceforth in the 
other offices and at the Port Authority he would speak Portuguese. Not only did it 
become relatively easier for him to get what he was looking for, but the office 
manager came from the inside to talk to him to make sure that everything was 
fine.
9
 
 
                                                        
7
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.   
8
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.   
9
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Achada Santo Antonio-
Achada Riba (Praia, Cabo Verde), August 2011. 
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This situation is understood by almost all. The members of the political and 
cultural elite understood that their using the Portuguese translates into faster and more 
efficient results. Take for instance the affirmation of the writer Rui Figueiredo:  
[In Cape Verde] people use Portuguese, when in contact with others and expect 
 respect. When you go a [state] service, to a store or to a place where you would 
 get a service in [the island of] Sao Vicente you start talking to the people in 
 Portuguese. Because certainly they would call you Mister; and give you a better 
 service.
10
  
 
What is important to retain from the above quotations is the perception of the 
language in social interaction. Portuguese is accepted as the currency of high social status 
and education. Those employing it are often taken to be part of the higher echelon of the 
social and political ladder. In other words, the employment of the Portuguese language 
invites respect, admiration, and high opinion about the speaker.  Therefore, it becomes 
one key element of social distinction—by the speaker and the audience alike. The 
Portuguese language is a marker and symbol of high social position and authority. As a 
symbol of authority, Portuguese becomes intimidating. 
The state is perceived to be a linguistic construct. That is to say, the state is the 
realm in which one language (Portuguese in the case of Cape Verde) is to have the 
predominant role and to be used for its functions. There was an almost a consensus 
among my informants, regardless of their social and academic background, that the top 
state agents must be fluent in the official language, the language of wider communication 
that permits the linkage between the country and the international community. A 
                                                        
10
 Michel Laban, Cabo Verde: encontro com escritores (Porto, Portugal: Fundação Eng. António de 
Almeida, 1992), 671 (my translations and added italics).   
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common mentality is that the role of the state is essentially to muster material and moral 
support from abroad.  The process of seeking foreign aid implies that the state agents be 
proficient in an international language. A young man in his twenty, with high school 
diploma and looking for job, tells me that one of the roles of the President of the Republic 
is to engage with foreign governments so as to procure developmental aid. In his own 
words:   
The President of the Republic is a person who travels abroad searching for aid, 
doing this and that. If he/she speaks only [Cape Verdean] Creole, for me, he/she 
should not be in that position. A person that speaks only Creole should not 
exercise such a post.
11
 
 
In the same line, another young man who had not concluded high school education 
considers that:   
a President of the Republic or a Prime Minister or a minister who speaks only 
Cape Verdean Creole is not good since there are times in which it is good to speak 
Creole but there are also times that one needs the Portuguese language more than 
Creole…But to be able to speak just Creole, even for us who are not the President 
of the Republic sometimes when we go to some place we feel frustrated let alone 
a President. A President who is not able to speak in Portuguese is too bad.
12
 
 
Still another informant put it as: 
A President of the Republic who speaks only in Creole can’t be possible. It is not 
good. [It is] too negative. Too negative as there are many Presidents who come to 
Cape Verde [for state visit].
13
 
 
The above citations give a clear idea how the common citizens think of a state. It 
should be stressed, as noted above, that this position is defended by the members of the 
                                                        
11
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cabo Verde), 
August 11, 2011.   
12
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cabo Verde), 
August 11, 2011.   
13
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cabo Verde), 
August 11, 2011.  
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political and cultural elite. As an apparatus of power, its personnel should (or perhaps) 
must use the language which has more prestige and power attached to it. At the same 
time, significant traces of a variation of a high language ideology that developed since the 
years of independence can also be found. There is the notion that the state needed 
Portuguese for international communication, a role that the native language could not fill.  
It should be noted that since late colonial period the Cape Verdean cultural—and 
later political elite—has created a representation of themselves as powerful 
intermediaries with the outside world. Given the history of calamities and other natural 
and man-made disasters, the dependence to foreign aid—private charity and public 
assistance—is something that has been recorded since the early nineteenth century.14 
Against this backdrop the elites have positioned themselves as the interlocuteur 
valable with the international world.
15
 As the gatekeepers, information and/or resources 
coming from abroad are to pass through them. Their social value is increased in terms of 
the control of the access to foreign information and resources.
16
  
   
Comprehending the State: The Media, the State and the Citizen in Cape Verde 
Accountability warrants knowledge of the limits of the institution and/or the agents under 
supervision. The citizens’ democratic control of the state, as such, implies that these have 
                                                        
14
 Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad; A History (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1963); 
Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 53 ff. 
15
 For a great discussion of the role of the Cape Verdean cultural and political elite as the intermediary see 
Jose Carlos Gomes dos Anjos,  Intelectuais, literatura e poder em Cabo Verde: lutas de definição da 
identidade nacional (Porto Alegre, Brasil: UFRGS/IFCH, 2002). 
16
 International immigration and new technologies of information have, in a way, decreased but not 
eliminated the power and role of the local elite in terms to access to the foreign resources and information. 
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an understanding about the operations as well as about the legal and political limits 
within which the state is allowed to act. In the contemporary society, the understanding of 
the state derives mainly from indirect sources, namely, the media. In what follows, I 
argue that the media contributes to the further linguistic isolation of the state in Cape 
Verde insofar as most of what is transmitted is done so in the language that most people 
understand only superficially or none at all.   
The media in Cape Verde can be classified as local, when owned and servicing to 
the nationals, and foreign, when programming has almost nothing to do with the social 
reality of the country. Globalization, the process of shortening space and time, allowing 
for the instantaneity of information across states’ borders, and the development of new 
technologies of information have had tremendous impacts in the Cape Verdean 
mediascape. While the global media are very influential and important, they are 
nonetheless accessible only to a minority of the people—those with either linguistic or 
economic capital to engage with the international media.  
The second path of communication between the state and the citizen is through 
the media. Most Cape Verdeans either do not have access to the internet or are computer 
illiterate. As such, the impact of the online media is quite limited. Print media circulation 
is relatively small limited to a couple of thousands per week (consumed by the culturati 
and highly educated class). The media that have more impact are the television and the 
radio broadcasts. Most of the radio stations are locally-based, that is limited to an island 
or to a group of islands. The RNCV, the state-owned national radio station, is the 
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exception as it has nationwide coverage. As for the television broadcast so far only the 
national television state has nationwide coverage.  
The logic of the market has dictated that private radio stations be focused almost 
entirely to entertainment programming, instead of programs that focus on informing and 
forming the population. National in-depth news and their analysis are almost an exclusive 
area of the National Radio and Television stations—the RTC, the Cape Verdean Radio 
and Television Broadcast Company. Almost all of the programs in those two media are 
presented in Portuguese—more so in the television than in radio broadcast (see table 9).  
While Portuguese is not the mother tongue for almost all Cape Verdean citizens, 
these, nonetheless, encounter with the Portuguese almost daily—chiefly via the mass 
media, which relies almost exclusively in that language. The Brazilian Colloquial 
Portuguese comes mainly through entertaining programs such as the Brazilian soap 
operas which are a success in audience. The “erudite” Portuguese and the Standard 
European Portuguese (the norm from Portugal) are used mostly by the local cultural and 
the political elite in their oral and written communication needs. The employment of 
these uncommon and unfamiliar words has a marker of distinction and social prestige.
17
 
The use of “erudite” Portuguese by the local elite accomplishes many other 
political and social objectives. It also constitutes a technique of manipulating social 
                                                        
17
 Portuguese has been defined as pluricentric language, given the fact that it has two main and 
recognizable standard versions, both in spoken and in written forms: the European and American (Brazil). 
On the notion of pluricentric language see Pluricentric Languages: Differing Norms in Different Nations , 
ed.  Michael G Clyne  (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992). For the specific case of the Portuguese language 
see Alan N. Baxter, “Portuguese as a pluricentric language,” Pluricentric Languages: Differing Norms in 
Different Nations, Michael G Clyne, ed. (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), 11-44.   
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perception insofar as the usage of a “difficult language” is perceived as face value for 
other socially rewarded qualities such as intelligence and technical competence.   
 
Table 7. The Mediascape of Cape Verde 
Type     Corporation   Main Language Used 
TV broadcast    TCV (state-owned)    PL  
    Tiver (private)    PL  
 
Radio Broadcast   RNCV (state-owned)   PL 
Crioula FM    CVL 
Praia FM    CVL 
Radio Comercial    CVL 
Radio Nova    PL 
Mosteiros FM    CVL 
 
Print Media    A Semana    PL 
Expresso das Ilhas   PL 
A Nação    PL 
 
Online Media    A Semana    PL 
Expresso das Ilhas   PL 
A Nacao    PL 
Noticias de Norte    PL 
     Liberal Online      PL 
Source: compilation by the author.  
  
Television and radio broadcast reach throughout the country. The television is far 
more attractive than other traditional media such as print media or radio, because of its 
bi-dimensionality (voice and image). Entertaining programs constitute the bulk of what is 
broadcast in the national television in Cape Verde. Most of the programs presented on the 
national television broadcast, be them national or foreign, are about musical or other non-
informative shows. Discussions of domestic socio-economic and political affairs are 
confined to the two types of shows: first, the news, particularly the 8:00 pm news, which 
present the most important political development of the day or week. The prime time 
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news takes about 50 minutes. As such, current political issues do not go through the 
process of careful and in-depth analysis. The second type of program is those in which 
informed commentators are invited to discuss some key issues of the week (e.g., “A 
Grande Entrevista” [The Great Interview] or “Conversa em Dia” [Updating Talk]). These 
two types of programs are almost exclusively presented in the Portuguese language.  
Most of the people, from the peripheral areas of the city, do not pay much 
attention to the news. During the prime time news (from 8:00 pm to about 9:00 pm) the 
streets were often packed with people. Tropical climate invite people to be outdoors at 
night. People prefer to be outdoors, talking with each other or simply roaming around. 
From the open windows of many houses, a turn-on television set on an almost empty 
room could be seen. Often only one or another member of the family is watching the 
news (the majority are outside, as mentioned).
18
 Lack of interest in the news may be 
related to the fact that information is transmitted in a language that most people either do 
not understand or have rudimentary mastery.  
The informed commentator interviews are almost exclusively in Portuguese. 
Almost always, the invited commentators are members of the leading strata of the 
society, a part of the local cultural and political elite. The use of the Portuguese language 
in these programs accomplishes two inter-related objectives: first, it legitimizes the 
commentator as an authority to comment on the subject under discussion, and, second, it 
                                                        
18
 The situation drastically changes at 9:00 pm. That is the hour reserved for the Brazilian soap opera. 
Suddenly the streets become deserted and the family reunites in front of the television set. Brazilian soap 
operas are a big success. These soap operas use the most colloquial and popular Brazilian Portuguese that 
can be easily understood by most of the Cape Verdean speakers (recall that the mother tongue is almost 
exclusively based on Portuguese lexicon).  
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provides an opportunity for the individual to demonstrate his/her capacity to manipulate 
the Portuguese language.  Linguistic exhibitionism leads to use of an esoteric Portuguese: 
uncommon lexicography, unusual grammatical and sentence constructions, and so on. 
Exoteric language is a key marker of expertise.  
Such linguistic practices foster monolingual citizens’ political passivity. The 
Portuguese language is intimidating and discouraging. When these informative programs 
are on, monoglot citizens have few incentives to follow it. Little can be retained by those 
citizens who don’t have a complete mastery of the Portuguese language. Unless there is 
someone available who is proficient in Portuguese who can either translate or provide the 
gist of what is being discussed, the monoglot citizens finds themselves in a difficult 
situation because they are excluded from information. The information is presented not in 
a form that they can grasp the contents in order to have a formed opinion about the 
subject matter. Rather, a “veil of ignorance” is imposed upon the monoglot citizen. Thus, 
linguistic exclusion becomes political exclusion insofar as not being proficient in the high 
language hinders one access to the vital information and/or the political processes.  Put in 
totally different words, linguistic choices in the media impact citizen’s enlightened 
understanding—another pillar element in modern democracy, the source for a proper and 
active civic and political engagement.  
 
 
183 
 
 
 
The Illegibility of the State and diminished Surveillatory Participation  
The state’s over reliance on Portuguese leads to political exclusion.  That language 
becomes an “instrument of deprivation.”19 Its sole use by the state for its daily operations 
and procedures deprives a sizeable segment of the citizens the access to the crude 
information. In this aspect, it  can be argued that the constant use of the Portuguese as the 
state’s medium of communication deprive many citizens of their right to information and 
negatively impacts on the overall principle of political equality before law. The 
comprehension of the Portuguese language is hindered not only by these “difficult 
words.” Sentence and grammatical constructions may also hinder the understanding of a 
message passed through the Portuguese language by those who are not fully trained in 
that language. 
 It is against this backdrop that I talk of an illegible state in Cape Verde, that is, a 
state that is “unreadable” by the great number of its citizens. Its insistence in using only 
one of the languages, the Portuguese language, for most of its formal communications 
implies that most of the people simply do not grasp the information that derives within 
the state. The problem of the state illegibility in Cape Verde—and the argument can be 
extended to other post-colonial states in Africa—is double. It is, on the one hand, about 
the form. By form I simply mean about choosing which language(s) should be employed 
by the state in its formal and informal operations.   
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There is also the problem of content, or what Weinstein calls “language of 
politics.” 20 This refers to the corpus of the language. It includes different techniques of 
manipulating the language (such as the word choice, tone, style and metaphor) as to fit a 
political objective. As the state elites are highly literate and has a complete mastery of the 
standard Portuguese, state’s rules, procedures, discourses and the like, are more often 
than not produced in an erudite language. Clearly it needs to be said that fluency in the 
dominant language is not a direct guarantee that one will understand all of the processes 
and operations of the state power (e.g., policies, laws, regulations, budgets, and other 
governmental outputs).  
The state use of the language is twofold. Sometimes the state uses the vernacular 
for direct and top-down communication. Other times, the uses the standard language as 
the language of specialty, characterized by specific jargons and structures that is 
understandable only by those who are familiar with that language (the second language).  
Yet, the distance between the specialty languages to the mother tongue is far greater than 
between the mother tongue and second language.  
The vernacular speaker’s encounter with the state is superficial. It is at best to 
acquire a service or a good that is provided by the state (e.g., a copy of the certificate of 
live birth in Conservatory of the Records). To truly understand the operations of power 
and the processes and procedures of the state entail that one goes to the core. To impose 
control over the state implies that one understand the institutional and legal architecture 
underpinning it. That is to say that to be able to fully question and/or to inquiry about the 
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actions carried out (or failed to carried out) by the state officials one must know the 
institutional limits that the state imposes upon itself.  
It should be noted, however, that I am not claiming that only by understanding the 
core of the state will the citizen be able to question the state. Apart from what can be 
called “institutional questioning,” the process of question whether the state’s actions (or 
lack thereof) might have trespassed the institutional limits imposed upon itself, one can 
also find moral and practical questionings. Moral questioning refers to the process of 
inquiring the extent that state’s actions is morally wrong and practical questioning is 
about the practical, economic and social efficacy and efficiency of the activities 
conducted by the state’s agents. Even when one does not know the institutional and legal 
limits of the state, one can still discern a moral and/or an inefficient action carried out by 
the state. The illegibility of the state, as such, is more linked to the institutional and legal 
framework that underpins it. The latter, as noted above, is essentially produced and 
guarded in the Portuguese language, a language that a great majority does not master. In 
the next section I explore the extent that the media aid or hinder the monolingual citizen 
in the process of simplification of the state.    
The concept of the “illegible state” is an analytical tool that helps explains the 
citizens’ relationship to the state, an important focus of comparative politics.  A 
clarification is warranted here in order to properly grasp the concept of illegible state. 
The concept of the state is not equivalent to the government. While in popular, and quite 
often, in media discourse “government” and the “state” are used interchangeably, the two 
are two different social-political entities. The government is but the executive and the key 
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administrator of the state. Institutionally, functionally and in terms of personnel the two 
are quite distinct: the government is just one portion—perhaps the most important one—
of the state institutions. The other institutions that make up the state include the different 
autonomous public organizations and enterprises, the judicial and legislative branches, 
the office of the head of the state (the president and the monarch in the non-presidentialist 
and monarchical regimes. As the government is a smaller portion of the institutions of the 
state, it follows that the government’s personnel is a fraction of the state’s workforce.  
For too many common citizens democratic oversight over the state is a difficult 
and complicated business. The concept of state illegibility that is brought in here one is 
important to understand why certain sections of the population do not fully exercise 
supervisory activities over the state.  The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of the 
term “legible” is “easily made out or deciphered.”21 Something is considered legible 
when it can be broken down into its key constitutive parts for the fastest intellectual 
absorption. James C. Scott theorizes about political legibility to refer “to a state’s attempt 
to make society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state 
functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.”22  Interested in the state-
society relations from a historical point of view, Scott analyzes ways and strategies 
created by the state to better control its corresponding society. The ultimate political goal 
of the state and its elite is to facilitate the penetration in the society for extraction and 
mobilization of human and material resources.  Making the society legible, thus, expedite 
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the rule of the state. With discourses, practices and policies, the state becomes the Trojan 
horse to be deployed within the ranks of society. Scott’s point of departure is the 
following: pre-modern state lived with an unordered society, or what he prefers to call 
“social hieroglyph” so as to hint the enigmatic characteristic of the society—from the 
perspective of the state elite. The key distinguishing feature between the pre-modern and 
the modern states is the following:  the latter is truly engaged in ordering, classifying, 
cataloging and controlling the population and the territory it administer. Therefore, 
“legibility [becomes] a central problem in [modern] statecraft.”23 Through the above-
described processes, the state’s activities vis-à-vis society are made easier for the former 
to become more knowledgeable of the latter; power is supported by the knowledge of the 
social. The latter supports and provides more substance to power.
24
 
The modern state, according to Scott, has created mechanisms and strategies to 
better map out its subjects, in order to proper dominate and rule over its population. The 
society is made “legible” permitting the state’s political management for the suitable 
extraction of human and material resources from the society.
25
 The more the society is 
made legible, the more is the state capacity for extraction of resources from its respective 
society and/or to defend itself against potential, violent or otherwise, retaliations coming 
from the state.   
Turning Scott’s theory upside down, I analyze how difficult it is to make the state 
legible to the totality or the greatest number of its citizens. In today’s world, 
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characterized by a mounting adoption of liberal democratic discourse, theoreticians and 
politicians alike and at global scale have popularized the concept of public transparence. 
Such a concept implies making the state “transparent” to its citizens—and to the foreign 
states, organizations and other states’ citizens.26  That is to say, that the state should and 
must publish and disseminate its activities, omissions, plans, vital statistics, and so on, as 
to make possible the seeing through the state. However, as it will become clear below, the 
concept of legibility of the state is far beyond the concept of transparency; it involves 
more than the dissemination of the state’s information  
The state uses a myriad of techniques and tools to make the society more (and 
easily) legible. Perhaps the most known method is that of gathering demographic, social 
and political-economic statistical information of the society over which it rules. Other 
methods include the management of the public space, mapping the territory, and 
application of ‘scientific’ methods to productive activities. All of this is related to what 
Michel Foucault has called governmentality, that is, a combination of practices, 
ideologies and beliefs constructed by the state to better dominate and seek compliance 
from its population.
27
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 In a way this is the guiding principle of the Transparency International, an international non-
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The notion of legibility can be better understood if analyzed in light of the 
concept of the “infrastructural power” of the state.28 Michael Mann defines infrastructural 
power as “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society and to implement 
logistically political decisions through the realm.”29 To facilitate the two processes of 
penetration and logistical implementation of decisions, the state embraces its respective 
society in a complex, multifarious and permanent web of relationships. The state engages 
the citizens at the level of “banality,” that is, through the use of symbols and other 
mnemonic devices, subtle and understated identity markers and images that effectively 
colonize the minds of the citizens.
30
 
Society also initiates communication with its respective state, to gather 
information and/or to redress a situation perceived as against the institutionalized rules. 
This is related to the notion of social accountability (figure 5). The figure brings in 
combines the insight of Michel Mann, who, as noted above, considers that a key element 
of democratic states is the employment of infrastructural power over the society, with the 
views of accountability theory. The members of society, either individual or collectively, 
seek to oversee the actions (and omissions for that matter) of the state agents.   
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 According to Michael Mann, historically two different types of power can be discerned in the state: the 
despotic power which, as the name implies, is simply the “power over society,” and the infrastructural 
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190 
 
 
 
Figure 4. State-Society Political Relations in Democratic Regimes 
 
 
Social accountability is an important pillar of modern democracies. Philippe 
Schmitter and Terry Karl note that accountability is one of the key pillars of modern 
democracy: the more the state elite are accountable to their actions, the more democratic 
a polity.
31
 The concept refers to the process in which one party (public or private, 
individually or collective) seeks to supervise and manage the actions conducted on its 
behalf by another party. As such, the definition contains three major components: first, 
there is the principal, or the party on whose interest an action is taken; second, the agent, 
or the acting party; and, third, there is the action itself, the element that is put under 
scrutiny.   
Elsewhere Philippe Schmitter argues that, in every political regime, from the 
dictatorial to the democratic, state leaders and elite, in a way of another, account for their 
actions.
32
 The question that one must ask is to whom these elites are responding. The 
intension and extension of the process of accountability is what distinguishes a 
democratic to non-democratic regimes. While the intension of accountability refers to the 
complexity of the process of oversight in itself, the extension of accountability relates to 
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the number of citizens and/or institutions (both public and private) involved.
33
 Ultimately 
through the combined policies and practices that promote and reinforce linguicism the 
state restricts its extension.  
The question that one needs to ask is how the state becomes illegible to the 
citizens. The simple and direct answer to the question is that between the state and the 
society the lines of communication must have had the fewest amounts of interference and 
statics possible. The communication channels that link the state to the citizen must be 
unhindered lest it have growing problems of miscommunication between the two parties. 
The use by the state of a language that is widely used within its border constitutes one of 
the key mechanisms to resolve the situation. When the state uses a language that is the 
mother tongue of a great number of the citizens it becomes easier for the latter to 
understand and track the paths taken by the state.  
The difference between the language of the state and that of citizens (the mother 
tongue), that is, between the politolect and the demolect, affects the lines of 
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communication between the state and society.
34
 The concept of state-citizen 
communication can be useful to facilitate the understanding of the communicative 
interactions between the state and society. The flow of information between the two can 
be initiated by either party, orally or in a written format, with the objective of gathering 
knowledge about the processes and the characteristics of the other side. The state-citizen 
communication can be either direct or indirect. It is direct when a dyadic communicative 
relationship develops between a state agent and the citizen (e.g., an encounter between a 
police officer and a citizen). Alternatively, it is indirect when is there is an intermediary 
between the citizen and the state. The state-citizen communication can be summarized in 
the following table:  
 
Table 8. Matrix of State-Ordinary Citizen Communication 
Types of communication  Low Ranking State Official/   Medium to high  
   ordinary Citizen    Ranking State Official/  
        ordinary citizen 
Oral Communication   LL+      unless clientelist/personal,   
    HL-     no pattern of direct   
         communication*   
     
Written Communication   LL-     LL-  
   HL+     HL+ 
LL (low language): the mother tongue of the citizens (Cape Verdean Language)  
HL: high language or the state’s official Language (Portuguese Language)  
+/-: denote whether the language is used the most or the least   
* or during electoral campaign periods.  
 
In many African post-colonial states, direct oral communication between the state 
and the citizen quite often takes place in the low language. The state agents such as the 
police officer, the clerks at the public administration providing direct information and/or 
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services to the population, and many other low ranking state officials engage in the 
mother tongue. These low ranking state officials often do not have a fluent command of 
the high language—thus, their subaltern position within the state hierarchy.  Direct 
communications between state elite and the common citizen are scare—excepting the 
periods of election campaign or visits to the community by the elected state elite.
35
 
Information and commentaries on the political processes and the architecture of 
power is channeled more often than not in the dominant language. Language ideologies 
and practices make a distinction between languages of modernity and tradition influence 
the choice of the medium to diffuse the performances of power. A language of modernity 
is accepted as the medium to transmit the political modernity. Other languages, according 
to the mainstream ideology in many post-colonial states, simply lack the necessary 
components or status to perform such a task.  
To properly understand how the linguistic exclusion becomes political exclusion I 
develop the model that links the monoglot citizen to the state (figure 8). Often the 
information is made available in the state’s own channels (e.g., public speech of a state 
leader, the state’s official newspaper, or, more recently, the government’s webpage, 
among other channels). Alternatively, the information coming from the state may be 
disseminated through the mass media.   
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 The public hearings can be conceived as a mechanism that would increase or facilitate the 
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Figure 5. The flow of information and control between the State and Citizens 
 
“T” means the time in which the information is made available by the state. T+1 and T+2 mean different 
time period in the process of dissemination of information.  
 
Insofar as the state operates almost exclusively in the high language, the 
monoglossic citizens simply cannot get access to the primary-source information. The 
state’s formal communications with the citizen is like hieroglyphics: not only does it rely 
almost always on a language that a sizeable portion of the society understands only 
partially (not to say anything at all), but also it uses an esoteric style of that language. 
Supposedly the mass media would fill in the vacuum of incomprehension by facilitating 
the process of interpretation of the processes of power. In modern democracies, the mass 
media have been considered as a crucial element in de-codifying the already complex 
political processes. The media, by following the diglossic language ideologies and 
practices, contribute to the further ineligibility of the state and the processes of power.  
The model represents the flow of information and attempts of mobilization and 
control between the state and the citizen that goes through an intermediary, be this a truly 
bilingual citizen or the media. As such, it does not apply to the situations in which the 
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citizen, who is proficient in the high language, can access the information by going 
directly to the state, without any linguistic intermediary.  
There are two main paths for the monoglot citizen to grasp the meaning and 
content of information about the political processes. The first path assumes that the 
monoglot citizen him/herself has access to another citizen who is proficient in the high 
language. The flow is the following: information about the political processes of the state 
is acquired by a commentator/translator (a citizen who is proficient in the two languages, 
that is, the low and the high languages and has personal relations with the monoglot 
citizen). This commentator cum translator, in turn, passes the information to the 
monoglot citizen. The direct linkage between an average citizen and an informed and 
truly bilingual citizen who can explain the processes of government and politics can 
either be through family relations or through some of the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). More often than not, the monoglot citizens lack access to bilingual citizens. The 
latter use different social spaces vis-à-vis the former—and, as such, the direct contact is 
quite minimal. This situation is worse in the rural areas—or in the peripheral areas of the 
urban Africa. Common rural folks rarely engage with bilingual citizens, the linguistic 
middle-persons.   
To shorten the gap between the elite and the people, the latter should have an 
understanding of the political process as to better partake in politics. This, however, 
should not be taken to mean that I am arguing that the citizens who do not understand the 
processes and operations of power do not involve in politics. The argument has to do with 
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the quality of participation, for the comprehension of the state permits further and better 
control of the state and the state elites’ behavior.  
Learning about the state, its procedures and processes, or high politics in general, 
is an important factor that may influence people to act politically. The understanding of 
high politics includes the comprehension of the predictability of the political processes 
(e.g., learning from the institutional architecture). That is to say that to learn about the 
state is to learn about how its institutions work. The importance of institutions in politics 
is that they set up the context and the arena within which politics should take place.
36
 
When citizens understand the logic of institutions they understand the limits imposed 
upon those institutions. Enlightened understanding about politics allows citizens to 
identify the cases in which the state elite’s actions (or omissions) are beyond the limits 
imposed by the rules, norms and procedures of the state. Having an enlightened 
understanding about politics may trigger a willingness to act in order to prevent or redress 
the widening between the pays legal and the pays réel.  
State illegibility in Cape Verde is reinforced by two social phenomena that are 
often found in post-colonial states. First, there is institutional linguicism. The concept of 
institutional linguicism denotes the ideologies and social practices, carried out by the 
state, through its agents, that subtly classifies and divides the citizens in terms of how 
they present themselves linguistically. Institutional linguicism refers to the fact that the 
state, its agencies and personnel, more often than not would assume a favorable position 
to citizens who are proficient in the Portuguese language. That is to say that the speakers 
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of the Portuguese language often find it easier to get the services and/or the goods from 
the state. To go to a state’s office and speak the Portuguese language may be a strategy of 
speeding up the business that made the speaker go to the institution in the first place.   
Political marginalization can be created by linguicist language policy that 
institutionalizes and reinforces the predominance of the official language (the “high 
language”).  The term “linguicism” was proposed by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, to mean,   
“ideologies and structures which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce unequal 
division of power and resources (both material and non-material) between groups which 
are defined on the basis of language.”37 Similarly, Robert Phillipson defines linguicism as 
a system of domination whereby language, “is the crucial criterion in the beliefs and 
structure which result in unequal power and resource allocation.”38  Inferring from the 
two given definitions, one can therefore conclude that linguicism is no more than 
language-based ideology and practice of social domination. It is, as such, correlated to 
other systems, ideologies and practices of social domination such as racism, classism, 
sexism, and ageism, in which the domination is based on race, social class, gender, and 
age, respectively. 
A linguicist language policy can be simply considered as a diglossic language 
policy writ large. Such a language policy reinforces the diglossic situation that 
characterizes the society. As such, the dominant language, that is, the language employed 
by the public authorities for its main functions, becomes the key, and often the only 
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medium for the formal, official socio-political and economic life.
39
 It becomes the 
“language of high politics” insofar as the elite’s and ruling classes’ major political battles 
are conducted in the dominant language. The language of politics means that formal 
political activities, in the realms of the state’s institutions such as the bureaucracy, the 
parliament, judiciary, and so on, are conducted through the medium of the dominant 
language—in the African context, we are talking about Portuguese, English or French. It 
is the language that the state considers as the medium for most, if not all, of its key 
political transactions—through various legislation, rules, norms and judicial review 
processes. High politics, therefore, is not in the vernacular. In post-colonial Africa, the 
vernacular is almost never the language of high politics. 
 The concept of institutional linguicism is borrowed from the concept of 
institutional racism. This concept, first put forth by the black civil rights activist, Stokely 
Carmichael, is related to the way in which state’s processes and procedures tend to favor 
one social group (“race”) at the expense of others.40 Like racism, linguicism is thus 
discourse and practices of domination based on a constructed hierarchy of people. 
Institutional linguicism, therefore, is related not only to the social ideology but also the 
entire social practices, at the level of the state's institutions, whereby resource allocation, 
favorable treatment of the citizens and transference of valuable information is biased to 
the dominant language and/or its speakers. In the context of the post-colonial societies, 
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particularly in the African continent, where Portuguese, French and English is clearly the 
dominant and hegemonic language, the dominant language consume a large part—if not 
total, in some cases—of the state's own resources. For instance, as the public education is 
conducted mainly through the dominant language, all of the state resources, from 
textbooks to teachers, reinforce the hegemonic position of the former colonial language. 
Dominant language speakers, as such, not only get a preferable treatment by the state's 
agents but also their access to the valuable information put out by the public authorities 
direct--that is, without the need of a translator—and fast. To talk about institutional 
linguicism is essentially to say that the public authorities invest far more in the dominant 
language than in the national language. In other words, the allocation of values by the 
public authorities is disproportionate, with the bulk of resources gearing towards the 
language inherited from the colonial language (particularly in terms of education and 
cultural policies). The state, in acting, promotes more the language of the former colonial 
power.
41
 Regulations, policies, laws, studies, archives, and the like, are almost exclusive 
realm for the dominant language.  
 The second mechanism is official-language privilege.
42
 The concept refers mainly 
to the accruing of benefits and privileges from the public authorities (and even by the 
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society at large) by the fact of being a fluent speaker of the official language of the 
state—which, in the post-colonial African state, is the language of the former colonial 
power. The official-language privilege may reflect either in the quickness of the response 
following an inquiry and/or in access to material and non-material benefits that non-
Portuguese speaker may find difficult to access. This concept is a valid as it helps 
understanding the state-citizen relationships. The more one commands the official 
language the more privilege one extracts from both the state and society—chiefly in 
terms of access to information and/or the assumption of a higher social status. The 
official-language is in itself a form of capital or “property.”43 
In the case of Cape Verde—and the model can be applied to the cases of the 
former Portuguese colonies in Africa—this social mechanism of domination corresponds 
to what I call “Lusophone privilege.” To be a fluent and proficient speaker of the 
Portuguese language is a powerful symbolic capital that can easily be translated into 
other forms of capital, chiefly economic. Lusophone privilege manifest in different 
domains of society. It manifests with the agent uttering, with the audience learning that 
the former is a fluent Portuguese speaker.   
 A sizeable portion of the Cape Verdean citizens, as noted earlier, lacks mastery 
of the Portuguese language. It should be noted that the different individuals and groups 
have different levels of mastery of the Portuguese language. In general terms it can be 
said that the non-elite does not possess the level of full linguistic competence. The 
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increasingly complex and abstract processes of politics that characterize the 
contemporary state take place almost exclusively in Portuguese. For the common citizen 
this situation may constitute a hindrance to his/her ability to act politically as to exercise 
democratic control over the representatives and political leaders. To put it differently, the 
linguistic difference between the common citizen and the state leads to the waning of 
what I call surveillatory political participation. The key assumption behind this concept is 
that citizens, along with other institutions of the state, should be fully engaged in the 
process of making the state agents accountable for their actions (or lack thereof). 
Surveillatory participation, as such, constitutes all the activities carried out by citizens, 
either individually or in conjunction with others, with the ultimate objective of 
supervising the activities carried out by the institutions and personnel of the state.  
The state can be properly understood as a hierarchically-based and well-
articulated network of institutions and personnel, with legitimate command authority over 
a territory and the people that resides within it.
44
 The personnel of the state can be 
divided into three major groups: the burocrats, whose entrance into the state apparatus is 
often through mechanisms of meritocracy (such as public service examination), the 
nominated and the elected officials. While the general population has almost nothing to 
say on about the burocrats, through political participation they can effectively decide 
about the composition of the state and its key agencies—from the government down to 
autonomous institutions and agencies. The citizens in an electoral democracy choose, 
through elections, what I call the “elected officials,” and these, on their own, “elect,” 
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 My definition of the state borrows from the insights of Max Weber. See Weber, From Max Weber.    
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through political nominations and other practices such clientelism and patronage, the 
group of state personnel that I call “nominated officials.”  
 
 
Linguistic Strategies of the State Elite in Cape Verde: The Language of the State 
and the state of Languages  
In the previous chapters I have noted that the linguistic situation in Cape Verde islands is 
that of a diglossia, in which the Portuguese language has taken the higher social and 
political position. It is the language of prestige, status, and power. The Cape Verdean 
language, on the other hand, while being the native language spoken widely throughout 
the islands is the subordinate language. Cape Verde, therefore, can be considered a prime 
example of what Heinz Kloss calls an exoglossic nation-state, that is, the modern state in 
which “the national official language has been brought in from abroad, and its few native 
speakers do not form the majority of the inhabitants in any district or major locality.”45 
 Like most states in sub-Saharan Africa, independence in Cape Verde did not 
usher in any major changes in language policy. The preference for the language of the 
former colonizer was (and still is) almost consensual among different sections of the 
post-colonial political and cultural elite. In linguistic terms—as well in other aspects—the 
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 Heinz Kloss, “Notes Concerning a Language-Nation Typology,” in Language Problems of Developing 
Nations, ed. Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, and Jyotirindra Dasgupta (New York: Wiley, 1968), 
72. It should also be noted that a pervasive language ideology is gaining adherents among the cultural and 
political elite. I am referring to the idea of co-property of the Portuguese language, that is, the notion that 
Portuguese is as Cape Verdean as the Creole. The central element of this social ideology is the notion that 
the Portuguese language is not a foreign language and that it is as Cape Verdean as it can be. For this 
reason, there are writers who are calling for “nationalization” of that language, through formalization and 
codification of linguistic norms that reflect the local ways of speaking that language.     
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post-colonial state is essentially a reproduction of the colonial state.
46
 Its operations, 
processes and memories are recorded and transmitted almost exclusively via the 
Portuguese language. The state in Cape Verde is fundamentally lusophone. It 
communicates, within and without, almost exclusively in the Portuguese language.  
High politics, operations and practices of power in post-colonial Cape Verde are 
more often than not carried out through the means of the Portuguese language. The state, 
through its high-level agents plans, implements and acts through that high language. The 
mapping and charting of the state is almost exclusively in the Portuguese language. So 
are the state archives and institutional memories. Laws, public policies, high level and 
formal speeches by the cabinet members and/or high-echelon bureaucrats, communiqués, 
and the like, are the reserved domain for the Portuguese language. The state machine is 
thus oiled by the Portuguese language. In spite of the inroads made by the Cape Verdean 
language into domains that were until quite recently sealed to them (e.g., public 
administration, schooling, religious services, and so on), official information on the state 
are stored and disseminated almost exclusively in the dominant language. Thus, for a 
number of people the state is linguistically concealed.  The former colonial language, 
while being the key language for the state’s arrangement, procedures and processes, is a 
language that a number of citizens do not master.  
Language ideologies replicate the old colonial ideology that different languages 
have different social roles and functions. In the case of Cape Verde, the idea is that the 
Cape Verdean language may not be sufficiently “modern” for certain functions. Reliance 
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on the Portuguese language constitutes in itself a necessity of modernity—political and 
economic. Ondina Ferreira, a former minister of culture, considers that the Portuguese 
language is “the richer medium of communication that we have in terms of development 
of the logical, philosophical, ontological, existential, technological and scientific 
thought.”47 The Portuguese language is the shortcut to modernity—the role that, for the 
proponents of this language ideology, the Cape Verdean language either can’t fill or does 
it improperly or unsuccessfully.  
Yet, post-colonial political developments and the recent regime to electoral 
democracy have made it possible for a timid entrance of the native language into the 
realms of politics previously closed to it. Like in many parts of Africa, the native tongue 
is spreading to different domains, even though the former colonial language maintains its 
ultimate dominance in politics and society.
48
 Public space is perhaps the domain where 
the vernacular is quite successful in making inroads. Increasingly the vernacular is used 
as the language of outdoor billboards, posters and other tools for public commercial and 
political advertisement. After all, as noted by Elana Shohamy, “governments, 
                                                        
47Ondina Ferreira, “A comunidade intelectual não sai em defesa da língua portuguesa”, Expresso das Ilhas, 
April 3, 2009,  
http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/pt/noticias/go/ondina-ferreira---a-comunidade-intelectual-nao-sai-em-
defesa-da-lingua-portuguesa (accessed on December 13, 2013—my translation and emphasis).  
Elsewhere she even goes further to claim that the country is too small to have two official languages—
hinting, thus, that the use of the Portuguese language as the sole official language of the state sufficient for 
the state and society goals. See Ondina Ferreira, “Ter duas línguas é demasiado,” Africanidades , April 25, 
2009, http://www.africanidade.com/articles/2387/1/Cabo-Verde-ATer-duas-lAnguas-oficiais-A-
demasiadoA/Paacutegina1.html (accessed December 13, 2013)  
48
 For the case of Senegal where Wolof is increasingly between used as the medium in several domains see 
Leigh Swigart, “Cultural Creolisation and Language Use in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Senegal,” 
Africa. 64, no. 2 (1994): 175-189; Fiona MacLaughlin, “Dakar Wolof and the Configuration of an Urban 
Identity,” Journal of African Cultural Studies 14, 2 (2001): 153-172; and Fiona  MacLaughlin,  “Senegal: 
The Emergence of a National Lingua Franca,” in Language and National Identity in Africa, ed. Andrew 
Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 79-97.   
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municipalities, NGOs, global and small companies, all use the public space as an arena 
for conducting their battles for power, control, national identity, recognition and self-
expression.”49 
In the past twenty years or so the Cape Verdean language has made inroads into 
the public sphere. Multi-party electoral democracy, instituted in 1991, created new 
opportunities for the political use of the Cape Verdean language. Competitive electoral 
democracy may have something to do with nationalism insofar as it highlights and 
instrumentalizes national symbols, mainly the national language. Electoral democracy 
and nationalism are intrinsically linked to the idea of people (demos): etymologically and 
ideologically both look at the nation as the legitimizing source. The cultural nation 
becomes synchronized with the political demos (the voting citizens). Electoral democracy 
facilitated the penetration of the Cape Verdean language in the public and political realm 
insofar as it forced the political elite to rely on that language when competing for popular 
votes. In order to capture people’s vote, the political class increasingly elaborate what 
Pierre Bourdieu calls the “strategy of condescension.” Such a strategy consists mainly 
in deriving profit from the objective relation of power between the languages that 
confront one another in practice […] in the very act of symbolically negating that 
relation, namely, the hierarchy of the language and of those who speak them.
50
 
 
At the time of elections, Cape Verdean politics seems to be in vernacular. Public 
speeches at rallies, party or candidate slogans, and a variety of electoral paraphernalia 
increasingly rely on the Cape Verdean language to attract the votes while presenting the 
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 Shohamy, Language Policy, 111. 
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party/candidate as closer to the people.
51
 The political elite’s public usage of the Cape 
Verdean language during election periods may be part of a calculated strategy. Political 
parties and candidates in general understand that the number of the votes in their favor 
depends on their broader appeal—instead of portraying as the party/candidate for one 
section of the society. Electoral strategies imply structural change in the organization to 
the extent that political parties increasingly become a “catch-all” organization that caters 
different sections and interests of the society. The use of the native language gives the 
idea of closeness and proximity to the electors, leading these to believe that voting for the 
individual uttering messages in the low language is tantamount to descriptive 
representation—that is, electing of one of them.  
 The use of the vernacular in the electoral campaigns is a calculated strategy to: a) 
bridge the politician and the electoral masses and b) manufacture the perception of 
descriptive representation.  The instrumental use of the vernacular during electoral 
periods, thus, is part of the ad populum strategies. The use of the vernacular—the Cape 
Verdean language in this study—is intended to facilitate the conquering of votes.  
In spite of all the developments mentioned above, the political and cultural elite in 
Cape Verde as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa rely extensively on the former 
colonizer’ language for most of its communicative and functional needs. The cultural and 
political elite show a bias in favor of the Portuguese language in the public sphere. In 
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 The Cape Verdean language is now the language of public speech during electoral campaigns. With the 
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spite of the discourse of supporting the native language, the truth of the matter is that the 
Cape Verdean language is far from getting a respectable social and political status in the 
society and politics. This situation worsens with the use of basilectal variatnt  for public 
communication. 
Political contacts between citizen-elected official (and nominated officials, for 
that matter) are scarce in Cape Verde. In everyday politics, the state officials and 
politicians are almost isolated from the general public. Political contacts, when they do 
exist, are often communicatively one-dimensional, that is, the politician assuming the role 
of the speaker and the general public as the listening (and passive) audience.
52
 Bi-
dimensional communicative contacts between the state officials and the citizens are very 
low. A report from the Afrobarometer indicates such a state of affairs (see table 10). A 
great number of citizens do not contact their representatives as to make them accountable 
for their actions (or omissions) or to have their inputs in the making and/or 
implementation of policies. This situation cannot be simply explained by noting that the 
linguistic distance between the citizen and the state officials is translated into political 
language.
53
 Yet, one cannot discard this hypothesis.  
  In the following chapter I will discuss how the high language is often used as the 
tool of social intimidation. Political apathy is often bought by the use of the high 
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 An example of this are the various acts of inauguration of public works, which often involves high 
ranking state officials (such as ministers and high-level state bureaucrats) and the population from the 
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language. The high level of political apathy may be the consequence of the diglossic 
situation that characterizes the society. The vicious cycle of political unawareness is, in 
part, triggered by the state that uses a language that most do not master as the language of 
communication and information. This linguistic distance reinforces political language 
insofar as not knowing (or not mastering) the language of power impacts on the 
information on and from the state one gets. In other words, the further one is from the 
language of the state the smaller the chances of having an enlightened understanding of 
the operations, processes and procedures of power.  
 
Table 9. Citizen-State Officials Contacts (percentage of respondents) 
  
Member of  
Parliament 
Local Government  
Councilor  
Official of  
Government Agency  
  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  
Never  87 86 75 72 87 90 
Once 5 3 10 8 2 2 
A Few times 4 4 9 13 7 3 
Often 2 2 3 3 2 1 
Don't Know 2 4 2 4 2 4 
Source: Afrobarometer 2012 
 
 
  Conclusion 
In Cape Verde, as in most of the post-colonial African states, there is a clear distinction in 
terms of the roles and functions of the languages used by the community and by the state. 
The predominant language ideology and practice, as produced during the colonial times 
and reproduced by the post-colonial elite, maintains that the citizens’ mother tongue as 
the language of tradition—in opposition to the Europhone language, taken to be the 
language of modernity. It is the medium through which tradition finds its way into the 
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present. The language of tradition continues to thrive because of the popular cultural 
manifestations and these are said to survive because of the former. However, such a 
language has deep limitations. It simply cannot perform tasks of modernity. That is 
reserved for the Portuguese language. Such a language position reproduces the exclusion 
of a number of Cape Verdean citizens who don’t actively participate in the political 
processes of the country as they do not possess the necessary linguistic tools to 
understand and comprehend those processes.  
 Such a linguicist language policy and planning has made the state unreadable to 
the majority of the citizens. The high language can only be learned in formal schooling. 
In African context that is the role reserved for the state. Political and economic crises of 
the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with the impositions of the international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, greatly reduced the 
state capacity to provide this type of public good to the citizens. Few people have access 
to education, the medium through which mastery of the high language could be attained. 
Therefore, the linguistic divide between the exoglossic, the foreign language state and the 
vernacular society widens. 
 A number of the citizens cannot effectively communicate nor comprehend 
messages transmitted in the high language, the language of the state. This situation 
hinders the process of surveillatory participation. Information about the processes and 
operations of power do not trickled down to the monoglossic citizens—as those are 
constructed, reproduced and transmitted through the medium of the dominant language. 
This seriously impacts the enlightened understanding of politics and its actors by the 
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common citizen. In other words, inability to proper reading the state often translates in 
the inability to effectively track and supervise the actions carried out on their behalf by 
the state and its agents.  
  There is a political incentive for the elite to keep the state illegible. For one, those 
to whom political accountability is to be submitted is kept at a relatively small number, 
usually from the same social stratum (the upper classes). Moreover, and related to the 
point above, political benefits, economic and material rewards can be extracted from the 
illegibility of the state. The elites, as such, position themselves as the intermediary or 
brokers between the local population and the international system. “Elite Closure,” as 
noted by Myers-Scotton has to do with the management of political participation.
54
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESTRICTED INITIATOTORY POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION: DIGLOSSIA AND POLITICAL NONPARTICIPATION IN 
CAPE VERDE    
 
 
 
 In 1986, while visiting the islands of Cape Verde as part of the Brazilian presidential 
delegation, writer Jorge Amado noted that “life in Cape Verde happens in [Cape 
Verdean] Creole.”1 In everyday social relations, the common man and woman engage 
each other almost exclusively through the vernacular, Cape Verdean language. The Cape 
Verdean language, in spite of its regional and class variations, is the language of 
affection, of friendship, and of family relations. In general, local intellectuals and 
culturati have adopted a positive posture vis-a-vis the national language, concurring that 
the vernacular is the “soul of the people,” in that it is the most visible trace of Cape 
Verdean identity.
2
 Yet, the form of modern art considered as high culture—literature, 
mainly—has been almost the realm of the Portuguese language. At the same time, high 
politics, public formal schooling, the judicial system, the realm of state bureaucracy are 
conducted through the means of the Portuguese language. Diglossia, the social and 
political predominance of one language over the other, is the norm.  
                                                        
1
 Almada Duarte, Diglossia ou Bilinguismo, 21.    
2
 Andre Corsino Tolentino, interviewed by Abel Djassi Amado, Praia, Cape Verde, August 10, 2011. The 
organicist notion that the mother tongue is what determines the essence of the Cape Verdean people was 
first developed in the early decades of the 20
th
 century, by poets and writers such as Eugénio Tavares and 
Pedro Cardoso, and later, in the 1930s onwards, by one of the first native philologist, Baltazar Lopes da 
Silva.   
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 This chapter explores the extent to which diglossic language policy leads to the 
political passiveness and submissiveness of a significant part of the citizenry, namely 
those possess little or no knowledge of the dominant language. The division of the 
political field into different linguistic fields, that of the dominant language at the state 
level and that of the vernaculars at the grassroots level, has an impact on people’s 
participation in the overall political dialogue and debate—other than electoral 
participation. The language of the state, which is the language of the elite, subtly 
excludes non-speakers from engaging in political discussions about policy making or 
changes to existing policies.  
 The diglossic situation impedes the participation of Creole monoglossic citizens, 
that is, individuals who are not proficient and/or who have only a rudimentary 
understanding of the socio-politically dominant language. These citizens can’t fully 
participate in the political business of the country. The lack of competence in the 
dominant language, the Portuguese language, is politically and psychologically 
consequential. It leads to political apathy through two key mechanisms that I call the 
politics of ridicule and the politics of inaudibility (see figure 4).  
 Full-fledged democracy can be experienced when citizens have few or no 
constraints, structural or otherwise, to their active participation in the overall process of 
political decision making.
3
 One of the fundamental limitations to the average citizen’s 
full engagement in the politics of his or her community has to do with language. 
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 Barber, Strong Democracy.   
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Whenever the language of politics is distant from the language that the citizen uses more 
recurrently, very likely he or she may be cast out of the political equation.  
  
Figure 6. Pathway to Retreat from Initiatory Participation 
 
 
In this chapter, I first describe what I call the culture of ridicule in Cape Verde, 
that is, the whole business of mockery based on the improper use of the Portuguese 
language. Then, I look at the issue of inaudibility. This is related to the fact that the truly 
monoglossic citizens, those who can only speak the mother tongue (Cape Verdean 
Creole), are not truly heard by the political elite, for they are not speaking the right 
language. This means that one’s level of engagement in the debate at the societal level is 
more often than not the consequence of the language one speaks. In the third part of this 
chapter, I touch upon the extent to which the politics of ridicule and inaudibility 
encourages people to retreat from active engagement in the political business of the 
community. In the conclusion, I highlight all the major points of the chapter.  
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The Politics of Ridicule  
Full political participation, particularly in terms of effectively partaking in the public 
debate about a political relevant issue, is not without a cost. The cost can be in material or 
psychological terms. This is to say that the cost can either be in terms of a supposed loss 
of free time—which could have been devoted to other activities, including productive 
activities that bring in material advantages or simply to leisure. To participate in the 
political life of the community implies, as such, a cost of opportunity.   
I start by presenting some illustrative cases that led to public ridicule.  My point is 
that by bringing these cases into the light, we can show how many people will simply shy 
away from partaking in public debates in fear that any speech error in the prestigious 
language may put them in the center of public derision. The first case is in the virtual 
realm. Two main reasons explain my choice to include cases drawn from the virtual 
realm as illustrative cases of language-based ridicule. First of all, in spite of the global 
digital divide, the Cape Verdean urban youth is relative wired. It is common to find 
across the city of Praia several “cyber cafes,” where customers could access the 
internet—and other services such as video games—for a relatively low price (usually 
about a dollar an hour). Secondly, the topics of conversation and dialogue on the virtual 
realm often overlap with that of the real world. I first learned about the video on 
YouTube (explained below) through informal conversation with one of my interviewers, 
in the moments before starting the actual interviewing process.  
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A video posted on YouTube, titled “Falando Português ou Brutuguês?” (Speaking 
Portuguese or Brutuguese?), went viral among Cape Verdeans online.
4
 The video, which 
has over ninety-five thousands views and more than eighty comments, is about a 
fisherman who is being interviewed about marine turtles. As the interview is being 
conducted in Portuguese, the fisherman attempts to respond to the questions in the same 
language. Lacking knowledge and training in the Portuguese language, the interviewee 
tromps on the most basic grammatical rules of the language (as, for instance, the rule of 
agreement). The video constitutes an example of syntactic, lexical and phonological 
errors. The title of the video is very suggestive of the dominance of a certain language 
ideology.  That is to say that a critical analysis of the title of the video itself reveals 
attitudes and beliefs regarding the use or the function of the languages. Not to follow the 
rules of standard Portuguese is to be a sub-human—after all, as shown above, Portuguese 
is the language of modernity and civilization. Not to follow the rules of agreement and 
other grammatical rules is to assume a monster-like figure. It is, according to the title of 
the video, to engage in a language that is appropriate to a monster, a Brutuguese. 
Arguably one finds the persistence of the colonial ideology in the title of the video. 
Colonialism, as it noted by one of most critical students, Franz Fanon, was essentially 
Manichean. The dichotomy between savage and civilized is implied in the title (the 
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 Rui Sanches, “ Falando Português ou Brutuguês?”, YouTube. Online Video Clip, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YX8bqYplfjM (accessed 21 November 2012).  
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Portuguese word for savage is “bruto”):  savagery, the condition of being uncivilized, 
implies the distorted use of the civilized language.
5
  
 For one commentator, this video was an example of a language “killer.” For 
another commentator, just one word was necessary to classify the situation: “Pretoguês” 
(blackguese)—clearly a play on words, whereby “português” becomes pretoguês (preto 
means black in Portuguese). Needless to say such a word has a long history that dates 
back to colonial times, when colonial officials often talked about “língua dos pretos” (the 
language of the blacks) to refer either to the native languages or the way that Africans 
spoke the language of the European.  
 Another video that has gone viral is a part of an interview, conducted by the 
national television station. A municipal officer from the local government of Santa 
Catharina, Santiago Island, was interviewed for a national television broadcast about the 
condition of stray dogs that were found to freely roam around the city.
6
 While explaining 
the policy to the reporter, who conducted the interview in the Portuguese language, the 
official committed a common enough mistake: he kept referring to “cãos” as the plural 
form for cão (dog), when the correct form is cães. While the plural form in the 
Portuguese language is often formed by adding an “s” at the end of the noun, there are 
some exceptions, as in the case of “cão.” The case in question is about a particular type of 
language error, which is common, that of a lexical error. 
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 For more on the subject, see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The 
Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2000), 209-210.  
6
 “Sem verbas para canil, CM de Santa Catarina de Santiago vê como única solução abater cães vadios,” 
RTC. Online Video Clip, http://rtc.cv/index.php?paginas=13&id_cod=16281 (accessed 21 November 2012).  
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 Deviation from the standard Portuguese often leads to mockery. This situation is 
particularly relevant in certain domains, chiefly in school. Among the youth, it is 
common to find examples of friends and/or classmates who are mocked for language 
errors while speaking Portuguese in the classroom. While conducting a focus group 
interview in the neighborhood of Brasil, one of the informants told me about an 
interesting case. He told that one day, while in a class, a school official came to his 
classroom while the teacher was lecturing. This official did knock on the door, but the 
teacher did not hear him. Another student, trying to get the attention of the teacher, said 
that someone was knocking on the door. However, the problem is how he did say it. He 
used a Creole language word—“konku”, which is a Creole word for “knocking on the 
door.”7 My informant further noted that still to this day his colleague is often derided for 
this language error.  
 In the same manner, another informant, who had recently graduated from high 
school, told me about how he and many of his fellow classmates would shy away from 
responding a question in the classroom, when asked by the teacher. He noted that:  
 When the teacher asks a question and he is asking for a volunteer to respond, most 
 of us tend to sit quiet and not venturing to respond. Often it is not because we 
  don’t know the answer. It is because we fear that if we make a mistake [in the 
  Portuguese language] as we are attempting to respond the question, our 
 classmates will make  fun of us.
8
 
 
 The above situation was also described by another informant from a different 
neighborhood (Ponta d’Agu). My informant, a 22-year old, with some college education, 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cape Verde), 
August 11, 2011.   
8
 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cape Verde), 
August 11, 2011.   
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recounted that sometimes the students know the answer to the question posed by the 
teacher—but have difficulty in putting the answer in the standard Portuguese. She stated 
that often the answer is “under the tongue” and once the permission is given by the 
teacher to respond in Cape Verdean Creole, the student often gets to the point.
9
  
 What happens within the classroom setting is just a micro-cosmic representation 
of society at large. There is a general condemnation about deviation from the standard 
Portuguese. This condemnation is particularly carried by some sectors of the political and 
cultural elite who often claim that the Portuguese language is being contaminated, in 
form and content, by the Cape Verdean language. For instance, Ondina Ferreira, a former 
minister of culture, and visibly a lusophile, talks about the development of a new form of 
talking that she coins as “creoulese” (or “crioulês in original, a portmanteau of “Crioulo” 
and “Português”).10  
 The above examples suffice to illustrate what I call the culture of ridicule. By this, 
I mean the popular predisposition to focus on the form and not the content of the 
message, with the intent to mock and deride the speaker. The content of the message is 
put aside—regardless of its importance, relevance and significance. What is striking is 
that language errors easily spread. The Internet, which has made possible the construction 
of online social communities and the rise of anonymous online commentators, has 
significantly fueled the phenomenon of ridiculing people for language errors.  
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.  
10
 Ondina Ferreira, “Crioulês – o novo veículo de comunicação dos Quadros,”  Expresso das Ilhas, nº 231, 
2006, 7.  
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To communicate is essentially about deployment of a language, be this verbal, 
written or gestural. As I have noted before, the use of a language is not politically neutral. 
On the contrary, the choice to use one language over the other is politically relevant. It 
can either be an attempt to open the public debate to further participation or about 
limiting the number of those who can engage in the same debate. This is particularly 
relevant in the states where the language of the state, a prestigious language, assumed to 
have all the benefits of a modern and advanced language, is not the local vernaculars. 
Cape Verde, as it has been showed throughout this thesis, is a case in point. Political 
debate, particularly in the written realm, is almost exclusively in the Portuguese 
language. In spite of great advances in public education, whose medium is the Portuguese 
language, this language is still poorly mastered by most citizens.  
The more social value attached to the dominant language, the more individuals 
come to be socially evaluated based on their competence in that language.” In most post-
colonial states, proficiency in the dominant language is acquired through formal 
education. It is also through schooling that one acquires technical competence. Linguistic 
proficiency and technical competence, thus, overlaps. Competence in the dominant 
language is the yardstick by which the general (technical) competence is measured. More 
often than not individuals’ social respectability and prestige is linked to their capacity of 
being at ease when speaking the dominant language. As it is more complicated to judge 
the technical competence of an individual, his or her comfort with the dominant language 
is used as the gauge for his or her overall competence.  
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 Alternatively, non-speakers of the dominant language will be negatively judged in 
terms of his or her technical competence. Politics of ridicule becomes quite common: 
failure to follow the basic rules of grammar or orthography of the dominant language is 
an invitation to public ridicule. Ridicule is a mechanism and strategy to minimize or play 
down the political role of the individual or his/her ideas by focusing not on the content of 
the message but rather on its form (e.g., grammatical red herrings). Modern technologies 
of information make the matter worse as they permit the instantaneous, anonymous, and 
globally reachable ridiculing comments. Many monoglossic citizens will simply shy 
away from discursive participation lest he or she be ridiculed. 
The process of communication is sometimes contaminated with what 
sociolinguistics call speech error, “a mismatch between what we intend to say and what 
we actually say.”11 This is like a slip of the tongue. Sometimes this is just the use of one 
word when we meant to use a different one; other times it can involve changes in 
morphemes or phonemes. These slips of the tongue are humorous and hilarious—
particularly when they take place within the familiar setting of our homes and closed 
circle of friends. Speech errors are not to be confused with language errors. Speech errors 
are related to mental facilities and how the brain sometimes works. In other words, they 
happen at psycho-neurological levels. Language errors, on the other hand, involve 
syntactic, phonological and semantic errors. These errors occur when the speaker has not 
fully mastered a language and has not internalized the generally accepted patterns of the 
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 Trevor A. Harley, “Speech Errors: Psycholinguistic Approach,” in Encyclopedia of Language & 
Linguistics, ed. Keith Brown (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), 739.   
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language in terms of syntax, phonology and semantics.  In other words, language errors 
are deviations from the accepted norm of a proper use of a given language.  
Modern societies have developed complex languages, that is, languages that can 
be used in different and diverse domains, with a developed and rich lexica and a 
multitude of rules regulating syntax, phonology and semantics. While there is a vibrant 
subfield of language error analysis, scholars have yet to analyze the political implications 
of language errors.
12
 In post-colonial Africa, since the language of education, government 
and the formal public sphere is often the language of the former colonizer, only those 
who go through extensive and widespread education possess the necessary competence to 
use the language without language errors. Cape Verde is no exception. Portuguese is the 
language of the state and education. The acquisition of this language occurs almost 
always through formal education, as it is the medium of schooling. The Portuguese 
language is used in Cape Verde as if it were not a foreign language—a state of affairs that 
has led, as some scholars have noted, to very disastrous consequences for learners.
13
 
Since Portuguese in Cape Verde is not considered a foreign language, students are not 
getting adequate instruction.  This results in an incomplete mastery of the language, 
evidenced by the frequency of language errors.  
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 Wenfen Yang, “A Tentative Analysis of Errors in Language Learning and Use,” Journal of Language 
Teaching and Research, 1, 3 (2010): 266-268; Carl James, Errors in Language Learning and Use (London: 
Longman, 1998).  
13
 Germano Almeida, a renowned writer from Cape Verde, defends that the Portuguese language in Cape 
Verde should be taught in the same manner that other foreign languages are used. For more on the subject, 
see “Língua: Português deve ser ensinado em Cabo Verde como língua estrangeira, defende Germano de 
Almeida,” Expresso (Portugal), March 27, 2010. http://expresso.sapo.pt/lingua-portugues-deve-ser-
ensinado-em-cabo-verde-como-lingua-estrangeira-defende-germano-de-almeida=f573370  (accessed on 5 
December 2012).  
222 
 
 
 
Making language errors in public often results in ridicule. Those who commit 
language errors become often the center of attention. The error (or errors) becomes the 
focus for all comments, while the content of the message often receives little attention. 
Public ridicule based on language errors is proportional to the depth of those same errors: 
the more the deviation from the standard norms, the more jokes and anecdotes are 
derived from the experience. It should be noted that this language error-based culture of 
ridicule is extremely high in the realm of primary and secondary education. Not 
infrequently, primary and secondary school students are the target of derision by their 
peers because of speech errors, while addressing or responding a question posed by the 
teacher. This situation creates a withdrawal from active class participation, lest those 
speech errors may be translated in a public joke. Personal experiences in Cape Verde, 
combined with information gathered during several focus interviews, I have come to 
know many cases in which individuals are jokingly nicknamed for the mistakes (the 
speech errors) made.
14
  
 The politics of ridicule are particularly focused on the improper use of the 
Portuguese language. Not following the rules of the grammar, or pronouncing words with 
an accent that is perceived to be distant from standard continental Portuguese, invites 
mockery, derision and ridicule. Often the process of ridicule can include nicknaming. It is 
common for individuals who have made highly noticeable public mistakes in the 
Portuguese language to be nicknamed after the mistake itself.  
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cape Verde), 
August 11, 2011.  
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 The issue with the politics of ridicule is that the message is never made the focus 
of the conversation and/or statement by an individual. Rather, attention is focused on the 
form and the general mistakes, often at the expense of the message, even when this is 
socially significant or important. Mimicking of the mistakes becomes the topic of 
conversation among close friends and/or family members. Whenever the conversation is 
about the incident, the message is put aside—all focus on the individual and his/her 
attempt to speak the Portuguese language.  
Because the politics of ridicule may lead to decline of individual self-esteem and 
self-confidence, people who are not proficient in the Portuguese language may think 
twice before engaging in public debate when the medium of the debate is a language that 
they poorly master. As a consequence, it is very likely that to these citizens politics 
happen in the realm of silence and head-nodding.    
Members of the Cape Verdean society understand that mockery is a major cultural 
trait and that the society as whole is often looking for an individual to be the butt of its 
jokes, derision and ridicule. Whenever a case of mistaken language use, it instantly 
becomes a social joke, shared by almost all members of the society, regardless of social 
classes. A powerful vehicle for the transmission of these social jokes about language use 
is contemporary popular music. Examples abound of musical hits which are about these 
social jokes. 
What was presented above is in no way something that is peculiar to Cape Verde. 
For instance, a study conducted in Mozambique notes that when non-educated attempt to 
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speak Portuguese, they often fall victim of mockery on the part the state agents.
15
  
Moreover, this situation can be observable even in states and nations traditionally 
characterized as monolingual and ethno-linguistically homogenous. While in case of 
Cape Verde—and in sub-Saharan Africa, in general—the situation is in terms of the 
social diglossia, whereby the dominant language is an imported language, one also finds 
similar experiences within the same language, whereby one of the dialects is the 
prestigious one.  
 
The Politics of Inaudibility  
The mechanism of inaudibility is the other psychological constraint for the public 
political participation of the monolingual citizens. By the concept of inaudibility I mean 
the extent to which the voice of an individual engaged in public discourse is actually not 
taken in considerations by others. “Being heard” means more than the ears capturing the 
sounds uttered by the speaker—or the eyes reading the words written by the writer. 
Rather, it is a perception that what one says and writes is taken seriously by others. The 
mainstream language ideology, which sustains the notion that the high language is the 
language of science, modernity and logic, influences how the general audience accept or 
reject as serious a message by a given speaker. Monolingual citizens’ inaudibility is also 
constrained by their lack of access to the media, biased towards the high language 
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 See Judith Marshall, Literacy, Power and Democracy in Mozambique: The Governance of Learning from 
Colonization to the Present (Boulder [Colo.]: Westview Press, 1993).C  Also see hristopher Stroud, 
“Portuguese as ideology and politics in Mozambique: semiotic (re)constructions of post colony,” in 
Language Ideological Debates, ed. J. Blommaaert, 343-380 (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999). 
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speakers.
16
  The mechanism of inaudibility often affects the perception of whether one is 
taken seriously or not. This leads to partial or total withdrawal from the public sphere.  
 A common problem of a diglossic language policy is that knowledge of the 
dominant language is often taken for technical knowledge. The high language, by the fact 
that it is acquired through formal education as it is the medium of schooling, becomes in 
itself a mark of intelligence and technical aptitude. To be proficient in the high-language 
is to be regarded as a well-educated person.  
In post-colonial states, diglossic language policy reinforces and reproduces the 
old colonial mentality of intellectual paternalism. That is to say that the well-educated 
self-portrays as the “vanguard” of the people and, in their name, act politically. 
Contemporary politicians do not differ as much from the old guard of African anti-
colonial nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. For African nationalists of the 1950s and 
1960s, politics was about guiding and speaking for the people. Politics was 
fundamentally about providing the ultimate solutions for the problems that the people 
face in their daily existence—without even bother to ask for co-participation in the 
devising of the solutions for the problem. Mobilization, and not autonomous political 
participation by the ordinary citizens, was the norm. African nationalists instrumentalized 
the masses as to challenge the colonial authorities through the means of power of 
number—and thus, forcing the latter into opening the channels of communication for a 
                                                        
16
 I am not making any claims that the subordinate language finds no space within the media. Rather, its 
presence in the media is not only relatively small vis-à-vis the dominant language but also its function is 
different. In this sense, the allocation of space in the media for the monoglot citizens in the media is often 
related to contentious politics (i.e., interview a monoglot citizen following an event of social and/or 
political crisis that directly affect his or her life).  
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possible self-government.
17
 Political participation of the African masses was restricted to 
presence at the rallies, demonstrations, protests, and so on. Party policies and activities 
were the result of the activities of the selected few African intelligentsia, who acted on 
behalf of the masses.
18
 
African Electoral democracy of the 1990s and 2000s might have opened the 
political arena, but this was basically limited to the elite. The fall of one-party states 
mean the opening of high politics, with social elite, previously barred from competing 
power, vying for the control of the state. For the most part, the masses are still blocked 
from active political participation. This is particularly visible in areas of policy making 
and implementation. The discourse of professionalism, meritocracy and development 
simply transform the majority into a “silent majority,” the passive reactors to the actions 
taken at the higher levels of state politics.  
The gap between the state elite and the masses might have decreased when 
compared to the previous regimes of personal rule and/or one-party system. Old 
institutions, however, maintain the public realm as the sphere of the high language. Such 
a situation permits the attainment of two interrelated objectives: on the one hand, the 
masses who lack mastery in the high language are maintained outside the circle of high 
politics. Contemporary electoral democracy restricts people’s role to choosing who gets 
                                                        
17
 An example of this politics of independence is the case of Ghana (then Gold Coast) under the Congress 
People’s Party, under leadership of Kwame Nkrumah. For more on the politics of demographic pressure on 
the colonial authorities see Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1964); David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1963). For the case of the former 
French colonies, see Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
18
 This explains, in part, why the mass parties of independence became the party-state of post-colonial. See, 
for instance, the case of Cote d’Ivoire: Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964). 
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to be ruling over them.  On the other hand, the number of actual, direct actors in high 
politics is kept at a minimum. The exclusion of the masses from this domain, supposedly, 
makes politics a faster process of decision making. The logic is the following: the more 
actors involved in the process, the more arduous and troublesome the process of 
gathering support from a given policy line. Consensus building can be an easier and 
faster process if only a few people are involved in the course.    
Being socialized in a society with two or more languages, a person internalizes 
from an early age the fact that one language is more equal than the others. Without being 
told explicitly, a person easily discerns that languages are used in different domains. 
Field research in Cape Verde demonstrated how the people in general have a clear idea 
about the linguistic divide that exists in the country. As one of my interviewees stated:  
There are places that the Cape Verdean language can be spoken, places that only 
the Portuguese language can be spoken, and places where both can be spoken. 
The mother tongue is that language that we fell more at ease to express 
[ourselves]. It is the language that we are fluent in and often it has influence in the 
spaces where only the Portuguese language is to be spoken, for instance in the 
school. Sometimes when one talks, a word in the Cape Verdean languages comes 
out with force. Thus, Creole has too much weight in our speech pattern 
(linguagen). And it has too much interference even in the places that are to speak 
only the Portuguese language.
19
  
 
As the Cape Verdean language is the language known from cradle to grave, the 
language of everyday use, one must be highly fluent in the Portuguese language in order 
to avoid mixing the two codes. It is relatively easier to mix the two codes for two main 
reasons: first, the fact that the Cape Verdean language is a Portuguese-based Creole. This 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.  
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means that the bulk of the lexicon in that language derives, in one way or another, from 
the Portuguese language. Even today, this latter language is the supplier of lexicon to the 
latter. As such, there is always a temptation to mix the two languages. Second, 
historically the two languages have a long history of sharing the same social space—
though in two different domains. For the young citizens from the peripheral areas of the 
city where I conducted most of my interviews, their knowledge of Portuguese is quite 
rudimentary. While most of them have attended high school, they are aware that they are 
not fluent in the Portuguese language. Increasingly though, people understand that the 
Cape Verdean language is the language of social and political relations. Another youth 
told me about the social weight that the Cape Verdean language has in the society.  
Creole has weight. It is rare one goes to the public administration and speaks 
Portuguese. And even if we are talked to in Portuguese, we often respond in 
Creole (…) Some MPs (deputadus) use the Cape Verdean language as to be 
properly understood. In the classroom, sometimes we may know something but 
we simply cannot explain it in Portuguese. We find ourselves saying to the 
teacher, “I know about the topic, but it is ‘under the tongue’ (baxu lingua).” It is 
not that it is “under the tongue;” it is about explaining it [in Portuguese]. 
Sometimes a down-to-earth teacher may allow us to explain the topic in the Cape 
Verdean language and a good explanation follows. If you say it in the Portuguese 
language it comes out totally different. Almost never what comes out as spoken 
word is what you think.
20
 
 
Language is, par excellence, the site of domination; communication more often than not 
reflects relations of power. Power relations are embedded in linguistic interchanges. It is 
through the use of language that the relations of power are made effective and efficient. 
Through different linguistic strategies and manipulations, the power of one social group 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011.  
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over the others is constructed and reconstructed. The power relation, thus, derives from 
the internalization of the linguistic hierarchy accepted as given in the society.  
 In post-colonial societies, one learns about the linguistic hierarchy at an early age. 
The first few years of life are reserved for the mother tongue, as the individual’s social 
spaces are confined to the family and neighborhood. That is the realm of the mother 
tongue, the sphere of intimacy. The language of intimacy is the mother tongue as its 
acquisition results from the intimate contact with family and neighbors.  
 In time, the individual experiences a linguistic shock. By linguistic shock I mean 
the psychological problems as one becomes aware of other situations in which a language 
other than the mother tongue is the medium of communication. The child will notice that 
certain domains are mainly for the use of a language that is different from what he or she 
is used to. As the mass media, such as the radio and television, is made available in 
different areas of the post-colonial world, including in the rural areas, the individual will 
notice that a language other than the mother tongue is the one that is widely used in these 
media.  Later on, when the individual reaches school age, the linguistic shock is furthered. 
He or she is made to believe that the mother tongue is to remain outside the perimeter of 
the school (or at least the classroom). The teacher, who is the first non-intimate figure of 
authority, speaks in the other-than-mother tongue language, a Europhone. The 
Europhone, in time, is linked to the informal, impersonal and cold authority—reinforced 
at the time that the individual enters, through school, into a relationship with the state.   
 One of the goals of colonial authorities was the people’s internalization of the 
linguistic hierarchy, in which the language of the colonizer was taken to represent the 
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highest stage of cultural and civilizational development.
21
 In other words, the colonial 
discourse posited that the Europhone and the native languages represented the two poles 
of the linguistic civilizational continuum: with the former at the higher level of 
development. Post-colonial language policies and practices are built on this notion.  
 The use of the Europhone may well be a tactic of silencing contestation. The elite, 
regardless of the political regime and/or historical conditions, seek to maintain their 
domination over the non-elite. The more citizens’ contestations the elite can avoid or 
duck, the more entrenched their domination.  
 It is precisely at the level of language that the elite seek to maintain their edge 
over the masses. Language policy becomes a tool at their disposal to manage how and 
when the subaltern, or the non-elite, speak. Distance from the centers of power (and this 
distance is both social and geographical) is at the same time a linguistic distance. The 
peripheral area is the domain in which linguistic power can be further exercised. In this 
regard, one of my interviewees presented her own interpretation of the linguistic situation 
in the peripheries:   
Take for instance the case of towns and villages outside the city. People in those 
areas have less access to radio, newspapers, television and the like. Whenever a 
politician arrives (or even when broadcast on television) and begins his 
“lectures” in Portuguese, not much attention is aroused. For these people it is 
just the same old things. However, when a politician begins to speak Creole, 
attention is aroused among these people. Things communicated in Creole call 
people’s attention.22 
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 Calvet, Linguistique et colonialisme. 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011 (emphasis added).  
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One cannot avoid asking why a bi-lingual politician would choose to 
communicate in the dominant language when he (or she) knows that the message passes 
faster and better if conveyed through the mother tongue. The use of the dominant 
language however, accomplishes two related goals. On the one hand, it justifies and 
reproduces the position of the social and political elite.  There is a history of the 
Europhone as the dominant language that dates back from the colonial period, and the use 
of that language justifies the position of dominance. The dominant language becomes the 
identifier of social leadership and domination. Fear of being ridiculed demobilizes many 
from the political arena. Ridicule is essentially a product of a social situation or relation. 
It is perceived as any naïve deviation from the norms (that is, peer-like) of social 
behavior.   
 Language is a powerful tool. It can be used for either to open channels of 
communication and dialogue or to impose a monologue. More often than not, political 
actors make use of the dominant language precisely to block any attempts at critical 
questioning, especially when such questioning is direct and bottom-up.  
The state official or representative may elect to speak in the dominant language—
or in the variation that is closer to the dominant language or dialect. This, in itself, is a 
political statement. To use a certain variant of the Creole, as such, corresponds to a 
certain social discourse. The choice for the mesolect, mixed with a catalog of words that 
are traditionally not part of the Cape Verdean language, is an indication that the speaker, 
by virtue of being able to speak the dominant language, a highly educated and well 
trained individual. The utterer presents him or herself, via language, as someone who 
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need not be questioned by untrained minds.  Even when the discourse is started off in the 
vernacular, the official often resorts to upward code switching (that is, changing from the 
vernacular to the dominant language) so as to dodge direct queries. Code-switching, the 
alternation of the linguistic code in in certain situations may constitute a powerful 
mechanism of avoiding responding to the demands of accountability.
23
 
Cape Verde, like other former Portuguese colonies, inherited a specific Lusitanian 
culture, which can be called the “culture of mister doctor.” The term culture of mister 
doctor may be defined as the overuse of the title “doctor” by those who managed to finish 
college studies.  Calling oneself a doctor has increasingly become more a social title than 
an academic title. An interesting argument often presented to distinguish between the 
“social doctor” and the “academic doctor” is at the level of writing. A college graduate is 
often referred to by the abbreviation of doctor (Dr.) while a person with an academic 
doctoral degree (Ph.D.) the title is fully spelled out (“doutor”). At the level of speech, 
there is no way of making a distinction between the two.  To have a bachelor’s degree is 
to be a doctor—and to require others to call one doctor. Language, that is the Portuguese 
language, is the medium that reinforces such a culture. The more erudite, esoteric and 
impenetrable the language used, the more one boasts his “doctor-ness.” The use of the 
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 An interesting example of code switching, from the low language to the higher language, is given by 
Donaldo Macedo, after an encounter with a high echelon state official from the Ministry of Education of 
Cape Verde. The meeting’s language was the Cape Verdean language, for most of the Cape Verdean 
Immigrants and Cape Verdean Americans do not understand Portuguese. Then, the official switched to the 
Portuguese language, arguing that, in a type of a philosophical debate he makes much more sense in 
Portuguese than in Creole, as he was educated in that language.  It turns out, as noted by Macedo, that “as 
soon as he started to speak Portuguese, the dialogue ended.”  
 “Donaldo Macedo: ‘A nossa língua é viável como instrumento pedagogic,’” A Semana, December 10, 
2005. http://www.asemana.publ.cv/spip.php?article14036&var_recherche=Procurar&ak=1 (accessed on 
May 12, 2013, italics added).  
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dominant language in the public sphere is a means to reinforce the social hierarchy, 
thereby creating relations of power and authority. Put another way, social relations 
become relations of power insofar as one of the participants uses language as the symbol 
for his higher social, economic and political standing.  
 The culture of “mister doctor” overlaps and is reinforced by the language 
ideology that considers Portuguese to be the only language capable of transmitting 
knowledge, science, logic, philosophy, and the like. The corollary of this ideology is that 
the vernacular, due to its inherent limitations, cannot, in any way, be used for transmitting 
complex and abstract messages.  
 In the communicative encounter between the state representative and the people, 
the former has two alternatives: a) either using the language or variety of language that is 
closer to the vernacular, and ipso facto, avoiding any static in the message to be passed to 
the audience; or b) using the dominant language/variation to play up his/her supposed 
academic and social superiority. Sometimes the use of the vernacular is a calculated 
strategy. Pierre Bourdieu talks about the strategy of condescension to demonstrate the 
instrumentalization of the vernacular in a diglossic community by the political leaders.
24
 
The strategy of condescension refers to the fact that a political actor, from higher socio-
economic and political class (in one word, the elite), takes up a language, speech or style 
that is often linked to the lower classes. The strategy, as such, implies the elite can 
temporarily accept and use a style or variation that is not part of their common linguistic 
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repertoire. Ultimately such a strategy is designed to conquer “the hearts and minds” of 
the lower class, whereby the actor, who is engaging in such a strategy, presents 
him/herself as “a man/woman of the people.” In other words, this strategy can brings 
political advantage to the elite, by removing, at least temporarily, the conditions of 
inequality and social hierarchy that exists.  
 The use of the high language, the Portuguese language in the case of Cape Verde, 
is an invitation to passivity [on the part of the wider audience]. In spite of the fact that 
these days more and more people come into contact with the Portuguese language, the 
truth of the matter is that Portuguese is not the everyday language. Only a tiny minority 
of the social and political elite are truly fluent in Portuguese (see chapter three). To most 
of the people the language is a foreign language, learned in schools and its command is a 
sign of upward mobility and education. Interviews with different people from different 
sections of Cape Verdean society supported this view. A young male from one of the 
peripheral areas of the capital city of Praia, tells me that sometimes that the role of the 
audience is nothing more than to clap hands, as the message often is not understood. 
25
 
This indicates a “disconnect” between the politician and the general population. Even 
when the former makes use of the Cape Verdean language, he or she frequently mixes it 
with the Portuguese language, which makes comprehension of the message a daunting 
task, to say the least, for a person whose knowledge of Portuguese is rudimentary.  
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Brasil (Praia, Cabo Verde), 
August 11, 2011.      
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On a different occasion, a female informant elaborated further this situation. She 
noted that:  
[There is the] question of peripheral areas [from the countryside, for 
instance]…People from these far regions, who have limited access to radio, 
newspapers and television, and the like. [When a] politician arrives, or even 
[when he or she is] on television, and he/she begins, with all his/her posture, 
reading in Portuguese, it simply does not bring any awakening in these people. 
For him, it is politics as usual.
26
 
 
Her focus was obviously on the rural and peripheral areas where access to 
education is relatively difficult. In these areas, formal education is harder to come by. As 
a consequence, common citizens from the rural areas have trouble understanding 
statements made in the Portuguese language. This is also because their contact with the 
language is often limited. Modern technologies, such as radio, television and/or the 
internet, are not part of the daily life of a sizeable portion of the rural population (in spite 
of the fact that the country is very small).    
For my informant, the use of Portuguese in public communication and in politics 
in general is rather alienating. Politics is (or, better, it is perceived to be) all about 
aggregation. The use of the dominant language results in keeping some portions of the 
population out of the circle of understanding. She further elaborated on this, stating that: 
When a person listens to what is being said in his/her own language, he or she 
feels more integrated. He or she feels that whatever is being discussed is related to 
him/her. But when it is in Portuguese he or she may feel that the message has 
nothing to do with him/her—sometimes he/she does not even bother to listen.27 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011 (emphasis added).  
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  Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
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Elections may be one of the few times that the political and social elite use the vernacular 
for public communication. Seeking to attract electoral followers and votes implies that 
the candidate—or the party or the political organization competing in the elections—
portrays itself, both in the content and in the form of the message, as closely as possible 
to the common, ordinary citizen. Increasingly, the language of electioneering is the Cape 
Verdean language. Candidates are increasingly relying on the Cape Verdean language. 
From party slogans, billboards, election jingles, and other communicative electoral 
paraphernalia, the presence of the vernacular is visible. Yet, things change in periods 
during elections. The use of the Portuguese language is associated with technical and 
scientific thought. Using the Cape Verdean, or ‘plain’, language may, on the other hand, 
link the speaker with simplicity of ideas. A well educated person is one who can make 
poetic use of the Portuguese language to the point that the message is only understood by 
a few. The gross majority of the population is thus kept out of communication. In this 
regard, an informant from the peripheral area of the capital city said that  
[There is the] question of which type of Portuguese to be used.—even among 
journalist who makes the interviews. They use very difficult vocabulary that most 
of the people are not familiar with and/or donot know.
28
 
 
The use of the vernacular in public discussion is linked to citizenship and 
participation. In spite of the fact that there is a widespread belief that Portuguese is the 
language of modernity and prestige, in actuality it is the use of the Cape Verdean 
language that brings people into the debate. It is the language that they best understand, 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Ponta d’Agu (Praia, Cabo 
Verde), August 13, 2011 (emphasis added).    
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for it is their mother tongue and the language of everyday use. Moreover, a public debate 
that is carried out in the vernacular allows citizens to naturally participate. The Cape 
Verdean language, as the mother tongue, is quite natural, flowing without constraints. In 
this regard, an informant tells me that “[when it is in Cape Verdean Creole, a person] 
feels even a better citizen, [capable of] ask[ing] questions.”29 As different languages are 
given different status and convey different sets of symbols, the choice of language by the 
person of authority (in this case, the politician) may determine whether hearers withdraw 
or adopt and integrative attitude.  
In the past two sections, I presented two mechanisms (ridicule and inaudibility) 
through which common citizens’ political departicipation is realized. I mentioned how 
the dominant language policy and practices force common citizen to either shy away 
from speaking or not to be taken seriously through what I call the politics of ridicule.  
 
Silencing and Managing Citizens’ Political Participation 
As I demonstrate in this section, the extent that post-colonial diglossia may, in fact, be a 
strong hindrance to effective political participation by a number of citizens. In order to 
accomplish such a desideratum, it is important to first define the concept of diglossia. In 
spite of its etymology, diglossia, is not and should not be taken for bilingualism. To be a 
bilingual is to have the ability to speak two languages.
30
 A bilingual individual “travels” 
easily in two different linguistic communities: in his/her mother tongue and in the 
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domains of the second language, often acquired through formal education. Diglossia, on 
the other hand, is more at the level of society and it is related to a socially and politically 
imposed hierarchy of languages, whereby one of the languages assumes predominance 
and preponderance. This means that the language that is socially predominant is the 
medium in the official domains, as in the administration of justice, education, formal 
commerce and public administration.  
As the dominant language is acquired through education, the distinction among 
the members of the society reflects the individual level of education. A person who is 
fluent in the dominant language is more likely to be part of the elite. Alternatively, the 
individual that can only communicate in the mother tongue is very likely to be cast 
outside the main circles of economic and social power.  
 In recent third-wave, electoral democracy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
language policy is a powerful hindrance that restricts political participation to a sizeable 
portion of the population. With few exceptions, the language of the state is the language 
of the former colonizing power. The Portuguese, French and English languages, as such, 
are the official languages and the medium of other various socially important functions.
31
 
As the official language is often other than the language of the population, this greatly 
impacts the people’s input in the process of designing and implementing state’s policies.  
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 This explains why the international identity of African states is often given in terms of being 
Francophone, Anglophone or Lusophone. The official language and the colonial legacy constitute, thus, 
two powerful elements in the national elites’ imagination of supra-national communities in Africa.  
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 Diglossic language policy defines and maintains language hierarchy in terms of 
their functions, roles and value in a given community.
32
 This type of language policy 
ultimately leads to a formation of two arenas of politics: one in which the official 
language of the state, the language inherited from colonialism is dominant—and 
sometimes is the only one—and the other arena, of the low, subordinated languages. To 
visualize the distinction one can think of the first arena as the main circles of power (the 
state institutions). This is the realm of what can be conveniently called “high politics”—
in the sense that it happens above the people and the decisions emanated from it 
supposedly are authoritatively binding.  
 The arena of “low politics” is at the level of the ordinary citizens. In this arena, 
people share ideas and perceptions about the political situation, organize collective action 
to defend their community interests, engage in the local associational life. Politics, as 
such, takes place in the vernacular.
33
 The two-arena politics reinforces political 
marginalization of monoglossic citizens. Political marginalization has to do with the 
“establishment” of structural constraints that “lock” certain segments of the population in 
place. The structural constraints may be based on different social constructions such as 
class, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, language, among others. One’s lacking ability to 
perform comfortably in the dominant language is very likely to push him/her to the 
margins of politics.  
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240 
 
 
 
The post-colonial linguistic condition, as described above, impacts negatively on 
the monolingual citizens’ political participation. On the one hand, there are the linguistic 
structural factors that demarcate the domains that each language can/should be used.  
Path dependence, individual strategies and institutional legacies mark off the social and 
political arenas for the employment of a certain language.  For instance, language and 
education policies determine which languages will be used in the formal school system or 
the language for the state bureaucracy. It follows that employability or upward mobility 
within the bureaucratic ranks is commensurate to one’s proficiency in the official 
language. The post-colonial state bourgeoisie, often through a calculated strategy but 
sometimes unconsciously, seeks to perpetuate this linguistic situation, forming itself also 
what David Laitin calls the “linguistic elite”34 
   
Blocking Initiatory Political Participation  
Political participation constitutes all the social activity that ultimately results either in the 
composition of government—at the local or national levels—or about the outcomes, or 
policies, that emanate from the governing bodies. Political participation may be as simple 
and direct as voting or can be as complex and indirect as partaking in a mass movement 
for, or against policies or the government. In this section, I argue that what I call 
initiatory political participation is relative low in Cape Verde. By the concept of initiatory 
participation I mean the ability to engage in the public debate about the issues, policies, 
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rules and other governmental output. In spite of the legal and political system, which may 
be constructed as to guarantee free and open participation by all, the reality may be very 
different. Strong formal and informal institutions, chiefly language policy, are effective 
elements that ultimately hinder ordinary citizens’ free and direct partaking in the affairs 
of the community.  
I have noted above that the actual sphere of politics is indeed limited. Elections 
may be one of the few channels of political participation for the general population. 
Participation in the general public debate, leading to either the formation of the 
government or to the creation and implementation of public policies, particularly at the 
national level, involves a very limited number of people. For one thing, there are 
infrastructural limits. In Cape Verde there is a deficit of political infrastructures and 
institutions that permits the free entry of people into the whole process of debating 
policies and their implementation. Political institutions such as public hearing, initiatives 
and referenda that can be effectively used as the channels for an active and engaging 
initiatory participation either are not present or exist only on paper.  For instance, the 
current Cape Verdean Constitution (from 1992) makes reference to the institutions such 
as referendum and citizens’ legal initiative. Yet, over more than two decades after the 
constitution has been approved, there is yet a law regulating these processes—let alone 
the actual experience of referendum in the national or local politics.  To engage in the 
question of the structures is to get into the very complex and rather difficult question of 
learning what the causes and what effects it has.  Is it the active participation that leads to 
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the opening of these structures or, is it the opening of structures that causes people to 
participate in politics?  
In any case, there is no incentive for the political elite to open another channel of 
debate. This is to say that the sphere of public debate is at best frozen—if not actually 
shrinking. Ordinary citizens are kept out of the circle. This state of affairs, in one way or 
another, has something to do with the language question—and the ideologies that 
underpin it. First, there is this idea shared by many that modern politics is very technical 
and complex. As such, the whole process of debating and discussing the forms and 
contents of it should be left in the hands of the professionals and technicians. The general 
public, therefore, is left only the option of choosing which “package”, already 
constructed, should be implemented. The idea is that by choosing one candidate or one 
party the citizens are automatically legitimizing all of the public policies implemented by 
them. Second, the political elite fear the entrance of competing forces from the general 
society. The opening of the public sphere produces its quantitative change—measured in 
terms of an increase in the number of participants. Subsequently, this quantitative change 
may ultimately lead a qualitative change of the public sphere as well as the form, content 
and manners in which the debate in carried out. Logically speaking, the power of 
persuasion would have to go through radical transformation with the increase in number 
of participants in the debate. If the debate is limited to the political elite, the participants 
would probably put out less effort to persuade the other participants to follow a certain 
line of action or thought. For once, being part of the same social group, and as such 
sharing the same cultural sub-system, the communicative process may be rather 
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superficial and needing not to provide explanation of small details, such as body language. 
Rather, there is emphasis on “thick description,” that is cultural understanding resulting 
from sharing the same culture, that the members of the group probably know and 
understand these un-communicated details. To enter in a debate with a member of the 
lower classes is to open a Pandora’s Box where everything would probably needed to be 
explained and clarified.   
The entrance of the general citizens would alter this state of affairs.  The Cape 
Verdean elite, like most of the African elite, find their legitimacy to rule in terms of their 
role as intermediates between the local and the international. The access to linguistic and 
cultural capital makes them capable of serving as the linking element between the general 
mass of citizens and the overall international market and politics.
35
 In fact, one of the key 
discourses legitimizing the sole reliance on the Portuguese language as the language of 
the State and education has to do with the notion that that language may constitute a 
bridge with the international world as well as to the scientific and technological 
development. I have noted in chapter four that even radical anti-colonial nationalists, 
such as Amilcar Cabral, did not see any contradiction in the use of the Portuguese 
language in the process of national liberation and post-colonial state building. As the 
country is heavily dependent on foreign aid and assistance, from the elite perspective 
ultimately the language question boils down to the capacity to link the country with the 
foreign donors. Yet, these outside-in notions of development tend not only to alienate 
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local population but also disregard all the local produced knowledge and social 
experiences as expendable.   
 It is important to understand the mental atmosphere in which politics takes place. 
One needs to learn about the general cultural context of politics, for culture shapes 
politics and at the same time is the arena within which politics is shaped. To investigate 
this cultural context, I gathered a group of five college-educated individuals (all male), all 
of whom are employed in the mid- to high-echelons of the public bureaucracy (some of 
these individuals also teach in institutions of secondary and higher education).
36
 My goal 
was to learn about the characteristics of political leadership at the national level. There 
was a consensus among the interviewees that political leadership at both national and 
local levels should be reserved for the well-educated. A forty-three year old male 
participant, a college graduate who teaches history at one of the high schools in the city 
of Praia, argued that:  
politics is too complicated a business. The modern state is very intricate and  
 complex. Only those with the necessary academic tools should be in the positions 
 of state leadership—such as, ministers and other elected officials, at the local and 
 central  government. Political leadership is technical leadership.
37
 
 
Behind this notion is the idea that the modern state is highly complex and difficult and 
that only those with higher education can effectively lead the state. The other side of the 
coin is that while an uneducated individual may not be fit for public office; he or she may 
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have the capacity to decide which policies are best for the community—but can’t come 
up with these ideas and/or implement them.  
 Following the discussion, another participant, also a college graduate, who works 
in the Ministry of Tourism and Energy, maintained that:  
 One cannot expect anybody to perform the jobs of a medical doctor or an engineer. 
 These jobs require expertise that comes from years of sitting in the college bench, 
 understanding the theories and approaches. In the same manner, one does not 
 expect  anybody to be in charge of the Ministry of Economy. One must be an 
 economist to properly guide the Ministry. Without college education, I am afraid 
 that you wouldn’t get  the necessary tools to properly serve the government.38 
 
This notion is also shared by individuals with little or no formal education, 
particularly elderly citizens who may not have had the opportunity for schooling. In this 
regard, the sentence uttered by an elderly female citizen during a focus group interview in 
the neighborhood of Paiol is illustrative. She plainly noted that “I have no schooling [and, 
thus,] I need only to follow what they say.”39 This is a common attitude among those who 
lack formal education. 
 
Conclusion 
The key objective of this chapter has been to note that the diglossic situation that 
characterizes Cape Verde fosters a situation of political withdrawal. Those citizens who 
are not proficient in the dominant language, the Portuguese language, have a 
psychological disincentive to active engagement and citizenship. For one, they cannot 
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 Focus Group Interview, Interview by Abel Djassi Amado, Neighborhood of Achada Santo António, 
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make a valuable contribution to the public political debate, which is most often conducted 
through the medium of Portuguese. At the same time, given the language ideology and 
the long history (and story) that considers the native language not suitable for modern 
domains and tasks, mother tongue speakers find themselves not being taken seriously—at 
least not to the same extent that the dominant language speakers are.  
 I also noted that one of the main motivations for the self-removal from political 
participation is what I have defined as politics of ridicule. Those who are brave enough to 
speak up are all but forced to attempt to speak in the dominant language if they have any 
hope of being taken seriously.  As they often lack the knowledge and/or experience of 
speaking the Portuguese language, their spoken language is far from following the norms 
of the Standard Portuguese. As a result, a wave of ridicule, mockery and jokes soon 
follow—directed, as we have seen, at the speaker.  
 Withdrawing from active political participation, particularly to partake in the 
public political debate, is the consequence of what I called inaudibility: speakers of some 
language, chiefly those who speak a non-prestigious language are not taken seriously. 
Their political complaints, suggestions or grudges often go unheard—and, as such, not 
acted upon. Speakers of the mother tongue in Cape Verde, particularly those who speak 
the basilect, the dialect that is far removed from the Portuguese language, find it difficult 
to engage in public debate. The (erroneous) idea that their language is not capable of 
translating complex thoughts is accepted as a given by many. Ultimately, ordinary 
citizen’s initiatory political participation is curtailed.  
  
247 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY: 
A COMPARISON OF CAPE VERDE, TANZANIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA  
 
 
Resulting from the decades of colonialism and post-colonial authoritarianism, the 
linguistic landscape of the countries that made up the African continent was rather 
simple: the language of the former colonial power (English, French or Portuguese) 
maintained its status of the official language, the language of education, administration 
and high culture, whereas, the African languages, regardless of the size of their speakers 
or their linguistic development, was kept to the secondary status, sometimes out of the 
public sphere, to be used solely in the private realm. “Colonialism two publics” has 
turned into post-colonial two publics.
40
 Even now that many states have already 
celebrated their fiftieth anniversary of independence, indigenous languages have yet to 
reach the level of the language inherited from the colonial experience.  
 The 1990s brought a renewal of political hopes to sub-Saharan Africa, as a lively 
parade of electoral democratization spread throughout the region, from the West Africa to 
East Africa, from the horn of Africa to southern Africa. Endogenous and exogenous 
pressures had weakened one-party and military regimes, which dominated the political 
landscape at that point. One by one, and little by little, multi-party elections took place 
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around the continent, producing different political outcomes.
41
 In some cases, as in the 
cases of Zambia or Cape Verde, the incumbent from the party-state regime was 
electorally ousted by an opposition coalition.
42
 In other cases, as in the cases of 
Mozambique or Tanzania, the party of liberation was able to control the process and to 
keep itself in power following the founding elections—though they were forced to 
institutionalize reforms.
43
 In other cases, the process towards electoral democratization 
had led to political decay—as in the case of Angola or Rwanda during the 1990s.44    
 This chapter delves into the impact of language policies and practices on the 
quality of democratic experiments in Cape Verde, Tanzania and South Africa. Put 
differently, I draw comparative cases to investigate the extent to which the continuous 
neglect of the indigenous languages constitutes a powerful obstacle to full political 
participation of the citizens in the above-mentioned countries.  
 
 
Tanzania’s Political History and Language Policy  
Like so many political entities in sub-African Africa, Tanzania is a product of 
colonialism. The agreements between Imperial Germany and the United Kingdom and 
Portugal led to the establishment of the Deutsch-Ost Afrika, a colonial possession that 
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included not only what is today the mainland Tanzania but also the two states of Rwanda 
and Burundi. Imposition of the colonial rule over the various ethnic groups was brutal. 
The terrible and inhumane response to the so-called Maji-Maji rebellion attests to the 
brutality of the German colonial enterprise.
45
   
 Colonial brutality notwithstanding, the Germans planted the first seeds in the 
language policy that was based on the African lingua franca, Swahili, a creole language 
resulting from the fusion of Arabic (acrolect) and Bantu languages (basilect). The 
language, first appeared in the coastal area of East Africa, from what is today Somalia 
down to Northern Mozambique. Arab traders and African porters that moved back and 
forth from the coastal areas to the interior of the continent led to the diffusion of that 
language to as far as the eastern territories of today’s Democratic Republic of Congo.46  
 To facilitate colonial domination, while economizing the costs of the colonial 
state-building, the Swahili language was taken in by the German colonists as the 
language of administration, along with German, after years of being used for Christian 
proselytizing (both protestant and catholic).
47
 Like most colonial powers in Africa, an 
unholy alliance between the colonial state and the various missionary groups developed 
in German East Africa. In need of an intermediary, the colonial state funded mission 
schools and even created schools to train the much needed cadres for the bureaucracy. 
German extension of colonial domination was carried out through the employment of 
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native agents, the so-called akidas, Swahili-speaking Africans and Africans who were 
practically the middlemen between the European masters and the large body of native 
Africans. In spite of some reservations by some missionary groups, mainly Protestants 
who were advocating for the use of the indigenous languages, in time all accepted 
Swahili as the language of instruction. Concomitantly, a process of Latinization of the 
Swahili language took place, when the previously used Arabic script was put aside for the 
Latin one. The debacle of the armed resistance against colonial interference opened a new 
era in the history of the territory, the age of improvement. John Ilife, a noted historian of 
colonial Tanzania, indicates that Swahili was employed by German authorities as the 
official language of district administration, “adopted for administrative convenience and 
subsequently defended against missionary enthusiasts for tribal languages and patriotic 
enthusiasts for German.”48  
 German colonial language policy, in a way, resembled that of the British indirect 
rule policy and was in direct opposition to the French and Portuguese policy of 
assimilation. Instead of a typical glottophagic perspective typical of the assimilationists, 
Germans and British assumed that native language could be and were used in the matters 
of colonial administration.  
 Germany’s defeat in the First World War meant the disbandment of German East 
Africa and its split in three territories, Rwanda-Urundi, the so-called Kionga Triangle and 
Tanganyika, controlled by Belgium, Portugual and United Kingdom respectively. British 
rule in Tanganyika, supposedly a mandated territory under the legal precepts of the 
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League of the Nations, was in effect a colonial rule, not different from other colonies. In 
the first instances, this meant the crowding out of Swahili from the public and 
administrative spheres by the English language. Sir Donald Cameron, who assumed the 
post of Governor of Tanganyika Territory in the early 1920s, instituted the policy of 
indirect rule, guarantying again the prominent role of Swahili language in the public 
sphere and in the domains of colonial administration.  
 In 1961, following political independence, Julius Nyerere and anti-colonial 
nationalist his party, the Tanganyika African National Union, established Swahili as the 
national language of the country—“in opposition to English.”49 Like in other former 
British colonies in Africa, decolonization was mainly through constitutional reforms and 
multi-party elections. By the end of the 1950s, Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) was incontestably the only political game in town. The independence elections 
translated the transfer of power to TANU, under leadership of Julius Nyerere. As the 
other political parties had no actual electoral power, it was just a matter of time for the 
transformation of a de facto into de jure one-party state.  
 Politics of national liberation and independence in Tanganyika can be said to have 
circulated around two key poles: the politicization of Swahili that is making the language 
a strong and viable tool for political mobilization, recruitment and identity formation, and 
the swahilization of politics, the process of making political processes, action and 
communication through the medium of that language.  The process of politicization of 
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Swahili, undertaken by TANU and its leader Julius Nyerere, was a multifaceted process. 
The language became a foundational and essential element in both horizontal and vertical 
national integration.
50
 Since pre-colonial and colonial times the Swahili language has 
enjoyed the role of lingua franca, linking individual and groups from different ethnic and 
regional background, this role was further reinforced with the coming of independence. at 
A the same time, the Swahili language was the language of vertical integration insofar as 
it was supposed to close the gap between elite and the masses. Henry Bienen, writing in 
the late 1960s about the political history of TANU, noted that  
Swahili provided an ideal, ready-made vehicle through which TANU officials 
could communicate with the grass roots of society and operate even in unfamiliar 
localities. A knowledge of Swahili was therefore a prerequisite to the 
establishment of a permanent, paid TANU staff, whose members could be posted 
anywhere in the country.
51
 
 
Post-colonial Tanganyika, later Tanzania, was also engaged in swahilization of politics. 
Party politics, the recruitment and vertical ascendancy within TANU became intimately 
related to the Swahili language.
52
 Politics, both in its high and everyday approaches, 
became the process conducted through the medium of Swahili. Independence meant the 
language was promoted to an official language status, a unique case in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the early 1960s. Moreover, against the backdrop of swahilization of politics, in 
1965 it was decided that the language would have the role of the medium of education for 
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primary and secondary education. In few words, nation-building, the creation and 
imagination of “Tanganyikaness,” became intimately connected with kiswahili.53  
Post-colonial Tanzania, like several other states in the region, was an example of 
one-party state experimenting with African socialism, through the ideology and practices 
of Ujamaa.
54
 By the 1970s, the politics and policy related to Ujamaa were all but 
successful. Neither socialism nor development were obtained. A crisis of legitimacy 
ensued and electoral democracy was envisioned (by foreign and local critics alike) to 
constitute a panacea against all the evils that the country faced. In 1995, the first multi-
party legislative and presidential elections since the 1960s were conducted.
55
 Oda van 
Cranenburgh, following Samuel Huntington’s typology of democratization, has suggested 
that political transition in Tanzania is an example of “transformation,” that is, a process in 
which “the initiative and leadership in the transition process lay with the governing 
party.”56 Electoral democracy meant the transition from one-party state to a dominant-
party state: Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the party in power (created in 1979 after the fusion of 
TANU and Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar), maintains almost total control of the state.   
It should be noted that by the time of political liberation of the 1990s Kiswahili 
has become truly a national language, spoken across the country and by people from 
different social and economic background. Nyerere’s linguistic nationalism had paid off 
                                                        
53
 Anderson, Imagined Communities. See also Bienen, Tanzania, 43.  
54
 See, among others, Zolberg, Creating Political Order; William H. Friedland and Carl Gustav Rosberg, 
African Socialism (Stanford, Calif: Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace by 
Stanford University Press, 1964); Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa—Essay on Socialism (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). 
55
 Goran Hyden, “Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania,”Journal of Democracy.10, no. 4(1999): 142-
155. 
56
  O. Van Cranenburgh, “Tanzania's 1995 Multi-Party Elections: The Emerging Party System,” Party 
Politics. 2, no. 4 (1996): 537.  
254 
 
 
 
and the reliance on Kiswahili has solidified national identity among Tanzanians.
57
 
Unsurprisingly the Kiswahili language became the key vehicle of democracy in the 
1990s. Many political parties created and legalized in this period established their names 
in Kiswahili. This can interpreted not only as a strategy to link with the general 
population but also an attempt to build upon the symbolic value of the Swahili language 
as the language of the nation.   
 
South Africa: from Apartheid to a Multi-Lingual Electoral Democracy  
South Africa’s history of politics and language policy is a complex one, bringing together 
different peoples, cultures and languages from Europe and southern Africa. While the 
Portuguese might have been the first Europeans to have reached the shores of what is 
today South Africa in the late 1400s, actual European settlement began with the sending 
of Dutch colonizers to the Cape colony in the second half of seventeenth century—as to 
serve in the supply line for the Dutch East India Company. Dutch setters, unlike the 
British who moved in later, de-linked themselves from the European world. The 
linguistic consequence of this process was the eventual the social manufacturing of an 
original and distinct language: Afrikaans.
58
 
 British penetration in the territory, in the late eighteenth century, was a calculated 
action to preempt French emperor, Napoleon, from conquering the area, and thus, casting 
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a big blow on the British global empire. The history of nineteenth century South Africa is 
the history of civilizational clash and forced migrations: the Mfecane among African 
ethnics groups, the Great Trek of the Afrikaner seeking to move away from the control of 
the British; the war between the British Empire and the Zulu Empire; the various armed 
conflicts and wars of conquest between the Africans and the Dutch settlers, and last, but 
not least, the so-called the Boer War of 1898-1901. By the mid-nineteenth century, and 
particularly in the later years of the century, the Afrikaner population (the descent of 
earlier Dutch settlers) were political antagonistic to the plans developed by the British—
who, by the end of the century, began to advocate an imperial plan, linking Cape to Cairo 
and had political economic plans of controlling the gold-rich areas of South Africa.  
 Peace agreements between Europeans kept Africans out of the political game. In 
1910, the political merger, the Union of South Africa, was formally created,  combining 
the two territories formerly controlled by the Afrikaners (Transvaal and Orange Free 
State) and the two controlled by the British (Natal and Cape Colony).  While the new 
political entity resulted from the unification of previously autonomous political units, the 
Union of South Africa was never a federal state. Its constitution mandated that English 
and Dutch were the official languages of the territory.
59
 British mainstream language 
ideology maintained that Afrikaans was a dialect of Dutch and, like other African 
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languages, that it could not fulfill modern roles and functions, particularly those 
pertaining to the activities of the state.  
 After the end of the Boer conflict, the British attempts to Anglicize the white 
Afrikaner farmers backfired. It led not only to a more entrenched feeling towards the 
language by the Afrikaner, but also to the development of several nationalist Afrikaner 
organizations that advocated their cultural and linguistic uniqueness and individuality. 
Some of these organizations strived to delink South Africa from the British 
Commonwealth, guaranteed first by the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and subsequently by 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931.
60
 Afrikaner ethnic nationalism ensued. In time, these 
nationalist feelings and organizations would lead to a formation of a veritable ethnic 
coalition among the Afrikaans. It became important to devise a system of 
Volkskapitalisme, designed to trickle in the share of economic development to the white 
poor farmers.
61
   
 Following Second World War, the National Party surged as a major political 
force, claiming the task of leadership to the Afrikaans nationalism. Once in power, 
radical Afrikaans nationalists began to erect a type of state that fit to their ideology. The 
foundation of this new state was the idea of separate development or Apartheid in the 
Afrikaner language. It should be noted that the whole idea of separate development was 
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something that was borrowed from the British political and colonial thought.
62
 The 
institutional beginning of the Apartheid regime was the year of 1948, with the 
promulgation of a series of race laws turning the country into what George 
M. Fredrickson calls an overt racist regime.
63
 Little by little, more severe race laws were 
enacted. For instance, the Population Registration Act divided the population of the 
country into four “races,” white, black, Asian and colored.  
 J. D. Omer-Cooper considers that the Apartheid regime in South Africa can be 
best understood if divided into three major phases.
64
 The first stage, which ran from 1948 
to 1961, constitutes the phase of the baaskap, or white supremacy, a “period in which the 
National Party put its original ideas into legislative form.”65 The period of separate 
development, from about 1961, the year that South Africa became a republic (that is, it 
broke away from the British Commonwealth, turning itself into a veritable autonomous 
Afrikaans republic), to about 1974-75, the year of southern Africa liberation. From the 
mid-1970s, a phase of multi-racial co-option developed. A new phase can be added to the 
history of the apartheid regime in South Africa, that of its dismissal. By the mid-1980s, 
following the two inter-related domestic and international pressures (particularly the 
“make the townships ungovernable” campaign and the international movement towards 
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divestment in South Africa) political leadership in South Africa had to open the regime to 
the African masses.
66
  
The history of the Apartheid regime, its origins and development, is 
fundamentally a history of the promotion of the Afrikaans and the culture related to that 
language. At the beginning of modern South Africa, following the Boers War, Afrikaans 
was essentially an oral language, lacking an organized and systematic orthography. In 
fact, for the dominant English speakers Afrikaans was no different to the many 
indigenous languages that made up the human landscape of the country. In 1906, for 
instance, an article in the English-newspaper The Cape Times read that, “Afrikaans is the 
confused utterance of half-articulated patois.”67 Moreover, post-war British policy was 
fundamentally directed towards Anglicization of the country, by making the English the 
language of education while promoting immigration of the English population into the 
territory.
68
 The sentiment of defeat, coupled with the hegemonic policies of the British, 
basically led to development of linguistic nationalism among the Afrikaners.  
  The first two decades of the twentieth century were crucial for the development 
and modernization of Afrikaans. Poets, writers, literary and language associations sprung 
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up, promoting and demanding the recognition of the language in parity with the dominant 
language (English). For the Afrikaner cultural and social elite, the promotion of the 
language was essentially a movement towards rising up the Afrikaner nation as a whole. 
Equipped with the organic perspective of nation, according to which language is the soul 
of the nation, as defended by German Romantic writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, they maintained, in the words of its most ardent leader, D. F. Malan, that “[to] 
raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, [is to] let it become the vehicle of our 
culture, our history, our national ideals, and you will also raise the people who speak 
it.”69 By the end of the 1920s, Afrikaans was a recognized official language of the 
country as well as a language of education.  
 Under the Apartheid regime (1948-1994), the country’s official language policy 
was fundamentally bilingual, sustained on the principle of legal and constitutional 
equality between the English and the Afrikaans languages. African languages, such as 
Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Tsonga, among others, were considered as the official languages of 
the then-called black homelands (Bantustans) and self-governing regions. Apartheid’s 
education language policy, however, was a bit more complex and it was based 
fundamentally on the two interrelated foundational principles, namely that of the idea of 
the apartheid itself and the notion of mother tongue education.
70
 This means that the 
creation of sovereign political units that reflects (or are expected to reflect) the language 
communities of South Africa. This explains the creation of the black homelands as 
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independent political units, where an autochthonous language was to be elevated to the 
status of official language.  
 Apartheid education policy was fundamentally sustained by the notion that 
children should be taught in their own mother language. For the majority of black 
population this policy meant that early education was to be carried out through the 
medium of Zulu, Tsonga, Xhosa, among others, depending on the “tribal” classification 
imposed upon them. Secondary education, according to the policy, was conducted 
essentially through the medium of the English language. This policy suffered a major 
shift in the mid-1970s.  
 In 1974, with the passing of the Afrikaans Medium Decree, the regime imposed 
that the Afrikaans language was to be the mandatory medium of secondary education 
along with English. Given the fact that Afrikaans was perceived as the language of the 
regime (and ipso facto, the language of oppression), such a measure resulted in an 
obstinate resistance on the part of the black population. Ultimately black resistance 
against this rule resulted in one of the most brutal repressions under apartheid, namely 
that of the Soweto Uprising of June 16, 1976. In the end, the apartheid regime, propped 
up by radical Afrikaners, resulted in the identification of Afrikaans as the language of 
oppression—while, at the same time, English was perceived as the language, medium, 
and instrument of liberation.
71
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By the end of the 1980s, the one-party state in Tanzania and the racist and 
discriminatory regime in South Africa were all politically bankrupt—albeit for different 
reasons. The opening of the political system, however controlled, became a key strategy 
in all of the cases, in order to safeguard the dominant position of the hegemonic party or 
to maintain the overall political order in the country. With different paces and approaches 
the regimes in Tanzania and South Africa were liberalized and opened to full electoral 
competition by the mid-1990s.  
 Since the mid-1960s, Tanzania was a de facto and de jure one-party state. Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi, the political party that originated from the fusion of the TANU and the 
Afro-Shirazi party, assumed the political monopoly since its inception in 1977.  The 
situation in South Africa was a bit different. It can be argued that up to the end of the 
apartheid in 1994, politics in South Africa was bifurcated, with “white” and “black” 
politics. The white political realm, blocked from the non-whites population (namely the 
indigenous Africans, the colored and the Asian minority), can be characterized as an 
electoral democracy, insofar as several political parties (white-only parties) competed 
freely for power. Yet, white South Africa was a clear example of a dominant party 
system as the Afrikaans-dominated National Party clearly dominated electoral politics. 
Black politics, on the other, resumed to anti-Apartheid protests and rebellion, as the 
regime did not provide any space for formal political participation to Africans—who, in 
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the later period of Apartheid, were considered as non-citizens immigrants coming from 
the so-called Bantustans).
72
  
 Democratic transition in Tanzania took about five years, from the time that the 
regime began to liberalize politically (1990) and the founding elections (1995). Goran 
Hyden, a student of Tanzanian politics, considers the case of democratization in Tanzania 
as “creeping,” given the number of years that the whole process took.73 In 1990, 
following the recommendations of Julius Nyerere, who had voluntarily relinquished 
power in 1985, President Mwinyi established a special commission tasked with legal and 
constitutional reforms as the precondition for the reintroduction of multi-party electoral 
democracy—which was decided to take place in 1995, thus following the already in place 
electoral terms.
74
 Democratization in Tanzania, unlike many of the cases of West Africa 
(Benin, for instance) was not the result of popular pressures.
75
 
The founding elections of 1995 clearly tilted in favor of the incumbent party. 
CCM won both the presidential and legislative elections.
76
  Democratization or the 
opening of political competition in Tanzania was one-sided, resulting from the absolute 
control by the government and the party in power (CCM). Political opponents, whether 
organized or not, simply did not have as much influence in the whole process of 
designing post-transition electoral laws and/or other key legislations.  
                                                        
72
 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London: Longman, 1983). 
73
 Hyden, “Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania.”   
74
 Ibid., 145. 
75
 A. M. Tripp, “Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy,” Comparative 
Politics 32, 2 (2000), 197. For the West African cases and the impact of popular protests and protests see 
Bratton and Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa.  
76
 For a detailed account of the 1995 general elections, see Lisa Ann Richey and Stefano Ponte, “The 1995 
Tanzania Union Elections,” Review of African Political Economy 23, 67 (1996): 80-87. 
 
263 
 
 
 
 South African democratization was a more complex business, insofar as 
democratization meant the nationalization of politics—hitherto reserved to a minority. 
The 1980s had been a terrible decade for the apartheid regime, facing increasing 
opposition from the domestic and international spheres. In the international arena, 
campaigns for disinvestment in South Africa, reinforced by investors’ fears of a “coming 
anarchy,” resulting from the “making the country ungovernable” campaign, had provoked 
capital flight from the country—badly harming the national economy. In the domestic 
sphere, the internal opposition, mainly the ANC, campaigned to make the country 
“ungovernable”—again severely damaging the regime, by making the country an 
investment risk. Early attempts to change and open the system were taken in the 1980s, 
when the colored and the Asians were guaranteed seats in the parliament. For the black 
majority, continuous pressure was the only way ahead.  
 Democratic transition followed the model used throughout Francophone Africa. 
Among most of the former colonies of France in Africa, the transition towards liberal, 
electoral democracy of the early 1990s was the outcome of what became known as the 
national conference. The model, first applied in Benin in 1990 quickly spread to most of 
the Francophone African states, though with different outcomes.
77
 In South Africa the 
national conference happened under the aegis of the Convention for a Democratic South 
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Africa (CODESA).
78
 CODESA was a major assembly of the National Party, the 
opposition ANC and a myriad of other small to medium political organizations. This 
major national conference took place in two different episodes: first in December 
1991and the second in May 1992. Ultimately, CODESA reached a Record of 
Understanding on September 26, 1992. This document provides the norms and the rules 
for a number of political and social issues to be dealt with during the transition from 
Apartheid to a more inclusive state. A year later, a new type of national conference was 
also constituted, namely the Multiparty Negotiation Forum. This forum produced not 
only an interim Constitution of the country but it also established a transitional executive 
council, which was to lead the country until the first multi-racial elections of 1994.  
 The democratization process, that is, the process of negotiation and political 
design of the institutions to follow the status quo, was essentially carried out through the 
means of the high language in the case of South Africa. The negotiation and the revision 
of the pact were entirely in the English language. The exclusive use of the high language 
in the process of political liberation—particularly in the horizontal communications 
between the regime and the political opponents—was linked to the idea of political 
paternalism, whereby the political elite, old and new, discuss the fate for the general 
masses—who, would be presented, after all things were done, in a language that is 
perceptible to them. Thus, it can be argued that the use of the dominant language in the 
process of opening the political arena was, in itself, a mechanism of political control, 
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through drastically reducing the number of possible and potential intervenient in the 
process. Fluency of the dominant language, in the last instance, became the subtle, yet 
strong, factor in deciding who gets to speak up and provide suggestions for the new 
political order under formation. 
 
Contemporary Linguistic Landscape in Tanzania and South Africa 
In order to better understand the current linguistic situation in Tanzania and South Africa, 
the succinct examination that follows is limited to two main areas, namely, the official 
language policy and education language policy.  In terms of linguistic policies and 
practices, Tanzania and South Africa, represent two different streams of linguistic 
traditions in the African continent.  
South Africa and Tanzania are multi-linguistic states, with dozens of linguistic 
communities found within their respective borders. As I have noted above, Tanzania has 
had the advantage of developing an indigenous language, Kiswahili, which has been used 
for education and public administration, along with English. Unlike a number of sub-
Saharan African states, post-colonial Tanzania has followed an overt policy of 
Swahilization of the country, where the language became the symbol of the nation under 
construction—though it seems that this policy is being reversed, as I shall note below. 
This has resulted in a greater and deeper application of the Swahili language in all 
different realms and domains of public and private lives. Yet, this should not be taken to 
mean that a situation of complete bilingualism does exist in the country. In fact, in spite 
of the post-colonial investment in the indigenous language, English still dominates the 
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linguistic landscape. The prestige of the English language results mostly from the fact of 
it being an international and global language.  
Sociolinguists who study current de jure language policy and politics in Tanzania 
talk about “ambiguity” or “confusion.”79 Though the first post-colonial constitution 
established that both English and Swahili as the official languages of Tanzania, the state’s 
present political constitution makes no reference to language policy. After more than two 
dozen constitutional reforms, the constitution has long erased the issue of language.
80
 In 
spite of the fact that a constitutional language policy is lacking, politics in Tanzania, at 
the state and society levels, are in Swahili. Public discussions and debate, within the 
various branches of the government, particularly in the legislative assemblies, as well as 
major government outputs (policies) are in Swahili. 
The dismantling of the Apartheid state was to be more than a simple regime 
change. Given the centrality of the language question in the former regime, post-
Apartheid policy makers—and the social and political leaders as a whole—accepted the 
need to reformulate and to redesign the country’s language legal architecture. The post-
apartheid constitution of 1996 focuses on the principle of “parity of esteem” among 
South African languages. This means that, supposedly, equal treatment was to be 
provided, by the state, to all different language communities that make up the country.
81
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 In spite of the legal and constitutional recognition of the country’s 
multilingualism, the truth to the matter was that South Africa had fallen victim to English 
cultural imperialism. Neville Alexander, a student of the language question in South 
Africa, noted about a decade ago, that the country’s main organized political forces have, 
in essence, pursued an “English-only” or an “English-mainly” policy.82 Social and 
political public communication, including most of the written processes and procedures 
of state action, are carried almost always through the medium of English—at the expense 
of other languages. The social practice of English monolingualism enters in “tension” 
with the constitutional principles of multilingualism.
83
 One questions about the extent 
that the constitutional language policy may be simply “declaratory.”84  
 Several factors militated for the hegemonic position of the English language in 
South Africa. First, English is recognized as a global language, linking the country to the 
international systems of trade, politics and culture. It constitutes a language of wider 
communication, making possible the linkage of the country’s elite way beyond the limits 
of territorial boundaries. International communication and business are maintained as a 
cause for this state of affairs. The second reason has to do with the fact that the English 
language had a traditional role, among black South Africans and non-white South 
Africans, as the lingua franca of political resistance against the apartheid regime. Lastly, 
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in the post-apartheid context, English is the lingua franca of the elite, making possible the 
linking and communication across the various ethno-linguistic communities and groups 
that make up the country.  
South Africa’s new post-Apartheid constitution broke new grounds of the official 
language policy in the continent by declaring eleven official languages, of which nine are 
indigenous African languages (along with the two former official languages, English and 
Afrikaans).
85
 The post-Apartheid regime constitution talks about “parity of esteem” 
among all the eleven languages. The idea behind this concept is that the speakers of these 
official languages should enjoy linguistic rights to speak their languages in whatever 
situation they may face. This situation potentially would result in the diminution—if not 
the complete breakdown—of anxieties and lack of confidence resulting from the use of a 
language that has less social status and prestige.  
 
Table 10. The Constitution and the Language Policy 
Country   Constitutional Principle  
Tanzania   While there was a provision in the earlier versions of the Constitution about the  
   language policy, it has been removed in most recent versions of the Constitution  
 
South Africa  “Parity of esteem:” 11 official languages (two from the Apartheid period and 9  
   new indigenous African languages), Section 6 
Source: Tanzania (1997, with various amendments), and South Africa (1994).  
 
As noted above, English dominates in South Africa.
86
 This language has been 
perceived as a unitary language since the times of resisting the apartheid regime. As the 
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language of liberation—for the struggle against the racial state was carried out almost 
exclusively through the medium of English—has come to mean that the majority of 
South Africans, particularly of their social and political elite, tend to perceive that 
language as a neutral and capable of healing the wounds from the past. Contemporary 
national politics, from electoral to parliamentary politics, takes place almost exclusively 
in the English language.  
The social and political status of a language—and of its speakers—is directly 
related to the use that the language may (or may not) have in the realm of education. 
Public education has been a powerful tool for language spreading at the hands of the 
modern state.
87
 The continuation of the colonial language-in-education policy has come 
to mean that the post-colonial African state has been an effective instrument of furthering 
European languages (mainly English, French and Portuguese), often at the expense of the 
indigenous, local languages. 
The social and political status of a language—and of its speakers—is directly 
related to the use that the language may (or may not) have in the realm of education. 
Public education has been a powerful tool for language spreading at the hands of the 
modern state.
88
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European languages (mainly English, French and Portuguese), often at the expense of the 
indigenous, local languages.  
There is a common social perception that modernity, social status, education and 
proficiency in the European language inherited from the colonial experience, are 
intimately related. The fluency in Portuguese, French or English often dictates one’s own 
social standing and/or employment opportunities. This social perception is furthered by a 
language-in-education policy that places greater emphasis on the European language, as 
the medium of instruction. In most of sub-Saharan Africa, the legacy that education, the 
process of transmission and building knowledge about social and natural reality, can only 
be effective and efficient if constructed through the means of a modern language (that is, 
Portuguese, English or French) still endures.   
Education language policy—that is, the state-mandated choice of language of 
instruction—in Tanzania since the introduction of electoral democracy has two different 
and divergent stages. In 1995 the government, through the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, issued a white paper that outlined the policy.
89
 The government, as such, adopted 
the model of the model of transitional bilingual education, according to which, the 
mother tongue is used in the early stages of education while the high language is taught 
as a second language and, in time, the former is replaced by the latter.
90
 According to this 
policy, Swahili and English are to be considered as the two main media of schooling, 
though used differently at different stages of academic development. Thus, the first years 
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of education (pre-primary and primary education), Swahili was to be the main medium. 
In the secondary and post-secondary education, English was the language of instruction. 
For the government of Tanzania, post-primary education was to rely exclusively on the 
English language “because of its tremendous power and prestige in the global market.”91 
More recently a major change in the education language policy has been proposed 
by the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training. According to this new policy, 
English is to be language of instruction from the nursery school to the tertiary 
education.
92
 The predominance of the English language is guaranteed in the education 
system of the country. Such a move has been criticized on the grounds that it is “in fact a 
continuation of the colonial linguistic inheritance.”93 Immersion into English seems to be 
favored over the old model of transitional bilingual education. 
Current South Africa’s education language policy dates back to the early years of 
the post-apartheid state. In 1996, two years after the instauration of multi-racial electoral 
democracy, The National Education Policy Act was passed that granted extensive powers 
to the government, through the Ministry of Education, in terms of a policy for language 
in education. The Language-in-Education Policy, adopted in 1997, laid the foundations 
of the policy.  Clearly influenced by the constitutional principle of “parity of esteem” 
among South African languages, the policy is centered itself on the notion of 
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multilingualism.
94
 This means that African languages—of which nine are considered as 
official languages of the country—can be used as the language of instruction. 
The principle of multilingualism, while enshrined in the constitution, is yet to be 
fully practiced, particularly in the realms of education. Scholars who study the linguistic 
landscape post-apartheid in South Africa have noted about English predominance.
95
 The 
situation is no different in school setting, where the hegemonic position of the English 
language has been upheld. The option to use English—often at the expense of the 
indigenous African language—was the option taken by most of schools in the country.96 
Against this backdrop, the government of South Africa has put in place new policies with 
the goal of redressing the current linguistic state of affairs. The first of these policies was 
the 2012 Use of the Official Languages Act.
97
 Among other political objective, this policy 
seeks to “regulate and monitor the use of official languages for government purposes by 
national government [and] to promote parity of esteem and equitable treatment of official 
languages of the Republic.”98 
The second policy—which is no more than the application of the first into the 
realms of education—is the Incremental Introduction of African Languages. This policy 
                                                        
94
 Margie Probyn, “Language and Learning: Policy and Reality in South Africa,” in Decolonisation, 
Globalisation Language-in-Education Policy and Practice, ed.  Angel M. Y. Lin and Peter W. Martin 
(Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2005), 155. 
95
 See, for instance, Laurence Wright, “Why English Dominates the Central Economy: An Economic 
Perspective on ‘Elite Closure’ and South African Language Policy,” Language Problems & Language 
Planning  26, no. 2 (2002): 159-77;  
96
 Barbara Dale-Jones and Lethabo-Thabo Royds, “Language policy lets pupils down,” Mail and Guardian 
27 July 2012, http://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-27-language-policy-lets-pupils-down (accessed on February 
18, 2015); Barbara Dale-Jones, “Tongue-tied on language policy,” Mail and Guardian 22 March 2013,   
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-22-tongue-tied-on-language-policy (accessed on February 18, 2015).  
97
 This bill was proposed by  
98
 PanSALB (Pan South African Language Board), Annual Report 2012-2013, 9 
http://www.pansalb.org.za/Annual%20Report.pdf (accessed on February 18, 2015).  
273 
 
 
 
was first advocated by Basic Education Minister Angie Motshekga, in 2013. Put into 
effect as a pilot project in 2014, the program is supposed to be fully extensive in 2015.
99
 
 
Political Participation and Effective Democracy in Cape Verde, South Africa, and 
Tanzania  
Electoral democracy has become part of social reality throughout the African continent.  
Since the early 1990s, periodic competitive elections, characterized by universal adult 
franchise, have become part of the political routine in countries like Cape Verde, South 
Africa and Tanzania. At least four cycles of multi-party elections have taken place in 
these countries, producing, however, different results. In general, the levels of electoral 
turnout are quite satisfactory (see table 11). While in Cape Verde, the government has 
changed two times, in the cases of South Africa and Tanzania, multi-party electoral 
democracy seems to have created a system of dominant party system. As defined by R. 
Suttner, dominant party system is “a category of parties/political organizations that have 
successively won election victories and whose future defeat cannot be envisaged or is 
unlikely for the foreseeable future.”100 The cases of the CCM in Tanzania and ANC in 
South Africa represent this subcategory.    
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Table 11. Turnout in Legislative Elections in Cape Verde, South Africa and Tanzania 
 1
st
 Elections 2
nd
 Elections 3
rd
 Elections 4
th
 Elections 5
th
 Elections  Average 
Turnout 
Cape Verde 
(National 
Assembly)  
1991 
75.27% 
1996 
76.52% 
2001 
54% 
2006 
54.17% 
2011 
76.01% 
 
67.19% 
South 
Africa  
(National 
Assembly*)  
1994 
86.9% 
1999 
89% 
2004 
76.73% 
2009 
77.3% 
 
n/a 
 
82.48% 
Tanzania  
(Bunge)  
 
1995 
76.5% 
2000 
73.8% 
2005 
72.52% 
2010 
39.71% 
 
n/a 
 
65.43% 
*The Parliament in South Africa bi-cameral. The data used here are those from the elections to the lower 
chamber.  
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.iup.org) 
 
Table 12. Regime type and Party System in Cape Verde, Tanzania and South Africa 
    Cape Verde   South Africa   Tanzania  
Number of Electoral Cycles  5   4   4 
Party System    Bi-party to Dominant Dominant   Dominant   
Founding Elections   1991   1995   1994 
Regime Type    Parliamentary   Presidential   Presidential  
Source: compiled by the author.  
 
 
The assessment provided by international ranking organizations, such as the 
Freedom House, provided a totally different image. With a score of 1 and 1,5 
respectively, Cape Verde and South Africa are characterized as free, while Tanzania, 
with a 3.5 score is partially free (see figure 7). While the Freedom House assessment may 
provide an idea of the political condition of the country, it does not give a full picture. 
The Freedom Index lacks a focus on the structural elements, such as language practices 
and policies that impair citizen’s active and engaging participation in the political affairs.   
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Figure 7. Evolution of Freedom House ranking of Cape Verde, South Africa and Tanzania 
 
Source: Freedom House (Annual Reports 1999-2012) 
 
This dissertation takes a rather different approach. By focusing on the language 
practices and policies—that includes obviously language ideologies—the objective is to 
discern the extent that the quality of democratic experience may be hindered when there 
is a linguistic gap between the hoi polloi and the state and state elites. In Cape Verde, 
South Africa, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, the dominant language is a language that is 
foreign to a great majority. Portuguese or English are fully mastered by only a small 
percentage of the population—while the vast majority, particularly in the urban 
peripheries and rural areas cannot engaged in serious and profound communicative 
activity in the official language.  
The dominant position of the English language in South Africa, while it has 
promoted horizontal integration among the various elites, originating from the various 
language communities, has meant, at the end of the day, the maintenance—to say the 
least—of the shrinking sphere of public participation. Writing two years following the 
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inauguration of post-Apartheid South Africa, Victor Webb has noted that “the present de 
facto language set up does not really allow for satisfactory citizen participation in the 
political life of the country.”101 He presents five major reasons to back up his claim. First, 
as the English language is the only—or perhaps—the main language of political debate, a 
language in which the overwhelming percentage of the population, particularly the rural 
population, lacks understanding or fluency. As a consequence, a large section of citizens 
are left out of the public discussion and deliberation circles. Second, there is a widening 
linguistic gap between the average citizen and the state administration, which is based 
either in English or Afrikaans. This ultimately means that citizens simply have troubles in 
“reading” the state—making the latter rather difficult to supervise and control.  
 Political scientists and other social scientists in general have long postulated that 
“enlightened understanding” of the political processes and procedures cause people to 
further probe and partake in the political affairs of the community, be it at the local or the 
national level.  In this regard, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter’s study of the 
American citizens is quite illustrative. They note that the political systems works “more 
democratically as the range and depth of information held by citizens increases and as the 
distribution of knowledge becomes more equitable.”102 At the same time, the authors 
suggest that “all things being equal, the more informed people are, the better able they are 
to perform as citizens.”103 William A. Galston opines about the importance and centrality 
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of political knowledge, by noting that “[t]he more knowledge we have, the better we can 
understand the impact of public policies on our interests, and the more effectively we can 
promote our interests in the political process.”104 In politics, to know is (almost always) 
to act upon. That is to say, learning about political processes is politically consequential. 
Political knowledge brings about political action. Once citizens have an understanding of 
the political processes and procedures they will act upon it. Family members, friends and 
neighbors are the primary candidate to be used for the promotion of their own views and 
interests, for they are the ones that are more accessible and social contacts are numerous 
and constant. Unfortunately, the reverse still applies. Lacking or having little political 
knowledge translates into less willingness to discuss and persuade the ones that one is 
often in touch with.  
 The numbers of the table 12 on 274 indicate that voter turnout in Cape Verde, 
South Africa and Tanzania are relatively high. The average for Tanzania, which was in 
the low 70 percent drops considerably with the elections of 2010, when less than 40% of 
the registered voters made to the polls. Fear of a Kenya-like election massacre, many 
voters worrying for their safety preferred not to make it to the voting station.
105
 One of 
the key arguments of this dissertation is that electoral participation is not a good 
indication of engaging political participation. In other words, high voter turnout is not 
necessarily related to participative citizenship. Voters may be attracted to the polls for 
reasons other than the pursuing of the collective good. This situation is particularly 
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significant in many states in sub-Saharan Africa. Studies across the African continent 
have stressed that elections, in themselves, are no indication of the quality of democracy. 
The record of African elections seems to indicate that old Big Man politics of patronage, 
clientelism and neo-patrimonialism are adapting to the new realities. Staffan Lindberg’s 
account of Ghanaian post-democratization electoral politics, for instance, concludes that 
it reinforces, rather than slashes, neo-patrimonial politics.
106
 For his part, the study of 
elections in Benin by Leonard Wantchekon suggests that “clientelist appeals and 
accessibility of clientelist goods greatly influence voting behavior.”107 As such, the fact 
that voter turnout is relatively high in most of elections should not be taken at face value 
or to means that there are high levels of participation among African citizens.  
 One should focus on the less visible—and often neglected—forms of political 
participation, ranging from political discussion and contacting a state official or 
representative, at the local or national levels. From the perspective of the ordinary 
citizens, the above-mentioned forms of political participation, unlike voting, guarantee 
more control and influence. For one, these forms of participation are direct and personal. 
To write a letter to a state official is to expect an answer. Similarly, to engage in a 
political discussion is to reasonably assume that questions will be answered. However, in 
the case of voting, things are not as clear. Depending on the electoral system, voting may 
be neither direct nor personal. For instance, in closed-list proportional representation, as 
in the case of Cape Verde, citizens vote for the political parties and not for the individual 
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candidates. The latter electability is dictated more by the party “selectorate” than by the 
voting population.
108
 Moreover, voting process is highly regulated that only those fitting 
certain legally-prescribed requirements (for instance, age, and nationality) may be 
allowed to take part. Other forms of participation are more inclusive, as they form a 
venue of civic engagement that under-age citizens or non-citizen residents could take part 
in the various aspects of the political process.  
Political discussion is an important element of participation in politics for it not 
only permits the circulation of political ideas and ideals among the discussant but it also 
constitutes a rehearsal of oratory and discussing and debating skills. Put in other words, 
there is a close relationship between political knowledge and discussion. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to delve onto the causality between these two variables. What is 
important to retain is that the two reinforce each other, as more knowledge about politics 
pushes people to enter in political dialogue—which leads to a qualitative increase in 
knowledge of the political processes and procedures.  
 At the same time, the practice of contacting a state official or representative is an 
important element of participation in the political affairs of the polity. For once, as it is a 
direct link between the official/representative and the citizen, it reduces the role and 
significance of the intermediary organizations such as political parties. In order words, it 
reduces the communicative and the real gap that may exist between the two. This 
exercise is of considerable importance for it establishes the practice whereby the agent 
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(the politician) responds directly to the principal (citizen). An increase of this exercise, at 
the individual and collective levels, inevitably creates a tradition of responsiveness and 
accountability.  
 
Table 13. Citizens’ contact with local and national representatives and state officials 
  Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
L N S.O. L N S.O. L N S.O. 
Cape 
Verde  
never 84 74 81 90 87 91 91 88 92 
Occasion. 5 9 7 3 4 2 2 2 2 
Few times 7 10 5 4 4 4 4 6 4 
often 4 3 6 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Don’t 
Know 
0 3 0 1 3 0 0 3 0 
South 
Africa 
never 82 94 94 72 86 84 73 95 92 
Occasion. 9 3 3 10 6 5 13 2 3 
Few times 6 2 2 13 5 6 10 2 3 
often 2 1 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 
Don’t 
Know 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Tanzania  never 71 83 83 68 84 87 66 78 57 
Occasion. 8 7 5 11 7 5 15 10 15 
Few times 10 7 7 11 7 4 11 8 17 
often 11 3 5 10 2 3 8 3 11 
Don’t 
Know 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Numbers are in percentile  
L: Local Government Representative/Official    
N: National Government Representative  
S.O.: Central State Official  
Source: Afrobarometer (various)  
 
In South Africa and Cape Verde, the levels of citizens’ contact with local and 
national representative is particularly low—with the number of contacts increasing when 
the contacted official is part of the national bureaucracy or of the national legislative 
body. A major reason explaining this state of affairs has to do with what I have named 
institutional linguicism, that is, the sum of language ideologies and practices 
underpinning the daily bureaucratic operations, whereby one or a few number of 
languages (the socially dominant ones) can be taken as the acceptable medium for formal 
281 
 
 
 
communication. In this situation, to engage the state is to drop the mother tongue and use 
the high language. Social and political practices dictate that the use of the high language 
is correlated with faster and more efficient response and service. Needless to say that this 
option is something that most people in South Africa (and in Cape Verde) simply cannot 
use, as their knowledge of the high language is rudimentary at best.  
There are, obviously, many reasons that explain this situation, ranging from a 
political culture that it is not based on the constant and continuous contact between state 
officials and representatives and the citizens to the material and economic costs of the 
contact itself. Yet, language policy cannot be put aside as it is a variable that help us 
understand these very low levels of citizens’ contacts with the state officials.  
The process of contacting national officials is often a formal one. Due to their 
busy schedules, the written word (letter or email in these days) is the main medium for 
communication. In South Africa, in spite of the fact that the Constitution provides for the 
eleven official languages, English maintains itself as de facto official language. 
According to The Economist,  
Today, 16 years after the advent of black-majority rule, English reigns supreme. 
Not only is it the medium of business, finance, science and the internet, but also 
of government, education, broadcasting, the press, advertising, street signs, 
consumer products and the music industry. For such things Afrikaans is also 
occasionally used, especially in the Western Cape province, but almost never an 
African tongue. The country's Zulu-speaking president, Jacob Zuma, makes all his 
speeches in English. Parliamentary debates are in English. Even the instructions 
on bottles of prescription drugs come only in English or Afrikaans.
109
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 The continuous hegemony of the English language in South Africa has created a 
situation that can be comparable to a de facto “linguistic neo-corporatism.” That is to say, 
the elite of the various language communities that make up the country use the English 
language as the linking element among the various communities in national politics. Put 
it differently, the groups’ elite, those who have mastered English, are presented—and 
self-presented—as the mouthpieces for their respective groups, insofar as they dominate 
the political lingua franca. This is based on the notions of representation, descriptive and 
substantial. Yet, this situation contradicts the principle of active and engaging citizenship: 
the elite of these communities are to be taken as the only available and potential voice for 
their respective groups. This simply forces the average citizen to rely on the 
representation provided by the elite.  
 In the case of Tanzania, as the table 13 indicates, more and more people are 
contacting the representatives and state officials. In the last round of survey conducted by 
Afrobarometer (2012) one-third of Tanzanian respondents contact their representative at 
the local level—though the percentage of those who do so regularly is relatively smaller 
(8%). The number is relatively smaller when it is about contact with the officials from the 
central government (22%). Given the colonial and post-colonial history of swahilization, 
the state and society share the common language. While the English language has far 
more social value and worth among Tanzanians, Swahili nonetheless is widely used in 
politics. For instance, parliamentary proceedings are almost entirely in Swahili—in spite 
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of the fact that English is also the official language of the country.
110
 The fact that the 
general population and the state agents regularly use the same linguistic platform 
(Swahili) can be said to facilitate any contacts that should arise between the two.  
 Language policy in South Africa, Tanzania and Cape Verde also has an impact on 
the level of political discussions among the people. Politics and, particularly, democracy 
(however defined) is essentially about discussion, debate and consensus-finding. Real and 
effective democracy must be inclusive in its discussions and debate. Citizens, regardless 
of their socio-economic or educational background, should find no obstacles in their 
access to the public circles of discussion and debate. 
 The central argument of this dissertation is that the linguistic gap between the 
state and society, a characteristic that most sub-Saharan African polities share, negatively 
impacts on the overall citizens’ active and engaging participation in politics. Lacking 
understanding of the dominant language implies, at the end of the day, that one cannot 
keep track of the political processes and procedures of the public power. In Cape Verde, 
in spite of the national language, the Cape Verdean language, being a true lingua franca, 
it is not the medium that intermediates the operations of power. In South Africa, as noted 
earlier, English is the dominant language and the operations and procedures of the South 
African state are almost exclusively in that language. South Africa and Cape Verde, 
therefore, suffer from the syndrome of institutional linguicism, the idea that only a certain 
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language (or a small number of languages) can effectively and efficiently be used as the 
medium for operations and procedures of power.  
Tanzania is in a different situation. As result of the post-colonial policy of 
promoting the Swahili language, which includes corpus modernization and status 
planning, that language has been an important and essential language of political debate. 
From debates in the national parliament to the record of the official meetings, the 
presence of Swahili is visible. This is not to say that English is not perceived as the 
dominant language in Tanzania. In spite of the advances of the Swahili language, English 
is perceived as the language of modernity and status among Tanzanians.  
One way to look at the way that language impacts political participation is to 
delve in the question of language and micro-level and macro-level public discussion. In 
fact, a major point of this dissertation is that the measure of actual and effective 
democracy is to be found in the quantity and quality of political discussion, debate and 
deliberation—for exchange of ideas and ideals precede, naturally, actions.  
Political debate in the countries under study is relatively restricted, both in terms 
of the number of participants and the depth of the topics under discussion. The surveys 
conducted by the Afrobarometer are quite illustrative in this regard (see table 14). In 
Cape Verde, 33% of the respondents maintained that they never discuss politics with their 
family members or friends. The Cape Verdean language is the idiom that is employed in 
the intimate dialogue and talk among family members and within a circle of friends. In 
any case, it is only 23% of the respondents who frequently discuss politics (while the 
number has been growing in the past few years, from 17% in the first round, the overall 
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number is very low). In South Africa, for round five of the surveys, only 20% of the 
respondents claimed to discuss political issues frequently. Yet, the percentage of those 
who claimed to have never discussed politics is a little below to what is registered in 
Cape Verde (29% and 33% in South Africa and Cape Verde, respectively). The case of 
Tanzania is a bit different. Not only is the percentage of those who said they never 
discuss political matters with friends and family members relatively low (22%) but also 
more than a third of the respondents consider that they frequently discuss politics.  
 
Table 14. Citizens’ discussion of political affairs 
             Round 3           Round 4           Round 5 
Cape Verde  
 Never     46  39  33 
 Occasionally    35  42  44 
 Frequently   17  18  23 
 Don’t Know    2  1  0  
South Africa  
Never     42  30  29  
 Occasionally    42  49  51 
 Frequently   15  20  20 
 Don’t Know    1  1  1 
Tanzania  
 Never     24  21  22 
 Occasionally   36  46  42 
 Frequently   38  32  35 
 Don’t Know    3  0  0 
Numbers are in percentile  
Source: Afrobarometer (various)  
 
The question that one cannot avoid asking is whether language policy has 
anything to do with these results?  To put it differently, to what extent the official 
language policy, which dictates the languages of public education and to be used by the 
state for the conducting of the public business, coupled with the actual language choices 
by the social and political elite impact on the general population understanding of 
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political matters and the subsequent exchange of formed political ideas? As shown above, 
the situation in Cape Verde is that the Portuguese language is the de jure and de facto 
official language of the state and the political and social elite. In spite of the long history 
of contact with the Portuguese people and language, a great number of the population 
does not possess adequate linguistic skills to fully grasp the message, when passed in 
Portuguese. In South Africa, the situation is not any different. While the constitution 
considers that eleven languages (including nine indigenous languages) are the official 
language of the state, in actuality the English language, understood by no more than 10% 
of the population, is the only language of the state. Tanzania is a starkly different case. 
Due to its strong post-colonial policy of Swahilization of the country, by making the 
Swahili language, an indigenous language, a truly national lingua franca, they have 
opened the gates for the general population to understand the processes and operations of 
power—when made public, that is. For instance, at the level of the parliamentary debates, 
they happened almost exclusively in Swahili—though the bill is often introduced in the 
Bunge (the National Parliament) in English.
111
 
The point that I want to stress is that not possessing knowledge about the high 
language of the polity is politically significant. For once, it limits the amount of 
information that works towards the construction of the individual's political knowledge. 
That is to say that the understanding of the language of the state leads to state literacy. 
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Alternatively, not possessing the necessary linguistic skills is very likely to result in a 
powerful crack in the building of political knowledge.  
Lacking political knowledge, the understanding of the processes and procedures 
of the state and power, ultimately results in an enduring withdrawal from politics—
particularly from the types of political activities that appear to require a large amount of 
resources (material or educational) or that can be tedious. To contact, either in the oral or 
written format, a state official or representative implies a collection of resources, from the 
most basic ones such as the knowledge of the written word to the expenditures in paper, 
ink and stamps of the letter to be sent. At the same time, private life with all its 
amusements, enjoyments and pleasures, often works against the engaging participation in 
the public life. Even in the most remote areas of South Africa, Tanzania or Cape Verde, 
folks do have access to a radio or other medium of mass communication, which is 
perceived as a source of entertainment.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has compared language policy in Tanzania and South Africa with the 
politics in Cape Verde. In all of these cases, the language of a former colonial power 
(Portuguese for Cape Verde and English for Tanzania and South Africa) is socially 
dominant, accepted as the language of power, prestige and social status—more in the 
cases of Cape Verde and South Africa than in Tanzania. I have shown that politics and 
the public debate in Cape Verde and South Africa is almost an exclusive realm of the 
Europhone. The ordinary citizen, who may have some rudimentary knowledge of the 
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dominant language—if any at all—may find him/herself “silenced” from the public 
debate. The situation is slightly different in Tanzania; in part resulting from the long 
historical tradition, since the colonial times and later further developed by the anti- and 
post-colonial nationalists, to make use of the Swahili language as language of education, 
public administration and intellectual development. Political documents, parliamentary 
debates and many other elements of the realm of officialdom are carried out through the 
medium of the national language.  
 The linguistic situation in Tanzania is politically consequential. As politics take 
place in the vernacular, more and more people become familiar with the topics. 
Discussion of politics and contacts with the local and national government officials and 
representatives are far more significant in Tanzania than in the cases of Cape Verde and 
South Africa. In Cape Verde, for instance, more than three quarters of the respondents of 
the Afrobarometer 2012 survey, have indicated that they never or only occasionally 
discuss politics with families, friends or neighbors. This number can be compared to the 
case of South Africa (80%) and Tanzania (66%). Therefore, it can be seen that discussion 
of political affairs, an important element that props up and pushes for more political 
participation, is something that is constantly conducted by one third of the Tanzanian 
respondents. My argument for this state of affairs has to do with the linguistic situation of 
the countries. The Tanzanian citizen is far more likely to understand what is going in the 
political arena as politics and political commentaries and analysis are increasingly 
performed through the medium of a language that is familiar to most.  
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 The fact that Swahili is a national language used by almost all citizens and at 
different aspects of social and political life has come to mean that the political distance 
between the ordinary citizen and the state officials and/or representatives is relatively 
small. Contacts with the local and central government officials and representatives are 
relatively high—in African context. More than one out 10 respondents of the 
Afrobarometer survey of 2012 regularly communicates with the officials.  
In linguistic terms, the situation in Cape Verde resembles much of Tanzania: the 
Cape Verdean Creole is a language used by all, mainly for private business and within the 
private sphere. Unlike the case of Tanzania, the Cape Verdean language is scantly used in 
the realms of officialdom. As I have previously shown, the Cape Verdean language is not 
the media’s language for political commentaries and analyzes. Mainstream language 
ideology reserves that domain exclusively to the Portuguese language.  This, in part, 
leads to the broadening of the political gap between the state and society. More than 9 out 
of 10 respondents have never contacted a local government official or a high-echelon 
state bureaucrat—relatively to the national representatives the number is 8.8. This 
situation exists in spite of the fact that the Cape Verdean language is a language 
understood and spoken by members of the political and social elite and ordinary citizens.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation brings language policy considerations in the discussion of the quality of 
democracy. Recent developments on the literature that focus on democracy, language 
policy and human rights must be briefly detailed here. Linguistic human rights, a topic 
that is beyond the scope of this dissertation, is a subject that is drawing attention from the 
scholarly community. Human Rights are those universally valid rights that are inherent to 
any human, regardless of time and space. Democracy is often hailed as the best regime 
that can protect and even strengthen the catalog of human rights. Current scholarship 
points to the fact that one of the pillars of these human rights, the linguistic ones, often 
goes unprotected. Linguistic human rights are defined as “the right to learn the mother 
tongue, including at least basic education through the medium of the mother tongue and 
the rights to use in many of the (official) context.”1 The keyword of the definition is 
“mother tongue,” that is, the language that one acquires without going through the 
process of formal education.  These rights are highlighted in order to significantly impact 
the process of changing the current language policy, by calling attention to some 
languages that, while they serve as the primary communicative means to many, are not 
part of the set of languages used in formal and official functions and roles. Lacking 
linguistic human rights may negatively affect the overall quality of democracy. 
Deprivation in linguistic human rights ultimately results in the considerable reduction in 
                                                        
1
 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Robert Phillipson, and Mart Rannut, “Introduction,” Linguistic Human Rights: 
Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Robert Phillipson, and Mart Rannut, 
eds. (Berlin: M. de Gruyter, 1994), 2. 
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enjoyment of other human rights, such as fair trail, fair political representation, among 
others.
2
   
 There is also another way of looking at the paths through which diglossic 
language policy may negatively impact the quality of democracy. The point that this 
dissertation makes is that diglossic language policy creates an artificial linguistic 
hierarchy, in which the mother tongues are placed at the bottom. This means that the 
mother tongues, in spite of being the main linguistic devices for everyday use for the 
ordinary citizens, are almost never used in formal and official roles and functions.  
Among post-colonial thinkers and critics, the impact of the post-colonial language policy 
upon citizens’ psychology is very damaging, leading toward their increasing de-
politicization. As mentioned above, radical thinkers such as Franz Fanon, Ngugi wa 
Thiong’o, and others, were very critical about the post-colonial reliance on the language 
of the former colonial power.
3
 To these writers decolonization without its linguistic 
component invites neo-colonialism, a novel form of external domination. Moreover, 
continuous reliance on a foreign language reinforces the alien culture as the main 
reference and standard, against which all must be compared. Indigenous political 
institutions lose political and social value, for they are constructed and disseminated in 
the local languages. A language policy that maintains and even emphasizes the 
continuous and sole reliance of a foreign language, such as English, French or 
Portuguese, is tantamount to a Trojan horse within the post-colonial society. This state of 
                                                        
2
 Ibid.  
3
  Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask; Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Decolonizing the mind: The Politics of Language in 
Africa (London: J. Currey, 1986).   
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affairs, as such, perpetuates the condition of exploitation and domination through cultural 
neo-colonial links. Following the insights of these radical thinkers, Donaldo Macedo 
writes that, in relation to Cape Verde, the use of the Portuguese language as the only 
medium of education in the post-colonial era brings the “danger of creating a distorted 
consciousness.”4 Politics can be best exercised when in the vernacular, for the 
psychological costs are kept at a minimum level.  
This dissertation focuses on the impact of diglossic language policy on overall 
political participation. Contemporary democratic institutions nurture its representative 
component, often at the expense of the participatory elements. Political representation, 
the mechanism through which the many supposedly finds a voice in a few, may 
ultimately work against the many. In fact, some political theorists have long called 
attention to the inherent flaws of representation. While it is not the focus of this 
conclusion to provide an exhaustive listing of scholars and thinkers who maintain that 
representation crowds out participation, there is cause, nonetheless, to point a couple of 
them. Jean Jacques Rousseau, for instance, writing centuries ago, claimed that 
sovereignty, popular in nature, cannot be delegated.
5
 Two centuries later, Robert 
Michaels contends that according to the “iron law of oligarchy” the representatives tend 
to promote their own interests at the expense of the represented.
6
 Contemporary scholars 
like Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren consider political representation in modern 
                                                        
4
 Donaldo P. Macedo, Cape Verdean Language Project: Final Report (Washington, DC: Department of 
Education, 1985), 114. 
5
 Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic 
Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 11(2008), 391.  
6
 Seymour Martin Lipset, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The United States and Canada (Berkely, 
Calif: University of California, Insititute of International Studies, 1966), chapter 12.  
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democracies to have been clouded by the “growing complexity of issues, which 
increasingly strains the power of representative agents, and thus their capacity to stand 
for and act on the interests of those they represent.”7 Given the new social and political 
reality, the value and ability of political representation has fallen drastically. I have noted 
in the introduction of this dissertation that ordinary citizens have increasing feelings of 
distrust towards their representatives. Representative democracy is failing in its most 
basic, essential and fundamental feature: representation.  
Present-day democratic institutions over-emphasize representation. 
Representative democracy in Cape Verde focuses on voting. Every four years citizens are 
called to choose who gets to form the government. In between elections, the voter is to 
leave the political representatives alone. The representatives know the best for the 
citizens. Thus, in the process of public policy making and implementation, the citizens 
are not to interfere, for they have already delegated power. Because of this citizens are 
made into passive rectors of policy. They do not effectively take part in the policy debate.  
One of the main arguments that this dissertation has developed is that diglossic 
language policy fundamentally sustains the system of representative democracy, while at 
the same time limits the extension of participatory elements. Diglossic language policy, 
as noted throughout this dissertation, creates a linguistic hierarchy between a dominant 
language and other languages. In case of Cape Verde, the case study of this thesis, such a 
language policy has effectively maintained the predominance of the Portuguese language 
at the expense of the local language, the Cape Verdean language—in spite of the fact that 
                                                        
7
 Urbinati and Warren, “The Concept of Representation,” 390.  
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this language is widely used by the population. Diglossic language policy fundamentally 
limits two main forms of political participation: initiatory and surveillatory.  
 The state, inherited from the colonial experience, was founded and developed 
through the medium of the colonial power’s own language, and not on the mother tongue 
of the subject population. This means that the state, colonial and its post-colonial 
offspring, is fundamentally encrypted: the language of political communication used 
within and by the state is not entirely grasped by the ordinary citizens. Such a state of 
affairs provides competitive advantage to the post-colonial elite, who have become the 
linguistic decoder of the state. Language policy, as noted above, has become a means to 
“elite closure.”8 
Diglossic language policy curtails citizens’ surveillatory participation. This form 
of political participation, as described in chapter six, is fundamentally about supervision 
and demands of accountability to the state and its agents. The state literacy, that is, the 
process of actually understanding how the state should act and actually act, is a major 
precondition for active involvement in the process of surveillance of the state, its 
institutions and its personnel. This should not be taken as if those without knowledge of 
the state do not participate in politics. One of the key points of this dissertation is that 
certain forms of political participation may be actually difficult to be experienced by a 
section of the population, given their lack of state literacy. Political participation is multi-
dimensional. The focus of the thesis is on non-contentious forms of political 
participation. These include participation in the public debate, whether in person or in 
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 Myers-Scotton, “Elite Closure.”   
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writing, contacting the political and state officials, at the local and central levels, with the 
goal of resolving a political problem, and demanding accountability from the actions (and 
lack thereof) by those who in the positions of authority.  
Political debate, within the elite as well as among these and the general 
population, is an important pillar of a democratic regime. After all, political debate is 
directly correlated to one of the most basic right and principle of democracy, that of 
freedom of speech and rule by consensus. Through public debate it is possible to reach a 
policy consensus that serves the interests of all those interested. Deliberation, discussion, 
debate, and argumentation are the fundamental mechanisms through which consensus is 
manufactured and actions are taken. In this aspect, Jürgen Habermas talks about 
communicative action to describe how political actions may be the outcome of the 
communicative process of the interested.
9
 
The elite use a number of linguistic strategies to avoid, control, manipulate or 
even terminate a political debate with the general populations. Strategies may include 
upward code switching (from Cape Verdean language to Portuguese) as well as 
employment of esoteric language and metaphors. Opinion articles written in the local 
newspapers are self-referential and crafted for a limited audience, the cultural and socio-
political elite. This form of political communication is less about conveying an idea that 
can be easily grasped by a high number of readers—fostering further debate on the 
subject—but rather an opportunity for the author to show his mastery of esoteric 
Portuguese.  There is a fixation of less common vocabulary (“difficult words,” as put by 
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 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. 
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one of my informants), as the evaluation by the peers is often on the form rather on the 
content of the message.  
 One way to limit the number of participants in the public debate is to start and 
maintain the whole public debate in the high language, a medium that most citizens lack 
full competence. This situation results from two main reasons: first, to keep some from 
even attempting to enter the debate as they do not possess the necessary linguistic skills 
that can make them able to understand the content of the debate. Others, while they may 
be able to understand, some or even most of the content of the debate, may find it rather 
intimidating to freely participate against those perceived to totally master the dominant 
language. There is, as such, a psychological mechanism of withdrawal.  
 Public political debate is limited through the application of a strategy of code-
switching. Code-switching refers to alteration of the linguistic medium used, by a given 
agent. Code-switching may be downward, that is, from the dominant language to a 
subaltern language. I mentioned earlier that the political elite may, in some instance, 
engage in this type of strategy as to emphasize their purportedly belonging to the masses. 
As mentioned earlier, this refers to the Bourdieu’s concept of strategy of condescension, 
the use of the vernacular as a populist tool by the political elite.
10
  
 The other side of the code-switching strategy, which has far more political 
consequences, is the upward switching, that is, from the low language to the dominant 
languages. This strategy is a powerful weapon employed by the elite to silencing the 
general masses, for it creates and sustains a linguistic fortress whose entrance is limited 
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to those who are proficient in the superstrate language. Upward code-switching is 
essentially about conveying political symbolism, namely that of social authority. By 
switching to a language of prestige and authority, the dominant social position of the 
speaker is emphasize—for the high language is, in itself, a mark of social distinction and 
status. The emphasis on social authority may be an invitation to silence the audience or 
the other debating party, who may not be proficient in the high language. Public political 
debate, when in the dominant language, is not extensive to a large section of the 
population, who are in fact alienated and silenced.  
Social practices, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors (language practices and ideology) 
inform and often determine who gets to speak. Legitimacy to utterance—and to be 
heard—is often linked to the language that is used as the means. The use of the low 
language, as a means to participate in politics, may result in the speaker being 
inaudible—not in the sense that the audience may not discern the words coming out 
his/her mouth, but in the sense that the audience may not find the message pertinent for 
the carrier is socially perceived as irrelevant. The subaltern thus can’t speak. His/her 
voice is not heard either in the official domains or in the sphere of the mass media—
unless for very short periods.  
The post-colonial state in Cape Verde (as in sub-Saharan Africa in general), like 
its colonial counterparts, has focused on establishment of authority. Language policy—
and linguistic practices carried out by the elite—constitutes viable mechanisms of 
authority enforcement. For this reason, one can extend Bourdieu’s argument that post-
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revolutionary France’s policy of linguistic unification was fundamentally about 
imposition of authority and less about communication to the case of Cape Verde.
11
 
 I have chosen Cape Verde as the case study for my analysis of quality of 
democracy exactly because of the amount of praise that the country gets in international 
media, policy circles and foreign diplomats and politicians. I have indicated in earlier 
chapters that, according to the scores provided by the index developed by the Freedom 
House, or even according to European and North American policy makers, the country is 
doing extremely well in terms of the quality of democracy. A profound and deep analysis 
of the political institutions and modes of political behavior—with a clear focus on active 
and engaging political participation beyond voting—indicates that things are not as rosy 
as they seem. Effective and real democracy is all about citizens’ participation in all 
aspects of the political life, from selecting the officials to taking part in the making and 
implementation of policies. A political regime that limits—or even hinders—its citizens’ 
ability and willingness to participate in the political debate and/or properly supervises the 
actions taken on their behalf is far from being a participating democracy. It may be the 
case that the institutions are democratic in the sense that it exist strong mechanisms of 
check and balances. Yet, these institutions on their own are not a guarantee of a 
participating democracy—for the general population, in effect, may not be participating 
in the process of surveillance of the state—which, is done from within, horizontally from 
other institutions.  
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Ordinary Cape Verdeans do not fully exercise initiatory and surveillatory 
participation. In spite of the inroads of the Cape Verdean language in public sphere, the 
Portuguese language still enjoys the predominant status. Political—and fundamentally 
public policy—life is far from being in the vernacular. The numbers of several rounds of 
Afrobarometer surveys clearly indicate such a trend. Political contacts between the 
ordinary citizens and the state officials, whether these are nominated or elected, are 
almost non-existent. The contact between the two is limited to two main events: mass 
meetings during electoral periods and inaugurating ceremonials of a public work. In these 
two cases, communication is one-sided, from the officials to the citizens. This form of 
engagement does not call for questioning by the part of the ordinary citizen.  
 At the same time, the surveys of Afrobarometer indicate that a sizeable portion of 
the society, chiefly in the rural areas, are not interested in politics nor engaged in debates 
or discussion within their circles of friends, family or neighbors. Information about the 
state and its agents are disseminated mostly through written vehicles and in Portuguese. 
Robert Dahl argues that enlightened understanding of politics is a major precondition to 
effective and engaging citizenship is correct. Not having sufficient knowledge about 
operations, procedures and processes of power limits the willingness or the content of 
public debate and discussion.  
  The last point that I want to emphasize and criticize is the direct correlation 
between size and democracy. Several thinkers and scholars have argued that small states 
tend to be democratic, or, at least, experience more democracy than large states. This 
argument can be found in writings of classical and modern thinkers ranging from 
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Aristotle, Plato, Montesquieu and Rousseau, and among contemporary empirical social 
scientists such as Larry Diamond or Dag Anckar.
12
 Diamond’s 1999 study found that 
small states are more likely to democratic than larger countries. According to this line of 
argument, small states foster democratic practices because smallness  
enhanced the opportunities for participation in and control of the 
government…made it possible for every citizen to know every other, to estimate 
his qualities, to understand his problems, to developed friendly feelings towards 
him, to analyze and discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity.
13
 
 
These scholars and thinkers have neglected a powerful variable namely language policy. 
Classical and modern thinkers did not need to bother with the question of language policy 
as they were focusing on small territories, ethnically and linguistically homogenous. 
Contemporary empirical scholars. Contemporary empirical scholars, whose studies tend 
to follow the large-N comparative approach, frequently neglect the fact that many of the 
micro-states are post-colonial states, where a linguistic hierarchy has been fostered since 
the colonial times. Where geography works toward approximation and shortening of 
distance between social and political actors, linguistic landscape effectively create a 
social divide that hinders full and engaging political participation by the speakers of the 
socially devalued languages. In terms of political participation, size may not be as 
significant as the language policy that is implemented, either de facto or de jure, in a 
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 For the position of ancient and classical thinkers see Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy 
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given state. The case of Cape Verde, as analyzed throughout this dissertation, indicates 
that in spite of its smallness, a linguistic wall divides the elite and the ordinary citizens, 
leading to an increase de-politicization of the latter. Effective, real and participatory 
democracy can become a fact when politics, in its all different phases, is in the 
vernacular.  
 
Towards Effective Democracy  
There is an analytical and real value of thinking about a democratic continuum. The 
notion that states and polities in general could be classified in two major camps, in 
democratic and non-democratic, is problematic as this type of classification tend to 
overlook subtle and understated processes that minimize and curtail ordinary citizens’ 
political participation. Moreover, methodologically speaking such a classification would 
eventually result in the problem of “conceptual stretching,” as noted by Sartori.14  
Democracy is better thought in terms of “gradation.”15 The democratic continuum 
implies the use of a referential against which empirical cases are to be compared and 
contrasted.
16
 The democratic referential does need to not be an actual and existing 
regime. Rather it is a mental construction, an ideal type in the Weberian sense, whose 
main characteristics is the full application of the etymology of the word: the unlimited 
and unconstrained rule of the people, in all aspects. The closer the regime approximates 
to this democratic referential the higher its quality (see figure 8).    
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Figure 8. The Democratic Continuum 
 
The Schumpeterian model of democracy, while it permits and encourages great 
political effervescence at the top, dictates departicipation during non-electoral periods.
17
 
This model of democracy is problematic for the following reasons. First, it creates what 
can be called “policy paternalism.” This means that citizens are only to choose indirectly 
the policies to be made and implemented. The choice is made through the elections of 
those who would form the government. Accordingly, a vote for a candidate A or for the 
party A is a vote for the candidate policy proposals.  This political model may ultimately 
create a the-political-elite-know-better culture, nurtured by the elites and the general 
population alike.     
  Second, there is an internal contradiction in the Schumpeterian model. The 
ordinary citizens’ are not to participate in the supposedly complex and difficult process of 
policy making and implementation and yet are called to discern among several policy 
packages which one best serves the needs of the polity. How can they judge about 
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 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy; Huntington The Third Wave of Democratization; 
Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.  
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policies and yet be kept out of the loop during the process of its making and 
implementation?  
There is another issue with Schumpeterian democracy in the sense that the 
conditions of the electoral period may not be constant. The party of candidate may bring 
forth a package of policy in light of their analysis of the socio-political conditions. The 
policy package that is “voted” by the people may be put aside, radically or minimally 
changed and transformed, in time, as a consequence of new conditions. Given the fact 
that these changes take place in between electoral periods, citizens are simply not asked 
to intervene nor to provide feedback regarding the changes.  
Effective democracy is the one that ordinary citizens are truly engaged in all 
different aspect of political business. Linguistic democratization is the start point towards 
effective democracy.
18
 The minimization—if not the total elimination—of influence, 
power and authority attached to one language, often at the expense of others, a process 
that can be termed linguistic democratization, facilitates political participation. For one, it 
does no matter in what language political participation is carried out.   
The leap from a Schumpeterian democracy into a more participatory democracy 
must include not only institutional reforms but also a great transformation in the 
linguistic field. Diglossia, at the level of the state and society, must be expunged if the 
goal to be attained is generalized autonomous political participation. The reform of 
political institutions on its own may not necessarily lead to greater political participation. 
                                                        
18
 This point was somehow developed by Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy who argued that diglossic 
language policy in post-colonial African states ultimately resulted in political marginalization of the general 
citizens. For more on this see Ali Al'Amin Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa 
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For instance, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy such as public hearing 
or town hall meetings would not stir participation in the debates if those reforms were not 
accompanied by a new way of thinking and acting upon the languages that are used in the 
community. One can only imagine how the nonspeakers of the high language would feel 
in a public discussion, in which the main vehicle is that high language.  
A quality democracy implies that the state-citizen relation be a direct one. This 
relationship in order to be truly direct must eliminate obstacles that invite the intervention 
of a third party. A diglossic language policy, which creates a linguistic hiatus between the 
political and social domains, is an example of an obstacle that I refer above. Legibility of 
the state means the state’s political and bureaucratic communication should be in a 
language that the common man and woman easily understand.   
The idea of making the state legible—that is, to foster the understanding of its 
policies, operations, procedures and processes—is gaining wide acceptance among policy 
makers and intellectual community. It is important to note two examples. Legal scholars 
across the globe have created an international non-governmental organization (Clarity 
International), whose main objective is the replacement of legalese with “plain 
language.”19 On October 13, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Plain Writing 
Act of 2010. The main objective of this law is to make the state and its agencies easily 
readable to its citizens. The law requires that federal agencies use “clear Government 
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 “Clarity - Advocating plain legal language,” http://clarity-international.net/index.html (accessed on 
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communication that the public can understand and use.”20 To be a state literate—that is, 
capable of minimally understanding its procedures, processes and operations—is an 
invitation to participate in its supervision.  
There is a political value in fostering ordinary citizens’ political participation. 
Tom Lodge points out four main advantages of a participatory democracy over other 
types of political regimes. First, he notes that it brings more efficient government; then, 
he notes that more participation by the citizens is translated into a law-abiding citizenry, 
for there is a stronger inclination to respect the decisions that one has somehow taken part 
in its making; third, more participation, as it brings more knowledge about the system, 
brings in a far more “sophisticated and knowledgeable decisions.” Lastly, political 
participation has a psychological value insofar as it increases one’s own self-esteem and 
the perception of political worthiness.
21
 Citizens’ active and engaging participation in 
politics brings in double developments, at the individual and societal levels. From the 
point of view of the individual, more participation can be translated in an accumulated 
knowledge and practice of partaking in the community political affairs. The more the 
individual knows about the operations and procedures of political agents and institutions 
the more he or she is inclined to use different mechanisms of political participation. More 
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participation, therefore, breeds further participation. A case can be made that the more the 
individual autonomously partakes in the polity’s political affairs, the more he or she will 
be inclined to use and to take advantage of other mechanisms and instruments of political 
participation.  
To conclude, the heart of democracy is the ordinary citizens’ political 
participation, in its different aspects and levels. Their “occupation” of the public sphere 
and political institutions ultimately makes the regime more efficient and more responsive 
to their demands and of higher quality. Given the fact that politics rarely is a silent 
activity, it follows that language, in general, is the core of political participation. Social 
and political importance given to one language eventually has an impact on its speakers.   
 
Which Language Policy for Cape Verde? 
In this sub-section I will propose a language policy for Cape Verde. Given the historical 
difficulties and the heated debate throughout the twentieth century regarding the roles and 
functions of the two main languages that are found in the archipelago, it is imperative to 
come up with a formula that can best create a harmonious relationship with the two, 
capable of bringing a veritable “equality of esteem.”  
Before explaining the model to be proposed it is important to note that the Cape 
Verdean linguistic landscape has drastically changed in the past twenty five years or so. 
Political opening of the 1990s has brought in economic opening with the international 
world. Tourism, internal and external migration, globalization, diasporization and de-
diasporization have changed, quantitatively and qualitatively, the languages in Cape 
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Verde. For once, the Cape Verdean and Portuguese languages are no longer the only 
languages to be heard in the country. Immigrants from other parts of Africa (mainly from 
Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau) have brought with them a number of West African 
languages, which, as in the past, may penetrate the realm of the native language, leading 
to a process of re-creolization.
22
 There is also a vibrant Chinese community, engaged 
mostly in petty trade. These immigrants, as they are blending in with the local community, 
are invariably influencing the phonetics and the lexicon of the Cape Verdean language. 
At the same time, Cape Verde has become a tourist destination, catering to European 
middle class—mostly Portuguese, British, Italian and Germans. As an example, in the 
islands of Sal and Boavista the Italian language has become the informal lingua franca of 
tourism.  
Moreover, given the increasing movement of Cape Verdeans from the homeland 
to abroad (diasporization) and from the hostland to the homeland (de-diasporization), 
linguistic influences can be identified as part of the whole process of social remittance.
23
 
Given the soft power of American culture, the hostland to a relatively large and 
historically important Cape Verdean community, symbols of American English are 
increasingly entering into the Cape Verdean language.  
As the linguistic landscape has become extremely complex, with a web of 
relationship and influences among several languages—though the Portuguese language 
and Cape Verde language still occupy central position within the state and society—it 
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becomes a necessity to devise a language policy that not only will maintain the social 
importance of these two languages but also would forcefully define the linguistic 
boundaries capable of safeguarding the uniqueness and coherence of these languages. I 
should note, however, that what is proposed is no way along the purist lines that can be 
found, for instance, in the cases of language policy in France or in the Canadian Province 
of Quebec. In these two cases, a rigid system of defending the boundaries of the French 
language against a supposed “interference” of other languages, mainly English, has been 
enforced. While it is important to defend the linguistic boundaries one must never neglect 
the fact that languages are dynamic and interpenetrative. Therefore, it is normal that 
“interference” from other languages be found—chiefly at the level of the lexicon. What 
should be aimed is to control these interferences. 
A proposed language policy for Cape Verde should have three major pillars: first, 
it should bring up the status of the Cape Verdean language relatively to the Portuguese 
language. Second, Portuguese and the Cape Verdean language should maintain the 
position of primus inter pares within the linguistic concert of contemporary Cape Verde. 
Third, given the increased globalization, Cape Verdean youth should also acquire a 
global language, namely the English language, that can allow them to be fully 
incorporated in the global world. Let me develop these three pillars.  
The first pillar, concerned with elevating the social and political status of the Cape 
Verdean language as such, is mostly concerned with the interrelated status planning and 
corpus planning of the Cape Verdean language. For Gibson Ferguson, status planning 
“addresses the functions of language(s) in society, and typically involves the allocation of 
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languages to official roles in different domains – government and education, for 
instance.”24 As such, status planning is fundamentally political. Corpus planning, on the 
contrary, is the field of the technical expertise. It “addresses language form, the code 
itself, and seeks to engineer changes in that code, central among which, as summarised 
by [Charles A.] Ferguson, are graphization (the development of writing systems), 
standardization and modernization.”25  
Corpus planning of the Cape Verdean language has gone a long way. Since the 
mid-1990s that an alphabet has been proposed and, in spite of the critics who insist in not 
using it, the model is being increasingly used by experts and lay people alike. At the same 
time, in the past thirty years or so, foreign and national scholars have devoted a large 
amount of efforts in codifying the grammar and/or publishing a dictionary of the 
language.
26
 
For the case of Cape Verdean language, status planning refers to the attainment of 
de jure recognition as an official language of the state, administration, education and in 
the media. Such recognition must be enshrined not only in particular legislations but also 
in the supreme law of the country, namely the constitution. While recent changes in the 
Constitution of Cape Verde have included a clause of protection and promotion of the 
Cape Verdean language, the language is yet to be fully recognized as an official language.  
                                                        
24
 Gibson Ferguson, Language Planning and Education (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 20. 
25
 Ibid., 21. 
26
 See, for instance, Nicolas Quint, Dicionário caboverdiano português: variante de Santiago (Lisbon,  
Verbalis: 1998); Manuel Veiga, O Caboverdiano em 45 lições: estudo sociolinguístico e gramatical (Praia 
[Cape Verde]: INIC, 2002). 
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The formal and legal recognition of the Cape Verdean language as an official 
language is to be taken beyond its political symbolism. Many people argue about no need 
to take that extra step—as the Cape Verdean language has penetrated several domains 
that before independence were reserved for Portuguese only. The legal recognition of the 
Cape Verdean language is fundamentally about “equality of esteem.” The concept of 
equality of esteem was developed by J.R. Pole.
27
 Pole’s study of American political 
thought, particularly in reference to the idea of equality, is very insightful. He considers 
that there are basically three major types of equality: equality before the law, equality of 
opportunity, and equality of esteem. In regards to the first type it is implied that it all be 
at the same (underneath) position vis-à-vis the law. The last type proposed by Pole is 
equality of esteem, a concept that is related to the principle of recognition and worth.
28
 
As such the principle of equality of esteem between the Portuguese and Cape Verdean 
languages is fundamentally about providing a psychological environment in which one’s 
worth is not linked to the language that he or she speaks—which is the present situation.  
As such, the process of turning the Cape Verdean language into an official 
language of the state—along with the Portuguese language—has social psychological 
implications. While these may not be seen right away, once the language is promoted to a 
level of official domains it brings esteem and self-respect for those who can only speak 
this language. At the same time, it also has legal implication. This means that by making 
                                                        
27
 J. R. Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
28
 Carl N. Degler’s review of the book maintains the concept of equality of esteem is an indication of 
“weakness of Pole’s terminology,” as the idea should have been more “accurately [called] equality of 
worth.” See, Carl N. Degler, “Book Review: The Pursuit of Equality in American History,” California Law 
Review. 67, no. 1 (1979): 258 (italics added).  
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the Cape Verdean language the official language is to open the gates of linguistic rights 
to the common citizen, who could rightfully challenge the state to present all of its 
actions, procedures and operations in this language as well.    
The process of lifting up the status of the vernacular may have social and political 
consequences if accompanied by serious allocation of resources that go beyond 
declaratory policies. For instance, the employment of the vernacular as a language of 
education in the first years of schooling may result in a more positive attitude vis-à-vis 
the mother tongue. Children’s understanding of the worthiness of the mother tongue 
would grow. At the same time, when the mother tongue is the language of instruction, the 
process of grasping academic subjects becomes relatively less difficulty.  
The second pillar of a language policy for Cape Verde is about guaranteeing a 
solid position for the two historical languages, Portuguese and the Cape Verdean Creole. 
While the history of Portuguese language in Cape Verde is the history of imposition and 
violence, it has nonetheless become part of the Cape Verdean psyche. In fact, Portuguese 
has been used as the medium to define, imagine, construct and invent the nation more 
than the Cape Verdean language ever was. Literature in Cape Verde is a literature in the 
Portuguese language. That is to say, the philosophical and ontological imagination of the 
nation and its culture has almost always been through the medium of Portuguese. At the 
same time, there is a sociological inclination in accepting Portuguese as part of the 
national patrimony. Intellectuals and political activists, ranging from Amilcar Cabral to 
contemporary writers such as Germano Almeida or Manuel Veiga, recognize that the 
Portuguese language is here to stay.  
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Within Cape Verdean and among Cape Verdeans residing abroad, the two 
languages, Portuguese and Cape Verdean language, are to be given a special treatment by 
the public authorities. The state should promote the use of these two languages, 
particularly within the context of Cape Verde. Foreigners, residing or sojourning in Cape 
Verde, are to become a target of language diffusion policy.   
As noted above, the linguistic landscape of Cape Verde has drastically changed 
with a number of other languages found in the islands—either via a community of 
immigrants, tourists and/or influence from the global diffusion of the English language. 
The linguistic landscape of contemporary Cape Verde can be simplified as following: 
along with the two historical languages, one finds a set of superstrate and substrate 
languages (see table 4.2). The classification of the languages in terms of their superstrate 
or substrate status results from the actual and perceived importance and status of the 
language by the local community. While European languages, such as English or Italian, 
are highly valued, West African languages such as Wolof, brought in by the Senegalese 
community, are not as valued.  
  
Table 15. Contemporary Linguistic Landscape in Cape Verde 
Position of the Languages    Languages   Modes of Penetration  
Superstrate Language     English   Global Media; Diaspora 
      Italian   Tourism   
      French    Tourism; Immigrants  
Cape Verdean Language 
Portuguese  
  
Substrate Languages     Mandarin  International Migration 
Wolof  International Migration   
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 This means that multidimensional language contacts have developed between 
Cape Verdean language or Portuguese, on the one hand, and other foreign languages. 
Yet, interferences in the Cape Verdean or Portuguese languages do not derive from all 
the languages that are found in the country. Rather on the contrary, some languages 
simply have not had any impact in recent linguistic developments of either Portuguese or 
the Cape Verdean language. The same cannot be said in relation to the case of the 
English language. In popular, scholarly and political discourse, English lexica have 
become conspicuous. Lexical borrowings, either into Cape Verdean language or 
Portuguese, derive mainly from the superstrate languages—particularly from the English 
language. A sample of recent policy concepts from the government reveals such a state of 
affairs. Concepts such as Cluster do Mar, workshop, Business Incubator Center, offshore, 
meeting, chip, and the like.
29
 
 As such, political and policy languages have become increasingly a sphere of 
interference of the English language. A policy proposal that brings in an English concept 
represents modernity and incorporation in the globalized world. More often than not the 
concepts that are brought in already have a corresponding term in Portuguese and/or in 
Cape Verdean language. Even if the concept have no correspondence in the two 
languages, there are other creative ways of linguistic borrowing instead of the simply 
inclusion of an English concept in the political and policy communication.  
                                                        
29
 “Ministro do Ensino Superior aponta ‘energia empreendedora como nova riqueza das Nações’” Sapo 
April 30, 2012,  http://noticias.sapo.cv/inforpress/artigo/186961.html (accessed January 13, 2013). See 
official governmental documents such as Government of Cabo Verde, Programa do Governo para a VII 
Legislatura 2006-2011 (Praia: Concelho de Ministros 2006); Government of Cabo Verde, Programa do 
Governo para a VII Legislatura 2011-2016 (Praia: Concelho de Ministros 2011).  
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Table 16. Major Foreign Communities in Cape Verde 
Community     Total (percentage)  
Guinea-Bissau     19,8%  
Portugal     13,8%  
China      13,7%  
Nigeria      11,5%  
Senegal      11,3%  
Source: Francisco Avelino Carvalho, Migração em Cabo Verde perfil nacional 2009 (Geneva: Organização 
Internacional para as Migrações, 2010), 21.  
  
 The goal of this proposal is to create an environment that is propitious for the 
establishment of a veritable bilingualism, sprinkled with doses of international languages 
such as English or French. This means that the language policy to be advanced should 
provide resources that make most of the people comfortable in speaking the two 
languages. This situation may be related, for instance, with the cases of Scandinavian 
states, where, through a calculated policy, bilingualism has become a way of life: besides 
the national language, English has increasingly become the other language of the country.   
However, Cape Verde, historically a nation of emigrants and now a touristic 
destination cannot stop at these two languages. As a Global Nation and historically the 
“crossroads of the Atlantic,” Cape Verde should not limit itself with the two languages. 
Efforts should be made to turn a number of its citizens fluent in international languages 
such as English and/or French. Given that there is a sizeable number of Cape Verdeans 
residing in Anglophone and Francophone states (across the Atlantic world) the task is 
practicable and relatively inexpensive.
30
  
                                                        
30
 The term “Global Nation” (Nação Global) is a term employed by the Government of Cape Verde. See, 
for instance, Government of Cabo Verde, Programa do Governo para a VII Legislatura 2011-2016. Praia: 
Concelho de Ministros 2011. For the concept of “crossroads of the Atlantic,” see Bentley Duncan, op. cit.  
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Neto, Sérgio. Colónia mártir, colónia modelo: Cabo Verde no pensamento ultramarino 
 português (1925-1965). Coimbra: Imprensa Universidade de Coimbra, 2009.  
 
Nyerere, Julius K. Ujamaa—Essay on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
 
Nyirabu, Mohabe. “The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the 
 Ruling  Party.” African Journal of Political Science 7, no. 2 (2002): 99-112. 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.  
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo A., Jorge Vargas Cullel, and Osvaldo Miguel Iazzetta. The Quality 
 of Democracy: Theory and Applications. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre 
 Dame Press, 2004.  
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 
 55-69.  
 
_____________. “Democracy, law, and comparative politics.” Studies in Comparative 
 International Development 36, No. l (2001): 7-36.  
 
Oliveira, Joao Nobre de. A Imprensa Cabo-Verdiana 1820-1975. Macau: Fundação 
 Macau, 1998.  
 
O’Meara, Dan. Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of 
 Afrikaner  Nationalism, 1934-1948. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1983. 
 
Omer-Cooper, J. D. A History of Southern Africa. London: J. Currey, 1987.  
 
Parkin, Michael, and Frances Zlotnick. “English Proficiency and Latino Participation in 
 U.S. Elections.” Politics & Policy 39, 4 (2011): 515-537.  
  
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge [England]: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1970.     
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